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Preface
Models come in many variations. Some are used for describing an object, pro-
cess, system or other entity in a simplified way. What simplification means is
at least partly up to the persons or groups for whom the models are presented.
Other types of models are more mathematical in nature. Sometimes they are used
as calculation devices, e.g. in determining how a one-percentage point increase
in inflation influences the level of unemployment. One could make a distinction
between models for thinking and models for solution. The former are relatively
loose constructs useful in analyzing, explaining or predicting what is happening.
The latter, in turn, are often policy-making instruments. Political economy as
the study of phenomena, structures and processes of interaction between poli-
tics and economics makes use of both types of model. The models for solution
are typically advanced versions of models for thinking and, therefore, in this
introductory text we shall concentrate on the simpler class of models. In other
words, we shall focus on models that are mainly used in describing and analyzing
interactions of individuals, institutions and organizations.
This book is intended for the first text on modeling of political economy. I have
tried to keep the technical details of models pretty much in the background,
putting the emphasis on a relatively broad overview of various modeling ap-
proaches and their basic principles. In terms of mathematical background required
for successful independent study of this text, no more than high school mathemat-
ics is assumed. In section 8.7 we make use of the first derivative of a continuous
function, but even there the argument should be accessible without knowledge
of calculus.
The text is intended to be used as material in a one-semester course on political
economy. Since this text is an introduction to models, it would fit nicely together
with another, more substance-oriented introduction to political economy.
During the relatively long period of time in which this book was written I have
incurred numerous intellectual debts. It is a pleasure to acknowledge these debts
now and express my sincere gratitude to the following persons and institutions.
My colleagues Hannu Salonen and Matti Wiberg of University of Turku read the
manuscript and made me aware of several errors in an earlier version. A similar
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role was played by Tommi Meskanen, who not only checked the more technical
parts of the text but also devised the algorithms for computations reported in
section 6.4. My research associates Juha Helin, Elina Kestilä and Maria Suojanen
have carefully read the manuscript and suggested several improvements. Some
parts of the manuscript were also commented upon by Antti Pajala. I am also
grateful to Rob Langham and Terry Clague of Routledge for encouragement and
support. The work on this project was made possible by my former and present




This book deals with the tools needed for understanding political, social and
economic life. Our main subject, political economy, gained – according to a
widely held view – the status of a distinct area of study in the 18th and 19th
centuries, in other words, well before the modern disciplinary classification was
introduced. The early practitioners of political economy were moral philoso-
phers rather than economists or political scientists. The devolution of economics,
sociology and political science from the master science, philosophy, was still
many decades away at the time when Adam Smith and David Hume outlined
their ideas of political economy. In his classic treatise of 1776, the former defined
political economy as follows (Smith [1776] 1961):
Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or
legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first to provide a plentiful revenue
or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide
such a revenue or subsistence for themselves: and secondly, to supply the
state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services.
It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.
Some 70 years later, James Mill ([1844] 1995) resorted to a familiar analogy:
Political Economy is to the State what domestic economy is to the family.
…[Political economy] has two grand objects, the Consumption of the
Community, and that Supply upon which the consumption depends.
Smith’s definition is phrased in a manner familiar from the early modern polit-
ical science literature. The main task of scientific activity was to be of assistance
for rulers (see Skinner 1978). The origins of the modern political science can
be traced to the mirror-of-princes texts of the 15th and 16th centuries. These
aimed at counseling princes in their search for virtue and greatness. In Smith’s
view the task of political economy is to assist the rulers in providing well-
being to their subjects and in securing the necessary means for running what
would today be called the public sector. In Mill’s definition, what distinguishes
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political economy from household economy are the actors, not the activities.
Both economies depend on the satisfaction of consumption and supply needs.
The classic views basically amount to extending the principles of running a
successful household to a new domain, namely to the affairs of the state. Political
economy was seen as an essential aspect of statecraft. The provision for consump-
tion and the requisite supply assume a view of the operation and organization
of the actors involved. Despite the strong emphasis on statecraft, the authors of
the classical period did not envisage much of a role for the state or statesmen
in the running of the economy. Left alone by the state, private economic agents
(consumers, producers, merchants, etc.), while pursuing their own interests, were
supposed to bring about outcomes that are collectively optimal. Thus, the markets
were assumed to regulate themselves with beneficial outcomes for both the state
and the people. In fact, the classic authors all but did away with the ‘political’
in political economy.
This approach was strongly opposed by Marx who questioned the evolutionary
mechanism underlying the classical view. While Smith had argued that markets
emerge as a result of the welfare maximization pursuit of the actors and can
be viewed as facilitating this pursuit, Marx questioned the ‘arrow of causality’
of the theory, namely that the individual interests bring about the economic
organization known as markets (see Marx [1939] 1973). In Marx’s view it was
rather the economic organization with its production relationships that deter-
mined the individual interests. The production relationships, in their turn, were
based on the development of the productive forces. The Marxist analysis entailed
a considerable enlargement of the scope of political economy. Most importantly,
the class structure of the society was to be seen as part and parcel of political
economy.
The neoclassical view of political economy agrees with the classic one in
treating the economy as an analytically separable subsystem of the society, but
introduces new philosophical and technical elements. To wit, the foundations of
economic behavior were sought in the utilitarianism and marginal calculus was
invented to explain the workings of the economies (see Caporaso and Levine
1992: 79–99). With the assignment of utilities to outcomes and to actions pro-
ducing them, the domain of political economy widened from the classical one to
cover basically all human action.
Over the span of some 200 years, the concept of political economy has thus
acquired several distinct meanings. Most definitions, however, share the idea
of an interaction of two conceptually distinct societal subsystems – the political
subsystem and the economic one. It would thus seem possible to use this idea as
the focal point in outlining the proper domain of the concept. Unfortunately, the
concept of politics is equally multi-faceted. In various times and places, politics
has denoted the art of government, power, public affairs, authoritative allocation
of scarce resources and conflict management (see e.g. Heywood 1997: 4–12).
Also the concept of economy takes on several meanings. This is the case not
only in everyday parlance but also in the texts of the prominent authorities of
political economy. In the classic political economy writings of Smith stressing the
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separation of the economy from politics, the former seems to pertain to markets
and the behavior of actors in market transactions. But there is also another mean-
ing attached to the concept of economy in Smith’s (and also in Marx’s) view.
In this meaning, economy consists of particular types of activities, namely those
related to production of goods and services (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 24).
Production and exchange are thus the basic characteristics of an economy. There
is, however, a third more general connotation of ‘economic’. This relates to the
reasoning underlying economic activities. It is their deliberative and calculating
nature that makes them economic (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 21–24). What
makes a deliberation economic is the importance given to costs and benefits as
well as the suitability of means to ends. Economy in this sense can obviously be
extended far beyond production and exchange.
Even though the concept of economics is less disputed, it seems – given
the wide disagreement over the meaning of politics – difficult to delineate the
domain of political economy as an intersection of two reasonably well-defined
subsystems. A more promising approach might be to concentrate on what kinds
of activities are involved in political economy. Caporaso and Levine (1992) see
the common core of various views on political economy in systems of want satis-
faction. This certainly includes the classic and neoclassic views. Also the Marxian
concept would seem to fall within the realm of this abstract characterization.
On the other hand, systems of want satisfaction as such may include ones that we
would not like to count as parts of political economy. For example, a family may
establish a ‘system’ for allowing smokers to indulge in their habit in a designated
room to minimize the inconvenience for non-smokers without depriving the
smokers of their short-term pleasure. While this system is undoubtedly related to
want satisfaction, it does not belong to political economy in the intuitive sense
of the term. The reason for this conclusion is that the system in question is
not public in the sense that matters political are thought to be. So, while the
notion of want satisfaction captures an essential aspect of political economy,
it is too wide to provide a definition of it.
In this book we adopt a characterization of political economy that rests largely
on one of the concepts of economics mentioned above, namely one emphasizing
the reasoning underlying the activity. We shall define political economy as the
application of means–ends reasoning to behavior in the public realm. In other
words, we see the defining feature of political economy in the calculus that
economic and political actors resort to in political and economic life. Understood
in this sense, the concept of political economy includes that of public choice
(Mueller 2003: 1). The latter is commonly defined as the application of economic
reasoning to non-market settings, in general, and to politics, in particular. Thus,
political economy is essentially wider than public choice in applying similar
reasoning to economy as well as to politics. Our particular focus renders the
distinction between public choice and political economy inconsequential since
what we shall be dealing with is the type of reasoning that has been called
economic. Whether it is being applied to politics or economy is of secondary
importance in our analysis.
4 Introduction
Extending the idea of economic reasoning to non-market settings is tempt-
ing mainly because the principles of this reasoning can be expressed in a concise
way. The specification of those principles and their analysis has been the primary
contribution of the rational choice theory. At the outset this theory was mainly
preoccupied with setting up the principles of behavior in fairly stable environ-
ments. So, for example, in classic political economy the profit maximization in
markets was viewed as an important instance of rational behavior. At the same
time the properties of the markets as an institution were discussed by Smith and
his followers. The political economy of today is interested not only in the prin-
ciples of market behavior but in analogous principles in other spheres of human
life. However, along with the behavior principles, the properties of the institu-
tions are very much focused upon also. This focus is a natural consequence of
the observation that principles of rationality may differ in different institutional
environments. A given type of behavior may result in desired outcomes in cer-
tain institutional settings, but may fail to do so in others. Consequently, if one’s
interest is in securing certain types of outcomes, both the prevailing institutions
and the behavior principles they are likely to be accompanied with should be
taken into account. In fact, in terms of the likelihood of achieving certain types
of outcomes, it becomes possible to talk about rational institutions in the means–
ends sense. Thus, the principles of rationality can, under some circumstances,
be extended to institutions as well as to behavior principles.
Our discussion will proceed as follows. In the next chapter we introduce some
basic concepts of philosophy of science with the aim of specifying how the
current research in political economy relates to the most common goals of scien-
tific inquiry. Although political economy as a field can be viewed as sui generis,
the research into it may well be characterized using the standard vocabulary
of philosophy of science. The next chapter introduces the basic agent of the
political economy, economic man or homo œconomicus. This idealized agent is
fundamental to political economy which in its neoclassical version approaches
its research object from the point of view of choice under various types of
constraints. Choices, in turn, are seen as the results of calculus or deliberation
or, more generally, decision making. Thus, the chapter on homo œconomicus
will dwell on the principles of decision making. This discussion is based on
an assumption of a passive environment which, of course, runs counter to the
intuitive view of the decision settings in political economy. Therefore, the next
chapter introduces other deliberating agents and outlines the basic ingredients of
the theory of games, one of the primary tools of modern political economy.
Group decision theory can be viewed as an extension of game theory to the
setting where members of a group make collective decisions, for example on the
provision of collective goods. However, this theory has emerged largely indepen-
dently of game theory and forms a link between market behavior and the design
of institutions. These two subjects will be introduced and analyzed in separate
chapters. The chapters on evaluation of public policies and theories of justice
are basically applications of game and group choice theory to political economy.
However, the former uses results from other fields as well, notably from multiple
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criterion decision theory and the theory of aggregation. The theories of justice,
in turn, introduce new concepts, namely those related to fairness, into the theory
of political economy. While most of the game and decision theoretic literature
emphasizes efficiency, it is obvious that considerations pertaining to justice also
enter the design and evaluation of institutions in political economy.
The crucial concept of this text is that of decision. Political economy consists
of structures, events, developments and patterns in which human decisions play
a central role. Therefore, a text on the models of political economy must devote
primary attention to analyzing the basic ingredients of decision making. We shall
begin by focusing first on decisions in stable and non-reactive environments to
become familiar with the basic vocabulary as well as with the essential perfor-
mance criteria. The first model is thus one with one active agent, the decision
maker, aiming at specified goals resorting to the choices available to him/her
(hereinafter, her). We then proceed to strategic environments by introducing
other agents with similar or different goals and choice options. In group choice
settings the new element is the institutional framework within which the choices
are made. With strategic actors acting under specified institutional constraints we
have the basic tools for modeling political economy. Extending these to cover
settings where institutions also undergo change (evolution) or can be deliberately
designed to achieve certain ends is the subject of the last chapters of this text.
1.1 Suggested reading
In addition to the Caporaso and Levine (1992) text referred to above there are
several treatises that aim to cover the entire field of political economy. Hillman
(2003) and Mueller (2003) are excellent – and extensive – overviews of the
relevant literature. Both authors have also made important contributions to the
research in the field of political economy. Dahl and Lindblom (1976) as well as
Lindblom (1977) are often regarded as a modern classic in political economy.
Freeman (1989) provides a systematic comparison of several politico-economic
systems and a concise exposition of the main theoretical approaches. A useful
introductory text is Przeworski (2003). For advanced readers, Austen-Smith and
Banks (1999, 2005) as well as Persson and Tabellini (2000) are excellent texts,
the former with an emphasis on political theory and the latter on determinants
of economic policy. There are two major periodicals specializing in political
economy: Journal of Political Economy and European Journal of Political Econ-
omy, but several others, e.g. Social Choice and Welfare, Public Choice, Homo
Oeconomicus and Economics of Governance, also regularly publish articles in
this field.
2 What are we aiming at?
Research in political economy is motivated by a wide variety of reasons. Some
authors aim at making policy recommendations, others point to successes and/or
failures in economic policy. Some works aim at making sense of what happened
in the past, while others strive for predicting the future. Some writers derive their
research problems from scholarly literature, others from everyday political and
economic events. On closer inspection, these and many other motivations can be
reduced to a fairly small number of basic goals of scientific inquiry: explanation,
prediction, causal attribution and theory building. These have been extensively
dealt with in philosophy of science. In this chapter our focus is on what this
field of research tells us about these basic goals of scientific work. Admittedly
there may be other, more personal goals involved in scholarly work; for example,
authors may aim at fostering their academic careers and/or at impressing their
colleagues. These motivations belong to the field of sociology and psychology
of science which is beyond the scope of the present work.1
2.1 Explaining political economy
In political economy, as in many other fields of research, the interests of scholars
and laymen often differ. Yet there are also problems that both of these parties
deem important. These are typically related to major politico-economic events,
such as major policy statements, unexpected changes in developmental trends
or emergence of new institutions. Thus, few would doubt either the scholarly
or lay importance of President Roosevelt’s announcement on 8 December 1941
which amounted to the United States joining the Second World War against
Germany and Japan. Similarly, the economic policy announcements of Alan
Greenspan and Jean-Claude Trichet concerning the monetary policy of Federal
Reserve and European Central Bank, respectively, are of obvious interest for
both researchers and citizens as are, albeit for different reasons, the decisions
of the main actors (primarily the chief executive officer and the chief financial
officer) in the course of events that led to one of the largest corporate downfalls
in history, the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation in December of 2001 (see e.g.
Bryce 2002).
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Also the European Council decision made in Laeken, Belgium in mid-
December of 2001 to commence the framing of a constitution for the European
Union by setting up a convention was a decision of both academic and practical
importance. In 2004 the convention published its proposal for the constitutional
treaty of Europe. It outlines the basic rights of the citizens of the European Union,
the legal competency of the Union, its basic institutions and their working prin-
ciples, the financing of the Union and many other more specific regulations.
The ratification process began in the member countries in 2005. Some coun-
tries decided to subject the treaty proposal to a referendum. In early summer of
2005, the proposal was rejected in two referenda: one in France and one in the
Netherlands.
With regard to the decisions and events just described it is natural to ask why
they were made or why they took place. Answers to these questions are normally
called explanations of the respective decisions or events. Thus, when a historian
points to the air force attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the ensuing
policy planning discussions in the United States government which, a day later,
culminated in the declaration of war against Japan, what she aims to provide
is an explanation of the event. Similarly, the accounts reporting the debates
in boardrooms of Federal Reserve and European Central Bank are intended as
explanations for the decisions announced by the respective chairmen. In a similar
vein, the explanation of what caused the nosedive of Enron’s stock market value
in 2001 is sought in the decisions made by its leadership.
At first sight, the explanations of the same events and decisions may vary from
one audience to another. What is a good explanation for a normal 5-year-old child
may not convince an adult with university degree and vice versa. There seems
to be an inherently subjective element involved in explanations. This is a proper
subject for psychology or sociology of science. What philosophy of science,
especially its analytic tradition, has attempted to do is to provide objective general
criteria for valid explanations. Of particular importance is Carl Hempel’s (1965)
program which aims at setting up general requirements to be fulfilled by any
account, presented in any field of inquiry, in order to be considered scientific
explanation.
Carl Hempel (1905–1997) was one of the leading representatives of the analytic
tradition in the philosophy of science. A student of the great names of the famous
Vienna Circle – Carnap, Schlick and Waisman – he received his doctorate in
Berlin. In 1930s he emigrated first to Belgium and later to the US where he taught
at Yale, Princeton and Berkeley. His main works are related to concept formation,
confirmation theory and the nature of scientific explanation (Murzi 2001).
The basic idea in Hempel’s view is that explanations are arguments.
Arguments, in turn, are statement sequences arranged so that some statements –
called conclusions or, in the present contexts, explananda (in singular,
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explanandum) – can be derived from others – called premises or explanantia
(in singular, explanans). Of particular importance is deductive derivation. In his
earliest models of explanation Hempel insisted that explananda be derivable from
explanantia as in a deductive argument (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). Deduc-
tive arguments are characterized by the property that once their premises are true,
their conclusions must also be true. Thus, in a valid explanation the thing to be
explained must be linked to statements that are (i) true, and (ii) must logically
entail what is to be explained. The essential feature is that, given the information
contained in the premises, the event to be explained was to be expected (Hempel
1965: 367–368). In later accounts, Hempel retreats somewhat from the strict
deducibility requirement, but not from the desideratum that, given explanantia,
the explananda are to be expected.2
In scientific explanation as seen by Hempel, the statements that explain a
fact or phenomenon contain universal laws, i.e. statements that maintain some
necessary connection between certain types of facts or phenomena. Paramount
examples of these statements are laws of nature which connect, for example,
volume, pressure and temperature of gases. To explain phenomena amounts to
showing that they are in fact instances of a general law that covers these types
of phenomena. For this reason Hempel’s view is often called the covering law
account of explanation.
When applying Hempel’s idea to human sciences, the first problem we
encounter is that, at least intuitively, much – indeed, most – of our behavior
is not subject to law-like regularities. This is, of course, not to say that there
are no laws of behavior, but, at least, our present day knowledge does not
include them to the extent that one could argue that many – let alone most –
social science explanations were based on them.3 Yet, explanations abound in
the social sciences, but rather than law-like universal statements they typically
invoke more restricted invariances or tendencies which may include exceptions.
So, the increase in investment is often explained by the decrease in the interest
rates, even though some investors may – for various reasons – decrease their
investments. Similarly, a person’s higher than average income may be explained
by her university degree, although not all persons with degrees make higher than
average earnings.
Now, Hempel would undoubtedly argue that the two examples are not gen-
uine explanations, but at best explanation sketches insofar as they do not contain
proper laws among their premises. There is no law stating that whenever interest
rates are decreased, there will be an increase in investment, or that whoever
acquires a university degree will necessarily earn more than she would have
done without it. Rather than natural laws we are dealing here with regulari-
ties that allow for exceptions, often a large number of them. Nevertheless, many
explanations in political economy are precisely of this type. They conform to two
basic Hempelian requirements, namely that the explanatory premises are held to
be true and that, given the facts stated in those premises, the explanandum was
to be expected. But they are not deductive arguments showing that, given the
What are we aiming at? 9
premises, it was necessary that the explanandum took place. Thereby, the
ordinary explanations in political economy do not satisfy the symmetry of
explanation and prediction, a hallmark of Hempel’s basic explanation model.
Making the event to be explained highly likely is, however, not always enough,
in the absence of natural laws. A well-known example is the account that purports
to explain a person’s recovery from the common cold in a period of a week
by stating that she consumed daily amounts of vitamin C, and that there is a
regularity which states that anyone taking vitamin C regularly will overcome the
common cold within a week (Salmon 1971: 33). The problem with this account
is that even if the premises of the purported explanation were true, they are
essentially irrelevant given the fact that most people recover from a cold within a
week regardless of their vitamin consumption. So, even true premises that make
the explanandum highly likely may not amount to an acceptable explanation.
The regularities included in the explanatory premises have to be relevant to the
occurrence of the event explained.
But what do we mean by relevance in the context of explanation? The basic
reason for rejecting the just-mentioned explanation is that it points to a mechanism
that has nothing to do with the event to be explained. Consuming vitamin C has
no effect on recovery from a cold within a week of its inception. The irrelevance
is due to the independence of the fact to be explained and the proposed factors: the
recovery would ensue even without the vitamin consumption. This independence,
in turn, rests on what we currently hold as true mechanisms of human physiology.
In a similar vein, when explaining the fact that the United States declared a war
against Japan, we look for acts, factors and phenomena that are true, make the
declaration likely and are relevant for the occurrence of the explanandum. Since
the latter is a symbolic event, the search for explanatory premises calls for an
analysis of perceptions, anticipations, goals and choice opportunities of relevant
actors rather than finding a relevant set of natural laws from which an objective
state of affairs can be deduced. For within the framework of our knowledge the
relevant mechanism resulting in the fact to be explained consists of these types of
considerations. The accounts of the war declaration and other examples presented
in the beginning of this section differ from the Hempelian one in allowing for
mechanisms that are not law-like in the sense of natural laws.
To explain something is, thus, to demonstrate that this something was to be
expected, given knowledge of the premises. So, at first sight the only thing that
distinguishes explanation from prediction is that in the former the phenomenon
we are interested in has already occurred, while in the latter it has not. But we can
predict things without really understanding how they come about. For example,
on the basis of everyday observations without any knowledge of the celestial
mechanics we may predict that night is followed by day. Yet, it would be diffi-
cult to call this an explanation of any particular break of dawn since it gives us no
answer to the question of why the sun rises. The description of our solar system
provides such an answer, showing once again that in a genuinely scientific expla-
nation predictive accuracy needs to be accompanied with relevant regularities.
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2.2 Building theories
In the analytic tradition of philosophy of science, explanations are related to
theories through laws. Laws play a crucial role in explanations and they are the
building blocks of scientific theories. More precisely, theories are hierarchically
organized systems of laws. Each law is positioned on a certain level of abstrac-
tion which means that it is on the very highest level or derivable from more
abstract laws. In either case it allows for less abstract laws and other statements
to be derived from itself. To give an example, we might have a general theory
of human behavior. From this we should be able to derive the theory of polit-
ical behavior and economic behavior as specifications of the general theory in
restricted environments.
This example is very close to the notion of theory one encounters in political
economy. Its highest level consists of the principles of rational choice behavior.
From these one then proceeds towards empirical observations via various envi-
ronmental specifications. Thus, we have the theory of choice under certainty,
risk and uncertainty. Postulating a strategic multi-actor environment leads to
the theory of games. Various further specifications yield the theory of mecha-
nism design, bargaining and electoral institutions. Most of these will be dealt
with in the following chapters. Before going into the details of these and other
theories, let us relate them to the basic concept apparatus of philosophy of
science.
It is obvious that the theory of choice behavior differs in several important
respects from the concept of theory encountered in advanced natural sciences, e.g.
in elementary particle physics, mechanics or organic chemistry. Firstly, instead
of natural laws determining the behavior of the objects of study, the theory of
choice consists of principles of behavior which the objects (human individuals)
may choose not to obey. The awareness of the objects of study of the principles
that determine their behavior is a consideration that is absent in natural sciences.
Thus, the principles are necessarily of a contingent nature. Secondly, the theory
of choice is clearly incomplete in the technical sense of the term. Completeness
of a theory means that all statements known to be true of the domain of reality
that the theory speaks of are derivable from it. An extensive body of evidence
suggests that this is not the case in the theory of choice. In many contexts the
choice behavior derivable from the theory blatantly contradicts empirical obser-
vations. Thus at best the theory is applicable in restricted rather than universal
domains.
As Giere (1979: 63) points out, if anything is the goal of scientific activ-
ity, scientific theory is. It not only contains a set of established laws, but can
also be used in pushing the frontier of knowledge further. Theories together
with empirical specifications suggest new hypotheses for empirical work. For
example, from decision theory one can derive a number of predictions, i.e.
statements describing choice behavior in specified contexts. Confronting these
predictions with empirical findings on the choice behavior of real world actors,
one is able to evaluate the theory itself. In fact, the hypothetico-deductive method
What are we aiming at? 11
Figure 2.1 Easton’s political system view.
consists of systematically confronting the predictions of a theory with empirical
material.
Theories have thus a double role in scholarly work: they present the achieved
results (laws) in condensed form and, with the aid of empirical observations,
allow for the evaluation of our knowledge. As a caveat, one should add that this
view of theories does not cover all usages of the term. Very often ‘theory’ means
no more than a concept apparatus used in describing reality. For example, the
diagrammatic description of political systems devised by David Easton (1965:
112) does not contain laws organized in hierarchical fashion, but merely a frame-
work for categorizing observations (Figure 2.1). Yet, this framework is often
called a systems theory. This is quite legitimate, but confuses two important
aspects of scientific work, namely the evaluation of statements or statement
systems on the one hand, and using concepts in describing reality on the other.
To keep these two aspects separate it would be advisable to employ another
concept for constructs that are mainly descriptive rather than explanatory or pre-
dictive tools. An obvious candidate for such a concept is that of a model which,
in fact, is used by Easton in outlining Figure 2.1.
2.3 Models
The concept of a model takes on many different meanings in everyday and scien-
tific parlance. Thus we may encounter miniature models of buildings and vessels,
mathematical models of natural or social processes, role models and model
theory, to name just a few prominent usages. Achinstein (1968: 209–225)
suggests a threefold classification: (i) representational models, (ii) theoretical
models, and (iii) imaginary models. In the first class we find true, distorted and
analog models. The unifying characteristic is that the models represent an object.
A representational model is a man-made construct that represents something
which is not necessarily man-made. It is primarily a tool enabling the analysis
or experimentation of the entity of which it is a model. The use of these types
of models in political economy is very restricted. Perhaps the best examples are
gaming models of, say, international trade, where persons represent countries
and the idea is to learn something about the interaction between countries with
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Theoretical models in Achinstein’s terminology refer to constructs that char-
acterize the object of study in theoretical terms. Examples from physics include
the corpuscular model of light which states that light is basically a set of moving
particles, and Bohr’s model of atom which makes specific assumptions regarding
the position and movements of nucleus and electrons (Achinstein 1968: 212). The
defining features of this model concept is that rather than representing its object
it states some assumptions regarding the object. Thus, the above two examples
claim something about the research object, namely that light is basically particle
movement and that electrons relate to nuclei in a specific manner. The property
that distinguishes theoretical models from theories proper is that they do not
purport to describe all aspects of the research object but are intended as con-
venient simplifications useful for explaining or predicting certain phenomena or
structures. When a person says she has a theory about something, that usually
means that she is convinced that the theory is true. In contrast, if a person has a
model of something, that does not make the same truth claim. Indeed, one could
argue that by speaking of a model rather than a theory, the person ipso facto
believes that the description given in the model is not literally true, but a useful
approximation.
Theoretical models include mathematical, statistical and computational ones.
These abstract certain features of the research object and express their relation-
ships in formal expressions. The usefulness of these models stems from their
amenability to formal manipulations. The models encountered in modern political
economy are predominantly of this type, i.e. theoretical, simplified descriptions
of objects of study. However, there are also models of Achinstein’s third type,
namely imaginary models. These are distinguished from theoretical and repre-
sentational ones by not involving any commitment to the truth of the description.
Indeed, to the contrary, imaginary models make assumptions regarding the study
objects that are known to be false. The assumptions and, consequently, the mod-
els themselves are tools of thought experiments. These models are also common
tools of political economy.
The main features of models in political economy:
• they are simplified descriptions of a part of reality
• they state explicitly a set of assumptions regarding the composition and
working mechanism of the object under study
• they are constructed with manipulability in mind
• the same study object may be modeled in several different ways depending on
the use of the model (prediction, explanation or simulating past behavior)
Models are basic tools of political economy and, indeed, of many other fields
of inquiry. Amenability to analysis and experimentation is their fundamental
property. In fact, much work in political economy is focused on the study of
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models rather than the part of the world they are models of. Models are refined,
elaborated, extended and solved. In these works the borderline between theory
and model is often blurred. Sometimes the concept of theory is used in a wide,
overarching sense as, for example, in the concept of game theory which basically
covers the theoretical study of game models. In other contexts the model concept
is wider than that of a theory. For example, one can speak of solution theory
of two-person game models meaning the derivation of predictions from models
describing interaction between two persons. The wide variation in the usage of
the terms theory and model should be kept in mind when studying the texts of
political economy. In the following we use these terms in loose conformity with
the existing literature. Proposing some kind of terminological orthodoxy would
not be helpful in outlining the basic ideas.
2.4 Interpreting acts
The concepts of theory, model and explanation have been dealt with in philosophy
of science mostly from the perspective of natural sciences. Many central concepts
and ideas of social sciences are eschewed in those discussions. Of particular
significance is the interpretation of facts or phenomena. There may be phenomena
and processes that are difficult to interpret in natural sciences in the sense that
certain measurements may give rise to different views of what is happening, but
in social sciences these types of interpretation problems are essentially aggravated
by the fact that the objects of study (individuals, groups) are also interpreting
what is happening in their environment. Moreover, the interpretation can, without
any changes in the objective features, modify the observable behavior of those
objects. For example, ways of conducting negotiations may vary in different
cultures: what is considered proper in one culture (e.g. going straight to business),
may be looked upon as impolite or offensive by representatives of other cultures.
Thus, provided that law-like regularities would constitute the core of theories and
explanations also in social sciences, the interpretation of facts, acts, utterances,
etc., poses a problem not encountered in other sciences.
Consider again the example of explaining the declaration of war by the United
States in December 1941. If we were dealing with a natural event we would
be looking for laws or other regularities that connect the events of declara-
tion of war with some events of a type that occurred preceding the declaration.
A possible candidate for such a regularity would be one stating that whenever
individuals deem themselves threatened, they undertake actions to remove the
threat. The United States or, more specifically, its top leaders, felt threatened as
a consequence of the air attack on Pearl Harbor and thus resorted to measures to
remove the threat by issuing the declaration of war.
To take another example mentioned above, consider the decision of the leaders
of the European Union to set up a convention to frame a constitution for the
Union. One could again look for a regularity that connects events of the type
represented by the decision to events of the type preceding the decision in time.
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Such a regularity might be one that says that whenever faced with growing
uncertainty, individuals undertake to reduce the uncertainty by measures deemed
appropriate. In this case, the uncertainty consists of the forthcoming enlargement
of the European Union and the accompanying dramatic increase in decision-
making complexity.
Neither of the above-mentioned regularities would count as a natural law.
Yet, the explanations suggest a principle of action followed by individuals in
settings involving threat. But in human affairs, threat itself may be a matter of
interpretation. The bombardment of one’s fleet, as happened in Pearl Harbor,
is pretty obviously an unequivocal threat, but decision complexity is certainly a
matter that may be looked upon by different individuals in a different manner.
Some may see it as a threat, others an opportunity, and still others deem it as an
additional cost offset by other considerations. The crux is that in human decision-
making we shall often be dealing with situations perceived in different ways by
individuals in identical positions. Thus, natural laws are unlikely to be found
in these settings. Even in cases where event types may seem to be regularly or
causally connected to other event types involving human decisions, there is bound
to be a ‘teleological ring’ between the event types, to use von Wright’s (1971: 85)
term. Thus, even though one may observe that oppressed people regularly rebel
and occasionally manage to overthrow their oppressors, this regularity (which
is by no means without exceptions) is mediated by a phase of perception and
deliberation on the part of the oppressed which may or may not lead to an
uprising. Similar teleological rings, of course, permeate economic regularities,
e.g. ones that connect interest rate changes to investment behavior or labor costs
to capital movements.
2.5 Normative and factual models
The models we shall mainly be dealing with are built on behavior principles.
These are to economic and social theory what natural laws are to theories in
physics or chemistry. In contradistinction to the laws of natural sciences, the
principles can often be given two types of interpretations, factual and norma-
tive. By factual principle of behavior we mean regularity of observed behavior,
e.g. that people tend to raise their hand in an auditorium to attract the attention of
the speaker. The normative principle, in contrast, pertains to behavior one thinks
ought to guide behavior, e.g. that in a bus full of people young persons ought to
relinquish their seats to old ones.
Systems of factual and normative principles can be – and often are – called
theories or models. Often the principles themselves or the intended field of their
application reveals whether one is dealing with factual or normative system of
principles. But there are systems in which the dividing line is particularly thin.
Many models of political economy are in this category. There are certainly models
that are easily classifiable as factual ones, e.g. many macro-economic models
linking employment, interest rates, exchange balance, etc. But the models based
on individual behavior are sometimes difficult to classify.
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The reason for this is the notion of rationality that forms the basis of the
behavior principles in these models. Rationality is certainly a desirable property
of a pattern of behavior in many – if not all – circumstances. But it is also
natural to think that individuals act in a rational manner in matters related to
political economy. After all, as was pointed out above one of the definitions of
political economy is to see it as an economic approach to political choices. This,
in turn, amounts to postulating rational behavior on the part of the individuals.
Thus, it would seem that to the extent that events in political economy do not
coincide with those predicted by our theories, the discrepancies can be explained
by the failure of the actors to behave according to the dictates of normative
rationality.
This is, however, too simplified a view. The concept of rationality, normative
or factual, is open to a wide variety of different interpretations. In other words,
even though one may envision simple settings where nearly all reasonable people
might agree on what is the rational way to proceed, there are circumstances of
just a modicum of complexity where the dictates of rationality imply several
non-equivalent ways of behavior. We shall discuss these in the next chapter.
Another central concept of political economy, namely optimality, lends itself
to normative and factual interpretations as well. Of course, achieving optimal
outcomes is by definition the best one can do, but optimal behavior by each
member of a group of individuals may lead to outcomes that are worse than
other outcomes for all group members. Thus, optimality on one (individual)
level may contradict optimality on another (group) level.
The third central concept is justice. It is at first sight a purely normative
concept, something inherently desirable. As John Rawls (1971) puts it: justice is
a fundamental value of all well-organized societies. This means that shortcomings
in justice cannot be compensated with other aspects of the society, such as an
increase in the standard of living, defence capability or excellence of educational
institutions. But along with normative content, justice also has a factual content
which refers to people’s perception of justice in the prevailing institutions.
John Rawls (1921–2002) is considered to be one of the most important political
philosophers of our time. In his main work A Theory of Justice (1971), he builds
a theory of how the principles of justice can be viewed as a result of a voluntary
social contract between self-regarding actors acting in a situation which precedes
the emergence of a state. The theory is to be seen as an alternative to utilitarianism.
Rawls was the foremost modern representative of the social contract tradition.
His other main works are Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999)
and Justice as Fairness (2001).
Normative political economy deals with concepts such as rationality, justice
and optimality, specifies their exact meaning and studies the compatibility or
incompatibility of various meanings as well as the relationships between these
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and various other normative concepts. Factual political economy builds models
that attempt to describe the real world in a simplified manner that allows for
detailed analysis of some aspects of real economies and polities. One typically
looks for solutions of models, i.e. some kind of stable outcomes or equilibria
which constitute the theoretical predictions of models. These then operate as
tests of the validity of models. However, more typical are uses of models in the
evaluation of politico-economic institutions. By building models out of planned
institutions, one may conduct experiments on them and estimate the effects of
various outer impulses or shocks on the behavior of the institutions. One may
also vary the structure of the model to see the effects of the variation on various
aspects of the institution.
2.6 Suggested reading
The philosophy of science is a vast field. Basic concepts discussed above are
dealt with in an accessible style in Achinstein (1968), Giere (1979) and von
Wright (1971). The issue of whether the social sciences require a specific mode
of accounting for events, structures and – above all – acts has given rise to an
extensive debate over the past decades. Much of this debate turns on themes
discussed about a hundred years ago by Dilthey (1914–1927). In the 1960s the
methodological controversies reappeared in the works of Habermas (1972, 1988),
Apel (1967) and other representatives of the so-called Frankfurt school. The
philosophical theory of human action is discussed in Davidson (1980) and the
theory of speech acts elaborated in Searle (1980, 1996 and 2002).
3 Homo œconomicus
The basic constituent in models of political economy is the economic man, homo
œconomicus. The economic man is a theoretically simplified model of the indi-
vidual. At first approximation it can be viewed as the residue remaining when
all non-economic aspects are removed from real world individuals. In particular,
in this model the individual is supposed to be rational in the sense of calculating
the consequences of her behavior under prevailing and anticipated circumstances.
As all models, the economic man is a simplification. Without simplification we
could not describe, let alone analyze, political economy. Yet, the model of eco-
nomic agent is often deemed inadequate and misleading. Indeed, it is one of the
most debated constructs in modern social and political theory. It is, therefore,
important to outline it in some detail. In models of political economy the eco-
nomic man appears in the form of an assumption. It is therefore appropriate to
discuss the role of assumptions and their types in the study of political economy.
3.1 The role of assumptions in theory
In his collection of methodological essays, Milton Friedman (1953) provides the
following provocative characterization of the role and nature of assumptions in
economic theory:
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have assump-
tions that are widely inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in
general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions
(in this sense).
This statement has become known as the F-twist.4 In its time it gave rise to a hot
scientific and philosophical debate (Musgrave 1981; Nagel 1979; Tietzel 1981).
The main source of provocation was the alleged inverse relationship between
significance and realism. Indeed, it would be nearly absurd to maintain that one
could construct significant theories just by making sure that one’s assumptions are
unrealistic. This is, however, not what Friedman is arguing. Rather, he says that
one of the hallmarks of significant theory is that its assumptions are unrealistic.
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No direct causal attribution is thereby made; at least not of the sort that would
imply that unrealism guarantees significance. Even so, many challenges have
been presented to Friedman’s view (see e.g. Nurmi 1983a for an overview).
Examples of ‘F-twisted’ assumptions:
• Individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their
expected returns.
• Political parties operate as if they were maximizing their short-term electoral
support.
• Voters vote for parties advocating policies that maximize the voter’s short-term
income.
• There is no government, i.e. the entire economy consists of private firms and
consumers.
• Officials in bureaucracies behave as if they were maximizing the budget of
their bureaus (Niskanen 1971).
Alan Musgrave (1981) argues that Friedman’s view overlooks the fact that
many types of assumptions can be found in scientific theories. Each type has a
specific role in those constructs. More devastating for the F-twist is, however,
Musgrave’s conclusion: it is incorrect for each assumption type.
Let us briefly assess the validity of the conclusion and list the three assumption
types.
• Negligibility assumptions. These state that some factors which could be
expected to have an effect on the phenomenon under investigation actually
do not have any effect at all or at most an effect that is undetectable. For
example, the color of a falling object is typically assumed to have no effect
on its acceleration. Or, the mechanism used in casting ballots in elections is
assumed to have only a negligible effect on the election results.
• Domain assumptions. These specify the domain of application of a theory.
The theory of ideal gases is assumed to apply only to very specific types of
gases.
• Heuristic assumptions. These are done in order to simplify the manipula-
tion of theories, e.g. by assuming certain parameter values in mathematical
formulae in order to make the derivation of solutions possible.
To argue that the F-twist holds for negligibility assumptions is tantamount
to saying that in significant theories the assumptions regarding factors or vari-
ables that can be overlooked in the analysis are more unrealistic than similar
assumptions in less significant theories. Under the not too implausible view
that unrealistic assumptions are descriptively false, the F-twist seems hardly
applicable to this assumption type, for if a negligibility assumption is untrue,
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this obviously means that the factors or variables omitted should not, after all,
be omitted. Under the stated assumptions the theory does not ‘work’. This does
not as such imply that theories with more false negligibility assumptions would
be any more significant than theories where such assumptions are fewer. What
can be inferred, though, is that the former are ‘simpler’ than the latter.
Milton Friedman (born 1921) is known as the pioneer and leading representative of
the monetarist school of macroeconomics. Convinced of the superior efficiency of
free markets in all economic circumstances, he has also advocated their adoption
in the developing countries. Known as a leading proponent of the supply-side
economics his main works are A Monetary History of the United States (with Anna
Schwartz) (1963), Essays in Positive Economics (1953) and the best-seller Free
to Choose (with Rose Friedman) (1980). In 1976 he became the Nobel Memorial
Laureate in economics.
In the case of domain assumptions, the conclusion is similar for one obvious
reason: by adding descriptively false assumptions one can restrict the validity
of the theory, not make it more significant. It is possible that a negligibility
assumption which turns out to be false under the domain of intended application
is turned into a domain one. Suppose that one’s theory of economic behavior
would include as a negligibility assumption that government activity has no effect
on national economy. Once it turns out that the assumption is descriptively false,
one may turn the assumption into a domain one by stating that the theory is to be
applied only under systems where government’s activity has a very small effect
on the operation of the economy.
In the case of heuristic assumptions the F-twist seems a more tenable position.
To use Friedman’s own example, consider the hypothesis ‘under a wide range
of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to
maximize their expected returns’. The part of the hypothesis starting with ‘as if’
seems to be a heuristic assumption and the entire hypothesis can be translated
into the following counterfactual statement: ‘if the firms were seeking rationally
to maximize their expected returns, then their behavior under a wide range of cir-
cumstances would resemble the observations.’ The two statements seem to have
an identical meaning. Yet the latter looks very much like a heuristic assumption.
Whatever else Friedman may want to convey with his ‘as if’ clause, he obvi-
ously does not say that the firms are seeking rationally to maximize their expected
returns. Rather he seems to suggest that they may have a wide variety of other
goals, but their behavior resembles closely one that would ensue from expected
return maximization. Moreover, he argues that looking at the observations from
the ‘as if’ angle helps us in predicting behavior.
Now, the unrealism of assumptions seems in this case more defensible than in
other types of assumptions. The heuristic assumptions are invoked by virtue of
their usefulness in predictions. This does not, however, justify the F-twist in so far
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as it postulates an inverse relationship between unrealism and significance. What
can be argued, though, is that there is no direct reason to reject the F-twist when
applied to heuristic assumptions, while such reasons exist vis-à-vis negligibility
and domain assumptions.
The above assumption types are not clear cut. As we just pointed out, assump-
tions may ‘migrate’ from one type to another. Indeed, whether an assumption
is a negligibility, domain or heuristic assumption may be seen as a matter of
interpretation of models. Thus, for example, Friedman’s example above may be
looked upon as a domain assumption stating that the theory applies only to firms
that maximize their expected returns as a matter of operative principle. Simi-
larly, it can be viewed as a negligibility assumption that suggests that all other
aspects except return maximization can be neglected in modeling firms. Finally,
and perhaps most plausibly, it can be seen as a heuristic assumption useful in
predicting behavior in heretofore unexplored settings.
This kind of ambiguity in the interpretation of assumptions pertains to the
economic man as well. It can be viewed as a negligibility assumption stating
that all other aspects except pursuit of utility maximization can be ignored in
building models of political economy. On the other hand, it can also be argued
that the economic man is a domain assumption, i.e. applicable only in con-
texts where individual utility maximization is the dominant behavioral principle.
Indeed, the standard defense of a theory that contradicts observations is that its
domain assumptions are not valid in the context of the study. However, the most
important interpretation of the economic man is that of a heuristic assumption
with instrumental value in deriving predictions, accounting for observed phe-
nomena, experimenting with policy alternatives and designing politico-economic
institutions. It is typically not intended as a counterfactual statement; that is, in
the models of political economy the economic man is not an assumption known
to be false. Rather it is a simplification believed to be true of a reasonably wide
class of agents and/or behaviors. Its assumed heuristic value is in enabling the
model-builder to account for a large set of observations – the larger, the better.
3.2 Aspects of rationality
The economic man is not a universally shared set of assumptions, but a fairly
wide consensus exists on one of the properties of the model, namely rational-
ity. Rationality and the theory built around it can be viewed from two angles:
normative and descriptive. Under the former interpretation rationality relates to
how one ought to behave, while the latter view pertains to how one does behave.
Elster (1986: 2) argues that the normative view allows us to explain behavior by
showing that it was rational and that the person in question had goals and beliefs
that made it appropriate for her to behave in the way she did. We can then say that
the behavior took place because the person thought it was rational. The success
of the behavior in achieving some goals is not adequate for its explanation unless
one can show that the person had both the goals and beliefs that connected her
activity to those goals.
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Jon Elster (born 1940) is a Norwegian-born social philosopher, political scientist
and economic historian. His work focuses on fundamental concepts of social sci-
ences, such as rationality and justice. He has also written a number of works on
methodology of historiography and political psychology. Some of his best-known
books are Ulysses and the Sirens (1979), Making Sense of Marx (1985), Local
Justice (1992), Alchemies of the Mind (1999) and Ulysses Unbound (2000).
The descriptive view of rationality, on the other hand, is less directly applicable
in explanations. However, if we assume that a person is rational, this guides us
to investigate her goals and beliefs in accounting for her behavior (Harsanyi
1986: 83). Thus, the descriptive view of rationality also has a role to play in the
explanation of behavior. Postulating rationality implies that one should focus on
means–ends relationships and beliefs underlying observed behavior.
John C. Harsanyi (1920–2000) was one of the most influential game theorists of
the 20th century. Apart from his important contributions to the solution theory of
games, he wrote extensively on welfare economics and moral philosophy. Harsanyi
subscribed to a version of utilitarian thinking in moral philosophy. His main works
are Essays on Ethics, Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation (1976), Rational
Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (1977),
Papers in Game Theory (1982) and A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in
Games (with Reinhard Selten) (1988). Harsanyi won the Nobel Memorial Prize in
economics in 1994.
What then is rational behavior? Two types of definitions can be found in
the literature. Thin rationality means that actors possess consistent preference
rankings and make their choices according to those rankings. Thick rationality,
in turn, augments the thin one by adding requirements that pertain to the nature
of goals pursued (see Herne and Setälä 2004 for an overview). In other words,
a person is rational in the thick sense if, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of
thin rationality, her behavior is directed towards reasonable goals, her means are
reasonable with respect to the ends she is pursuing, and her expectations regarding
her environment are reasonable. Thus, thick rationality essentially extends the
notion of rationality by imposing conditions upon goals and beliefs.
In empirical research rationality can form the basis of two distinct methods,
namely the method of revealed preference and that of posited preference (Riker
and Ordeshook 1973: 14–15). In the former, one infers the preferences or goals
by observing people’s behavior, thereby assuming that the observed behavior
is rational. The question asked is thus basically the following: given that the
individuals made the observed choices under the circumstances which were also
observed, which goals are such that the pursuit of them would make the choices
rational? A full answer to the question would require us to dwell on the belief
22 Homo œconomicus
systems of the individuals. A typical setting for such questions is one where some
unexpected type of behavior emerges. A trivial example would be a scene where
one sees a group of people suddenly running on a street, but also unexpected
buying and selling behavior in the stock market belongs to the same class of
situations where the method of revealed preference is often instinctively used.
The method of posited preference calls for a somewhat different setting. To
wit, one may be interested in finding out what kinds of effect a new piece of
legislation might bring about. For example, would an increase in minimum wage
reduce the plight of the working poor or to the contrary put more of them out
of work? The introduction of new legislation is always based on some goals
and thought experiments on how reasonable people would act on the new setting
created by the proposed legislation. Postulating rationality on the part of the actors
often gives a useful benchmark for assessing the effects of new legislation.
The goal most often discussed in defining rationality is that of increasing,
indeed typically maximizing, one’s welfare. MacDonald (2003: 552) defines
rationality in terms of three components: purposive action, consistent preferences
and utility maximization. As we shall see later on, the last two components
are intimately related: without consistent preferences, utility maximization does
not make sense. In the absence of information about more specific goals of
human activity, the welfare maximization is often assumed to be the goal that all
individuals are striving for. A theoretically more useful concept is, however, that
of utility maximization. The latter is more useful because it is more general. While
individual welfare maximization is associated with egoism, utility maximization
allows for a wide variety of different social changes – including changes that
increase other persons’ welfare – that the actor might derive utility from. This
point is significant since one of the most frequently voiced objections against
rational choice theory is its alleged basis on egoistic behavior. As we shall see,
this is a misconception. What the theory is based upon is goal-directed behavior
with respect to consistent preferences. The reason behind arranging alternatives
in a given order of preference is not significant, i.e. it may be egoism, altruism
or some other principle.
3.3 Making choices under certainty
Rational choice theory is based on the concept of decision. What makes individ-
uals or groups rational is that they make rational decisions. Rational decisions, in
turn, are those that result in the achievement of the goals of the decision maker
(DM, for brevity). Without goals, there is no way of distinguishing rational
and non-rational decisions. Both goals and decisions may be hidden or private
information accessible only to the DM. Thus, a person may decide to apply for
a position in an organization, but may not reveal her decision until the very
last moment of the application period. Similarly, a general may order part of her
troops to prepare an attack to the enemy positions in A even though her goal is to
capture a different position in B.5 So, the goals are not always observable from
the acts and the latter are not always simultaneous with the decisions. Yet, to
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outline the basic constituents of decision making, we shall begin with a setting
where both goals and decisions are observable.
Consider a committee which consists of a chairperson and two members. The
committee makes its decisions using the majority rule so that any proposal which
is supported by at least two persons is adopted. Otherwise the proposal is rejected.
Suppose that the committee is to decide whether a given project receives funding.
Each member can either support or oppose the funding or abstain. The voting
takes place so that the members indicate their stand first whereupon the chair gives
her opinion. The latter thus casts her vote in full knowledge of the others’ votes.
Assume that the two members express opposite opinions about the project: one
favors funding, the other rejection. It is therefore the chair’s vote that determines
the outcome: if she votes for funding, the project is funded, otherwise it is not.
This is the setting of a decision under certainty. What kind of behavior could be
regarded as rational under these circumstances?
Obviously, the chair has three options at her disposal: to vote for funding,
to vote for rejection or to abstain. Without information about her goals it is
impossible to tell which of these actions is rational. Assume that the chair would
like to see the project funded. Should this be the case, the rational thing for her
to do is to vote for funding since this guarantees funding. If she, in turn, would
not like to fund the project, then she has one way to achieve this: to vote for
rejection. Should she be indifferent between funding and not funding, abstaining
would obviously be the best choice for her as it would lead to non-decision (since
neither of the basic options receives at least two votes). In a situation involving
two outcomes, the information regarding the preference of the DM over the
outcomes gives us a way to distinguish rational behavior: it is the choice of that
decision alternative which leads to the preferred outcome.
Let us assume that, instead of being the chairperson in a group, the DM is given
the exclusive power to determine the order in which a set of project proposals
is to receive funding. She does not know the overall budget constraint, i.e. the
total amount of funds available, but she knows that the projects will be funded in
the order she proposes until the available budget is exhausted. Since the DM has
the sole authority to determine the outcome, we need not make any assumptions
regarding the behavior of others. On the other hand, what is needed for defining
rational behavior is the DM’s preference order with respect to the projects. More
specifically, the DM has to be able to compare any pair of projects in terms of
preference, that is, for any projects x and y, the DM is required to have an opinion
according to which either x is preferred to y, or y is preferred to x. In technical
terms, the DM’s preference has to be complete. Sometimes this requirement is
called connectedness. Why is this requirement called for? Suppose that it were
not satisfied, i.e. for some pair of projects the DM could not say which one is at
least as preferable as the other. This would then mean that of these two projects,
the DM could not fund one since she does not know if it is at least as preferable
as the other. Nor could she abstain since this would mean that one project is as
preferable as the other. So, none of the three action alternatives could be justified
with reference to an underlying preference of the DM.
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Another requirement on the DM’s preferences is logical consistency or, in
technical terms, transitivity. This states that whenever a project, say project 1, is
considered at least as preferable as another project, say 2, and the latter at least as
preferable as a third project 3, then it has to be the case that project 1 is at least as
preferable as project 3. For example, if a voter in the U.S. presidential elections
of 2000 preferred Nader to Gore and Gore to Bush, then transitivity requires that
she preferred Nader to Bush. If the preferences do not satisfy transitivity, it is
impossible to form a preference order or ranking, i.e. a sequence of candidates
so that each candidate is located in only one position in the ranking. Together
with completeness, transitivity guarantees that such a sequence of priority exists
and each candidate is positioned in one and only one place in it.
If the requirements of completeness and transitivity are imposed on the DM’s
preferences we can justify or ‘rationalize’ actions by referring to preference rela-
tions: an action is rational just in case it leads to the preferred outcome. This is
the basic idea of what is called thin rationality (Elster 1983). Rational are actions
that are consistent with preferences which, in turn, are complete and transitive.
It is worth emphasizing that the principle or rationale underlying the preference
ranking has thus far played no role at all. In other words, the definition of thin
rationality is not based on any specific principle which is used in forming the
preference. In particular, the preferences may or may not be egoistic or altruistic,
local or global.
Connectedness and transitivity of preferences enable us to construct a sequence
of alternatives from best to worst, possibly including ties. In any event, each
alternative is positioned in one and only one position in the sequence. We may
thus consider rational an action that chooses the alternative which is best in the
sequence. The same reasoning can be extended to any subset of alternatives.
In the case that several alternatives are tied for the best position, the choice of
any one of them may be deemed rational.
The requirements needed for the construction of a preference ranking of
alternatives are quite mild. Yet, it is not difficult to envision a situation where
an intuitively perfectly reasonable person may find it impossible to meet them.
Consider again the presidential candidates Bush, Gore and Nader. Suppose that
a voter would rank Nader higher than Gore because she likes the environmental
policies of the former to those of the latter. Suppose, moreover, that the same
voter prefers Gore to Bush because of the employment and incomes policy con-
siderations, i.e. she thinks that Gore’s policies would have brought about more
jobs and more even income distribution than those of Bush. By transitivity we
would now infer that the person in question prefers Nader to Bush. It is, however,
quite possible that the voter has the opposite preference. She might, for example,
have thought that Bush’s policies on crime prevention are preferable to Nader’s.
If these three considerations or criteria – environment, employment and crime
prevention policy – are deemed the sole determinants of the voter’s preference in
the way described, then the voter’s preference relation over the three candidates
becomes cyclic: Nader is preferred to Gore, Gore to Bush and Bush to Nader. In
fact, a cyclic preference could also result by assuming that the voter considers
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Table 3.1 Cyclic individual preference relation




each of these three criteria equally important and that her preference ranking is
that shown in Table 3.1.
Nader is better than Gore on two criteria out of three. Similarly, Gore is
preferred to Bush on two criteria. The same holds for Bush with respect to Nader.
There is nothing unreasonable in this type of preference relation. Yet, because of
its intransitivity it makes it impossible to say which choice of candidate would
be rational from the voter’s point of view. If the voter chooses Nader, it can be
pointed out that Bush is preferable on two criteria out of three. If she chooses
Bush, the same argument can be built in favor of Gore, etc.
Very often the preferences are not visible. Rather, their role is to provide a
rationale for making choices. If only one candidate can be voted upon, the voter
may break the tie between all three candidates by emphasizing one criterion at
the cost of the others, invoking further criteria or by some random mechanism
(e.g. rolling a dice). The last device suggests that the voter is indifferent between
all three alternatives. The other two stratagems amount to transforming the cyclic
preference relation into a transitive one. Thus, the starting assumption of deci-
sion theory gets at least a partial justification from the observation that cyclic
individual preferences are not visible in practical choice situations.
Now, given the complete and transitive preference relation, what, then, would
be the rational thing to do? Under certainty, the DM’s choice determines the out-
come. Thus, given that a candidate, say Nader, is ranked first in the voter’s pref-
erence order, she should obviously vote for Nader and thereby get him elected.
Voting otherwise would make the voter’s preference ranking highly questionable.
When we are certain about the results of our actions, the specification of what
a rational actor would do is, thus, straightforward: she chooses whichever action
leads to the best outcome according to her ranking. Naturally, things become
more complicated when the results of actions are not fully known at the time
of decision. This, of course, is typically the case in elections where no voter
alone decides the outcome. For example, in the U.S. presidential elections of
2000 many Nader supporters ended up voting for their second-ranked alternative
instead of their favorite in an attempt to undermine their worst-ranked candidate’s
chances of being elected.
3.4 Choices under risk
Suppose that the DM knows that her action leads to one of several outcomes,
but does not know which one. She has a preference ranking over the outcomes
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so that she is not indifferent between them. To see the difference between this
setting and the one discussed above, consider an example. You have just finished
writing your first novel and the time has now arrived to look for ways of making
it accessible to the reading public. This being your first one, you have not got
around to contacting publishers before finishing the book. Being a literary person
you have read many novels of similar genre to yours and have – upon talking
to representatives of publishers – learned that there are three major publishers in
the field you are working on: companies A, B and C.
Company A is the most prestigious. Its distribution and marketing network
is very wide, its books are on exhibit in every major book fair in the world
and most of its novels are reviewed in important literary magazines. Company
A’s main drawback is that it is very selective. It publishes in relative terms far
fewer manuscripts received than its competitors. Company B, in turn, accepts a
clearly higher percentage of manuscripts than A, but – perhaps partly because of
this – tends to enjoy lower prestige. It also spends less on marketing books and
its international visibility is more modest. Company C, finally, publishes nearly
all manuscripts it receives, but requires the authors to play a role in marketing
the books.
Having carefully collected the statistics provided by the publishers, you
summarize the data in Table 3.2.
The value assigned to the companies reflects your assessment of the men-
tal (fame, honor, esteem) and material (royalty and other payments) benefit
that would accrue to you if the company in question would publish your book.
Approaching company A with your manuscript would, thus, give a large ben-
efit should it accept the text in its publication program. The probability of this
happening is, however, very small. Company B’s value to you would be less,
but probability of success higher than in A’s case. Company C would give you
a small benefit, but almost certainly.
The above setting appears in various disguises in many everyday decision situ-
ations. The most trivial settings notwithstanding we are often faced with choices
which may lead to many different outcomes each distinguishable by the benefit
ensuing from them as well as by the likelihood that the outcome is reached. For
example, individual career choices often boil down to varying income prospects
as well as possibilities of reaching them once the career choice has been made.
Situations in which the best outcomes also have the best success probability
are intuitively obvious, i.e. we do not typically spend much time on them. The
difficult ones have at least some similarity to the one summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Publishers’ data summary
Company A B C
Value Large Medium Small
Likelihood Almost Reasonably Excellent
hopeless good
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What distinguishes this situation from that discussed in the preceding section
is that we now have to compare choices in terms of two – rather than one –
criteria: value and success likelihood. Unfortunately, the data in Table 3.2 are
not sufficient to guide us in the choice of the best alternative. Or, to phrase it
somewhat differently, reasonable people might end up with different choices,
given the data of the table. A person opting for company A might argue that
she chose A despite the slim chances of success since she regarded the value of
success so much that even a small likelihood of achieving it makes it superior
to the other alternatives. Besides, she might feel lucky. Another person could
choose C and justify her choice by thinking that things just have the tendency of
turning against her and that the main thing is to get the work published. A third
person could opt for company B because it guarantees a reasonable probability
of success and a modicum of media exposure.
The difficulty of judging the rationality of decisions in Table 3.2-type situations
stems from the vast variation in the possible content of the expressions ‘large’,
‘medium’ and ‘small’ when applied to values and ‘almost hopeless’, ‘reasonably
good’ and ‘excellent’ when these denote probability values. Let us assume that
instead of these verbal expression we have numerical values that can be added and
multiplied. We may assume that the author looking for a publisher is exclusively
preoccupied with the income she is entitled to if her book is accepted by the
companies. For simplicity we assume that each company pays out the entire value
of the contract in a single lump sum upon accepting the manuscript. Company
A would offer her a contract assuring her the sum of x(A) if her work would be
accepted. Similarly contracts with companies B and C would give her x(B) and
x(C), respectively. We assume that x(A) > x(B) > x(C) which is consistent with
Table 3.2. The success probabilities, in turn, are pA, pB and pC , respectively,
indicating the likelihood that each company makes a contract with the author.
In accordance with the table we can assume that pC > pB > pA. Table 3.2, now
takes the form of Table 3.3.
Since each company has the option of rejecting the manuscript, we need to
assign a value to the outcome of the manuscript being rejected as well. Let us
assume that the value of this outcome is zero regardless of which company
rejects it.
If the author decides to approach company A with her manuscript, she faces
two possible outcomes: the manuscript is accepted or it is rejected. The value
of the former outcome is x(A) and that of the latter is 0. The work is accepted
with probability pA and rejected with probability 1 − pA. The latter probability
Table 3.3 Publishers’ quantitative data
Company A B C
Value x(A) x(B) x(C)
Probability pA pB pC
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follows from the fact that, given the choice of company A, there are only two
mutually exclusive outcomes: acceptance and rejection. The probability of the
latter is the same as the probability of the former not occurring, 1 − pA. The
expected value of choosing company A, denoted by EV (A), is thus: EV (A) =
pA × x(A) + (1 − pA) × 0 = pAx(A). Similarly, the expected values EV (B) and
EV (C) of submitting the manuscript to company B or C yield: EV (B) = pBx(B)
and EV (C) = pCx(C), respectively.
The expected value is the weighted average of the values associated with
all the possible outcomes ensuing from a choice. The weights, in turn, are the
probabilities of the corresponding outcomes materializing, given that the choice
has been made. Suppose that for a given choice all outcomes are equally likely.
In our example, this means that for some company the probability of acceptance
and rejection are equal, i.e. both 1/2. Then the expected value of submitting one’s
manuscript to this company is the average of values associated with acceptance
and that of rejection (which we assumed to be zero).
To take another example closer to everyday life in many urban areas of the
world, consider a passenger embarking on an inner-city bus or tram ride. The
tickets costing 2 euros can be purchased from machines located near the bus stops.
Passengers riding without validated tickets face the inspection charge of 100 euro
if caught by inspectors. Now, a passenger has found out that the probability of an
inspector riding on any given bus or tram is p. Consequently, the probability that
there is no inspector on a given ride is 1 − p. The passenger may either purchase
a ticket or enter the bus without one. The choice of buying has two possible
outcomes: the passenger travels the desired distance with or without facing an
inspector. Either way, she pays two euros. The choice of riding without a ticket
may also have two outcomes: the passenger is confronted with an inspector and
is caught or she does not encounter an inspector on her ride.
Using the vocabulary of decision theory, we may say that there are two states
of nature which, together with the DM’s choice, determine the outcome: the
state in which an inspector is riding on the bus, and the state in which there is no
inspector on the ride.6 Combining these states with the choices gives us Table 3.4.
Suppose that the bus company has decided to randomly assign inspec-
tors to buses so that on average one passenger in every 100 is inspected.
The expected value of buying a ticket is not dependent on the inspection
probability since EV (buy) = p × (−2) + (1 − p) × (−2) = −2, no
matter what the value of p. The expected value of the don’t buy option,
Table 3.4 Passenger’s values
Choice
State of nature Buy a ticket Don’t buy
No inspector −2 0
Inspector −2 −100
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in contrast, varies with the value of p. When p = 1/100, its expected value
EV (don’t buy) = 1/100 × (−100) + 99/100 × 0 = −1.
The expected value of not buying a ticket, thus, exceeds that of buying one.
But what is the expected value? More specifically, how does this value compare
with the value accruing to the DM under certainty? Obviously, it is different in
the sense that it has nothing to do with what happens to the passenger without
a valid ticket when she embarks on a bus ride on a given day at a given time.
Depending on whether an inspector happens to ride on the same bus, she may
lose 100 euros or nothing at all. Neither one of these coincides with the expected
value. For a passenger with a valid ticket it really tells what she is bound to
benefit in monetary terms once entering the bus.
The nature of expected value hinges on the notion of probability and has
been the subject of an extensive philosophical debate (Carnap 1962; Edwards
et al. 1963; Reichenbach 1949; Salmon 1967). According to the most common
(frequency) view of probability, the expected value is the average of the value that
the DM would get if the decision situation were repeated an indefinite number of
times, given that she would make the same choice on every occasion. Thus, −1
is the average value that the passenger would get per ride if she would embark
on every journey without a ticket. The average is the sum of a sequence of zeros
and −100s divided by the number of rides.
Similarly, in the publishing example, the expected values of choosing each
publishing house represent theoretical average benefits for an author submitting
her manuscript to the company indefinitely many times. Clearly, the expected
value is a highly theoretical concept. Yet, it can be linked to rationality in the
same manner as choice under certainty. That is, it can be shown that under
fairly plausible assumptions concerning preferences, the behavior that strives at
maximizing the expected values of choices can be seen as rational in pretty much
the same way as choosing the highest valued alternative can be seen as rational
under certainty. This point will be elaborated shortly.
Suppose now that using expected utilities as guidelines for action is rational.
It follows then in our bus passenger example that a rational passenger never
purchases a ticket since if she did, she would lose 2 euros on every ride with
the average benefit obviously equal to −2. She doubles her average benefit in
monetary terms by not buying a ticket. Obviously, the bus company needs to
reconsider its inspection fee policy.7 Alternatively, the company might consider
placing more inspectors on the buses so as to decrease the expected benefit from
riding without a ticket.
3.5 Choices under uncertainty
The above bus rider calculus is based on the assumption that the passengers know
the probability of encountering an inspector upon stepping onto the bus. More-
over, we have assumed implicitly that this probability is the same as that with
which the bus company assigns inspectors to its buses. Both of these assumptions
may be challenged as unrealistic: the passenger may be in an unfamiliar town
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and thus unaware of the inspection policies, or the bus company may change
its policy at irregular intervals. Intuitively, it would seem more reasonable to
assume that instead of an objective probability, the passenger has a more or less
precise hunch or guess of what is going to happen to her when embarking upon
the bus ride with or without a ticket. She knows that if caught without a ticket,
she will be fined. She also knows that if she is not caught, she will get a free ride.
Here, being inspected or not being inspected are two mutually exclusive con-
ditioning events which, together with her choice, determine the outcome and
the benefit for the passenger. The conditioning events or states of nature are not
known to the passenger to the extent that she could assign objective probabili-
ties to them. Thus, she is not able to compute the expected benefit accruing to
her from the acts of buying or failing to buy a ticket. This setting characterizes
decision making under uncertainty: one has a pretty good idea of what happens if
various conditioning events occur, but has only a vague estimate of the likelihood
of those events. Clearly, the calculus of expected benefits is not applicable here,
at least not in the form outlined in the preceding section.
Yet, there are settings involving uncertainty where there are rather obvious
ways of telling good decisions from bad ones. Consider the following simple
coin picking game situation (Table 3.5) (Hamburger 1979: 17). There are four
coins on the table and two players take turns in picking them up. On each turn,
the player has to pick up either one or two coins. The player who gets the last
coin wins and collects all the coins that were originally on the table.
Suppose you are the player who has the first turn. Should you pick one or two
coins? Obviously, you should pick one since regardless of what your opponent
does, that guarantees that you still have either one or two coins left when it is
time for your second turn. Moreover, it guarantees that you can win the game
on your second turn. So, on your first turn picking one coin is a good decision,
while picking two coins is a bad one. It is bad since it opens the door to victory
to your opponent. Table 3.5 illustrates this.
The outcomes in Table 3.5 are based on the assumption that each player is
rational in the most straightforward sense: given two outcomes, one of which
is her victory and the other her defeat, the player chooses the former. Thus, for
example, if you choose one coin and your opponent also chooses one, you are
faced, on your second turn, with the choice between winning (i.e. picking two
coins) or losing (picking one coin, whereupon your opponent takes the remaining
coin and wins).
Table 3.5 Coin picking game
Your choice
Opponent’s choice Choose one coin Choose two coins
Opponent chooses one coin You win You win
Opponent chooses two coins You win The opponent wins
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In the example of Table 3.5 your choice of one coin at the outset is the best one
in the sense that no matter what your opponent does, it guarantees victory, while
choosing two coins is very likely to result in your defeat. Choice theory uses
the concept of dominance to characterize this type of choice situation. An option
(choice, strategy, action, etc.) is said to weakly dominate another option if choos-
ing the former in all circumstances results in outcomes that are at least as good
as – and under some circumstances strictly better than – those resulting from the
latter. The circumstances in Table 3.5 refer to the opponent’s choices or states
of nature.
The option ‘pick one coin’ clearly dominates the option ‘pick two coins’ for
you since under both choices of the opponent it leads to at least as good an
outcome as the latter option and under one choice of the opponent, namely ‘pick
two coins’, it results in a strictly better outcome for you.
It may happen that an option leads to strictly better outcomes than its com-
petitor under all circumstances. In this case it is said that the former strongly
dominates the latter. As an example, suppose that you are offered a ticket in
two simple lotteries, A and B. Both consist of a single throw of dice. If the
throw results in the side with six dots showing up, you win 10 euros in lottery A.
Otherwise you win just 1 euro. In lottery B you win 20 euros if the side six shows
up. All other outcomes give you 2 euros. Surely lottery B strongly dominates
lottery A since no matter which outcome emerges, your payoff is strictly larger
in B than in A.
Situations involving weakly dominated options are encountered in many
everyday choice situations. Often these are ignored since the choices made are
considered so obvious that not much attention is paid to them. For example, when
in Britain each individual car driver is well advised to drive on the left-hand side
since this choice dominates (at least weakly) the option of driving on the right.
Similarly, when taking a test the students often submit papers to the instructors
even though they are uncertain about the acceptability of their essays. The act of
submitting is seen as weakly dominating the act of not submitting.
An interesting class of situations emerges in the evaluation of activities or
institutions with many performance criteria. For example, in evaluating institu-
tions of higher education, several aspects of performance are usually invoked
in the overall assessments: the quality and quantity of research conducted, the
quality and quantity of teaching and training, the external impact of the insti-
tution on its environment, etc. Often the criteria are discussed, modified and
elaborated by the representatives of the institutions under scrutiny. In these dis-
cussions, the introduction of criteria that favor their institutions can readily be
seen as a weakly dominating option vis-à-vis settling for those already exist-
ing. Similar settings arise in many evaluations of public-sector activities, but are
not restricted to these. Also those private-sector institutions and activities that
are intuitively multi-dimensional (profitability, quality of service, environmental
soundness, etc.) are subject to similar strategic considerations by participants.
The point of these examples is to show that there are situations in which
the knowledge of the states of nature – be it certain or probabilistic – is not
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essential for making choices that can be justified as rational in the sense that they
exclude dominated options. However, in many cases, and certainly in the most
interesting ones, there are no options that dominate all the others. Some options
are best under some circumstances, while other options result in best outcomes
under others. In these kinds of settings various decision principles come into
play (see e.g. Giere 1979: 337). Most of these reflect not so much rationality but
attitude towards risk.
Thus, for example, a person might adopt the principle that focuses on the very
worst outcome ensuing from any option under all conceivable circumstances
and chooses that option that gives her the largest benefit under the worst sce-
nario. This principle is often called the maximin principle or play-it-safe rule
since it maximizes the minimum payoff for each option. It can be viewed as
a version of the expected utility maximization principle in the sense that for
each option it assigns the probability of unity to one state of nature, namely
the one which together with the option in question brings about the minimum
payoff.
Rather than rationality, the play-it-safe rule exhibits pessimism on the part of
the DM. A mirror image of this rule is the maximax principle or gambler’s rule
which focuses attention to the largest payoff that may ensue from each option
and chooses that option for which this payoff is the largest. In other words,
this rule looks for the option that is associated with the largest possible benefit.
Obviously, the rule is based on extreme optimism. As for maximin, this rule can
also be seen as an expected utility maximization assuming that for each option
one state of nature – namely the one that together with the option leads to the
best possible outcome – gets a probability weight of unity.
Between maximin and maximax rules various variations can be envisaged.
To wit, the rationalist rule which assigns each state of nature an identical prob-
ability and chooses the option which maximizes the expected utility under this
probabilistic assumption. While maximin and maximax rules assume, for each
option, that one state of nature will materialize with certainty, the rationalist rule
regards every state of nature equally probable. Obviously, these probability value
assignments are mere guesswork since, by definition, under uncertainty one does
not know the probability distribution of the states of nature.
Another rule that can also be seen as a mediating position between maximin
and maximax is Hurwicz’s rule (Hurwicz 1951; Milnor 1954). It is based on
computing for each option the weighted average of the utility of the best outcome
and the worst outcome. The weights assigned to these utilities reflect the DM’s
degree of optimism: the larger the weight assigned to the best outcome, the higher
the degree of optimism. The weights vary from 0 to 1. With the former value
Hurwicz’s rule boils down to maximin, with the latter to maximax rule.
Suppose that in the above riding example, the passenger has no idea of the
probability of encountering an inspector on the bus. All she knows is that the
ticket costs 2 euros and that if she is caught without a valid ticket, she will pay
100 euros. Obviously, the maximin rule dictates buying a ticket since the minimal
payoff associated with it is −2 euros, while not buying a ticket may bring about
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the −100 euros in payoff. The maximax rule, in contrast, calls for not buying
since the best that can happen for a rider is that the ride is free, i.e. the payoff
is 0. The buy option, on the other hand, would bring about the payoff −2 in
any event. The rationalist rule would give both states of nature – one in which
the inspector is encountered and one in which there is no inspector on the bus –
the probability of 1/2, whereupon the expected payoffs of ‘don’t buy’ and ‘buy’
are −50 and −2, respectively. Hence, the rationalist rule would recommend
buying. Hurwicz’s rule, finally, would also recommend buying whenever the
passenger’s degree of optimism is less than 49/50.
The above rules make very limited use of the fact that there are often many
states of nature which together with the option chosen determine the outcomes.
The above example does not reveal this since there are only two states of nature
in it. The number of states can, however, be increased by assuming that instead
of policy of constant fines for free riding, the bus company allows the inspectors
to determine – within some reasonable limits – the amount to be paid by the free-
riders caught. Despite the added states of nature the calculations still focus on
at most two of these states. Maximin looks at the worst case scenario, maximax
the best case one and Hurwicz’s (1951) rule computes the weighted average of
these. Only the rationalist rule uses information associated with all states of nature
combined with options. Its probability assignment is, however, often somewhat
questionable: all states are given an equal probability.
If one has some hunches or intuitions that can be expressed as probabilities of
various states occurring, one could easily avoid the problematic equiprobability
assumption of rationalist rule. Thus, one can use the intuitive or subjective prob-
abilities as if they were objective. Thereby the decision making under uncertainty
can be transformed into that under risk. Instead of expected utility maximization,
one could then aim at maximizing subjective expected utilities of options. The
computation of the best option is in all respects identical with the expected utility
maximization under risk.
3.6 Axioms of rational behavior
All the principles of choice under uncertainty have some justification which
makes them plausible under some decision settings. The maximin rule amounts
to guaranteeing a reasonable security level in making decisions. Consider a person
trying to catch a bus which is about to leave the stop on the opposite side of a
very busy road. Even if missing the bus would mean being some 10 minutes
late in arriving at an important meeting, many people would choose to cross the
street at traffic lights rather than hurrying to the other side of the road in the
midst of the traffic. The former type of behavior can be viewed as maximizing
the minimum benefit since the option of running across the street regardless of
the traffic may end up with a disaster (serious bodily injury or even death), while
crossing at the traffic lights will at worst result in being late in the meeting. In
general, if the worst possible outcomes are bad enough, it makes intuitive sense
to try to avoid them.
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The maximax rule, on the other hand, can be justified in circumstances where
the options differ mainly in terms of the best outcomes that are associated with
them. The rationalist rule, in turn, may be motivated by stating that since there is
no information suggesting that any of the states of nature would be more or less
likely to occur than the others, it makes sense to regard them equally probable.
Some of the principles discussed above have, however, somewhat firmer than
intuitive foundation. Indeed, some arguably embody rationality in the sense
of satisfying axioms of rational behavior under well-defined classes of circum-
stances. These principles all belong to the set of utility maximization rules (see
Harsanyi 1977: 22–47). In other words, the utility maximization under certainty,
risk and uncertainty can all be viewed as rational choice principles. Rationality
is here understood in the ‘thin’ sense, that is, behavior is rational if it is in accor-
dance with the preferences of the actor under scrutiny. This means that an actor
makes a rational choice if she chooses A rather than B whenever she prefers
A to B. If she is indifferent between A and B, she is equally likely to choose
each of them.
To see how this view of rationality relates to utility maximization, consider a
person faced with the choice between A and B and ask what conditions would
her preferences need to satisfy in order for us to be able to judge whether her
behavior is rational or not. Obviously, the person has to be able to establish a
preference relation between A and B. In other words, she has to be able to say
whether A is preferred to B, denoted by A  B, or B is preferred to A, denoted
B  A, or she is indifferent between A and B, denoted A ∼ B. In technical terms
we must assume that her preference relation over options A and B is complete
(or connected). Were none of the above three possibilities to hold, we would not
be able to say that whatever she chooses is in accordance with her preferences.
Another requirement we must impose on the preference relation is asymmetry
of the strict preference. That is, if A is preferred to B, then B must not be preferred
to A. On the other hand, the indifference should satisfy symmetry: if the DM is
indifferent between A and B, then she surely must be that between B and A.
Suppose now that the above conditions are satisfied in the choice situation
involving A and B. Then it is possible to assign real numbers to A and B so
that, when choosing between these two, the DM acting in accordance with her
preferences acts as if she were maximizing the numerical values. For example,
if she prefers A to B, we can assign A the value of 100 and B the value of 10
whereupon the DM – if picking A in accordance to her preference – eo ipso
maximizes the value assigned to the alternatives. Similarly, if she prefers B to
A, we assign B a larger numerical value than to A, guaranteeing thus that the
behavior that reflects preferences maximizes the numerical value.
The remaining possibility is that the DM is indifferent between A and B. Then
it would seem natural to state that a rational person chooses A and B with equal
probability of 1/2 if she is indifferent between the two. By assigning both A and
B an identical numerical value, we notice that a DM who chooses A and B with
equal probability does in fact maximize the numerical value which happens to
be identical for both options because of the underlying indifference.
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The numerical values assigned are commonly called utility values. Formally,
utility is seen as a function defined over outcomes or alternatives. Hence in the
two alternative settings the DM appears to be maximizing her utility function by
selecting the alternative she prefers to the other or by choosing both options with
the same probability if she is indifferent between them.
What we have sketched above is a synoptic proof of a representation theorem.
What we have seen is that preference relations can be represented by numer-
ical (utility) values in a way that preserves the fundamental features of the
relation, i.e. that one of the alternatives is preferred to the other or that they
are indifferent.
Two alternative cases are, however, hardly general enough for modeling real-
life decisions. More often than not, the set of available options is much larger.
In general we are dealing with a set A of alternatives. It turns out that we can
extend the representation theorem to these more general settings by imposing two
relatively mild additional conditions on preferences. The first is transitivity of
weak preference relations. This amounts to the following requirement. Suppose
we take three alternatives ai, aj , ak of A so that ai  aj and aj  ak . Here 
denotes the relation ‘at least as preferable as’ or ‘is better than or equal to’ or ‘is
no less preferable than’. Transitivity now requires that ai  ak . In other words,
if alternative i is at least as preferable as alternative j and if the latter is at least
as preferable as alternative k , then also i must be at least as preferable as k . For
example, if you feel that beer is no less preferable than milk and you also feel
that milk is no less preferable than water, then transitivity requires that you also
feel that beer is no less preferable than water.
The other condition pertains to two types of subsets of alternatives: the inferior
sets and superior sets (Harsanyi 1977: 30).8 These are defined for each alternative,
say, ai. I (ai) denotes the former and refers to those alternatives that are either less
preferable than ai or indifferent with it. The superior set S(ai), in turn, consists
of those alternatives which are at least as preferable as ai according to the DM’s
preference relation. The condition called continuity states that for any ai both
I (ai) and S(ai) are closed sets. Closed sets are sets that contain all their boundary
points. The requirement that I (ai) is closed amounts to saying that whenever
there is a sequence of options a1, a2, . . . that converges (i.e. becomes increasingly
similar) to option a0 so that for each option aj in the sequence ai  aj , then also
ai  a0. What continuity says in essence is that small changes in properties of
options are not accompanied with large changes in the attractiveness of options.
In other words, if a sequence of options becomes arbitrarily similar – albeit not
identical – with a given option a0 and all options in the sequence are either in
the inferior or superior set of ai, then a0 is also in the same set (either I (ai) or
S(ai)) as the options in the sequence.
Completeness, transitivity and continuity are the only requirements that a
DM’s preference relation needs to satisfy to fall within the realm of utility
maximization.9 When dealing with situations involving certainty we can, thus,
state that rational behavior is nothing but utility maximization if the DM’s
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous. In other words, if these
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assumptions regarding preferences are satisfied, then whenever the DM chooses
in accordance with her preferences, she acts as if she were maximizing her utility.
To see why this is so it is useful to first notice that completeness and transitivity
of preferences imply that one can form a list of options representing the DM’s
preferences so that each option appears only once in the list with the most pre-
ferred alternatives in the beginning and the least preferred at the end of the list.
Completeness guarantees that all options can be seen as either on the left, on
the right or on the same position as any given alternative. Transitivity, in turn,
guarantees that each option can only appear in one position in the list. Once this
list has been constructed, it is possible to assign numbers to positions on the list
so that larger numbers are given to the more preferred alternatives. Alternatives
in the same position are assigned the same number. So, when acting in accor-
dance with her preferences the DM in fact maximizes her utility. The principle
whereby she makes her choices is in technical terminology called utility ratio-
nalizable (Aleskerov and Monjardet 2002: 30). In other words, her choices can
be justified with reference to the underlying utility function.
The representation of the individual preference relation is, thus, solved. How-
ever, the number assigned can be chosen in many ways since the only requirement
imposed is that more preferred alternatives are associated with a larger number
than are less preferred ones. It is clear that the familiar mathematical opera-
tions on numbers, such as addition, multiplication or division, do not make
sense when applied to numbers representing preference relations. More pre-
cisely, the results of those operations on numbers do not have a counterpart in
the preference relations. This brings us to the other aspect pertaining to mea-
suring preferences: the uniqueness of the resulting number assignment. The
above axioms guarantee that any function of assigning numbers to options that
preserve the ordinal properties of the options, i.e. keeps the listing of options
the same as the listing of the assigned numbers, is an equally good way of
representing preferences. Accordingly, the function is often called the ordinal
utility function.
To represent options under risk or risky prospects, we need new axioms, some
of which are reminiscent of the corresponding axioms under certainty. Before
dwelling on the axioms, let us consider a utility function that is defined for
risky prospects. In other words, the function assigns utilities to options (choices,
acts, policies), each consisting of a probability distribution over a set of cer-
tain outcomes. That is, a risky prospect consists of a list of outcomes and a
list of probabilities with which these outcomes occur. The utility function, then,
indicates the utility of each such prospect. To illustrate, in the preceding sec-
tion we discussed the option of embarking on a bus ride with a valid ticket.
The other option was traveling on the bus without a ticket. The outcomes that
may ensue in this example are (i) that at some point during the bus ride the
passenger encounters an inspector, and (ii) she will not encounter an inspector
during her ride. Suppose that the bus company has decided to randomly assign
inspectors to buses so that overall the probability of encountering an inspec-
tor is 0.1. Traveling on a bus without a valid ticket can now be considered
Homo œconomicus 37
a risky prospect with two outcomes: either encountering an inspector without a
ticket or not encountering one without a ticket with probabilities of 0.1 and 0.9,
respectively. Similarly, the option of riding with a valid ticket is a risky prospect
with outcomes: seeing an inspector and showing her one’s ticket or not seeing
an inspector but having the ticket.
The outcome probabilities are the same in both cases, but the benefit differs.
Assume now, as we did in the case of certainty, that the DM is capable of
forming a complete and transitive preference relation over the outcomes. In our
example it should not be difficult. The worst outcome is clearly that in which the
passenger without a ticket has to face the inspector. The ordering between the
three remaining outcomes is more debatable. From a purely monetary point of
view, the outcome associated with not encountering an inspector while carrying
a valid ticket is worse than not meeting her when not having a ticket. After all,
the only objective difference between these two outcomes seems to be that in
the former one has lost two euros in purchasing the ticket. Similarly obvious
seems to be the ranking between the two outcomes associated with the state
of nature where an inspector is riding on the bus: it is (much) better to buy a
ticket than not to buy one. The only non-trivial comparison involves the outcome
associated with buying a ticket: is it better that the inspector shows up or not?
In purely monetary terms these are equivalent: one loses 2 euros in both states
of nature.
Assuming that the DM has constructed a complete and transitive preference
relation over the outcomes is tantamount to assuming that she is able to work out
a preference order over both the trivial and non-trivial comparisons. We denote
the outcomes by letter pairs (B, NI ), (B, I ), (NB, NI ), (NB, I ) where B and NB
denote the act of buying and not buying, respectively, while I and NI refer to
the presence or absence of the inspector. As was pointed out in the context of
certainty, the complete and transitive preferences can be represented by utilities.
This means that we can assign utilities to the outcomes in a natural way, i.e. so
that the utilities represent the preferences. We denote the utilities as u(B, NI ),
u(B, I ), u(NB, NI ) and u(NB, I ). Now, each outcome is associated with a fixed
monetary loss for the DM. For example, (B, I ) and (B, NI ) involve the loss of
2 euros, while (NB, I ) and (NB, NI ) amount to losses of −100 and 0 euros,
respectively. It is tempting to equate these values with utilities, but it is well-
known that typically utilities are not linear functions of monetary amounts.10
Hence, we shall resort to the more general notation in which we simply refer to
the utility ensuing from a given monetary amount. This may vary from person
to person.
The risky prospect associated with not buying a ticket upon entering the bus can
be written as [(NB, I ), p; (NB, NI ), 1−p)], where p is the probability that there is an
inspector on the bus and 1−p is the probability of there not being one. Similarly,
the risky prospect of buying a ticket can be expressed as [(B, I ), p ; (B, NI ), 1−p].
In this notation one thus lists all the possible outcomes with their occurrence
probabilities so that each outcome–probability pair is separated from others with
a semicolon.
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Let us now define a utility function with the expected utility (EU, for brevity)
property. Given outcomes O1, . . . , Om with probabilities p1, . . . , pm and utility
values u(O1), . . . , u(Om), the utility function u has the EU property if the risky
prospect [(O1, p1; . . . ; Om, pm)] is given the following utility:
u(O1, p1; . . . ; Om, pm) = p1u(O1) + · · · + pmu(Om) (3.1)
In other words, the utility function has the EU property if it associates the
utility of any risky prospect with the weighted average of the utilities of the
outcomes, any of which may ensue under the prospect. Moreover, the weights
are equal to the occurrence probabilities of those outcomes. So, for example, if
a person gets 5 euros if a given toss of a fair coin results in heads facing up
and 0 euros otherwise and if her utility function has the EU property, then she
assigns the act of throwing the coin the utility:
u(heads, 0.5; tails, 0.5) = 0.5 × u(5) + 0.5 × u(0) = 0.5 × u(5)
The EU property singles out a unique way of attaching utility values to risky
prospects. In a way, it represents a consistent way of handling options which
involve probability elements. It is, however, by no means obvious that utility
functions with an EU property would be more common in practice than other
types of utility functions. In fact, as will be seen in the next chapter, empirical
evidence tends to suggest that under some circumstances it is quite common to
deviate from the dictates of EU utility maximization. Yet, it turns out that any
DM who is rational in this sense and whose preferences satisfy a few intuitively
plausible conditions, axioms, does in fact have a utility function that represents
her preferences and, moreover, has the EU property. The DM thus acts as if she
were maximizing her expected utility.11
The first axiom postulates completeness and transitivity of the preference rela-
tion over risky prospects. In other words, it requires that the DM be able to order
all risky prospects so that each prospect occupies one and only one position in
the order. This axiom is thus an extension of the completeness and transitivity
condition to risky prospects. The second axiom is an analogous extension of the
continuity requirement. It says that both the inferior and superior sets are also
closed in the case of risky prospects.12 The third axiom is called monotonicity
in prizes. It is also known as the independence axiom.13 It states that if A  B
and p > 0, then (A, p; C, 1 − p)  (B, p; C, 1 − p). If the latter strict inequality is
replaced with a non-strict one, the condition is known as Savage’s (1954) sure
thing principle. Both versions capture an intuitively plausible requirement: if the
probability of winning is the same in two lotteries, one should prefer the lottery
where the amount won is larger.
The representation theorem concerning rational choice under risk establishes
the conditions for the existence of utility function with the EU property that
represents the DM’s preference relation. It states that whenever the above three
axioms are satisfied, the behavior of a DM that acts in accordance with her
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preferences can be represented as a maximization of an EU function. It states
nothing about how common utility functions with the EU property are. All it says
is that whenever those three axioms about the preference relation are fulfilled,
there exists a utility function with the EU property that represents the relation and,
to the extent the DM acts according to her preferences, her behavior can be seen as
EU maximization.
When compared with decision making under certainty, the risk modality in
fact introduces only one new axiom, the first two are already present in the
axiomatization of the decision making under certainty. It should be observed,
though, that these two axioms are now extended to the domain of risky prospects.
Forming a preference order over certain outcomes is in many cases much less
demanding than doing the same for risky prospects (lotteries). In return to adding
a new axiom – monotonicity in prizes – we, however, get a considerably more
specific utility function than in the case of certainty. To wit, the three axioms
together guarantee the existence of a utility function with the EU property. Thus,
not only do we get to know the order of the options in terms of utility but we
also learn how the DM evaluates risky options in terms of the certain outcomes
that constitute – with given probabilities – the prospects.
As in the case of certainty, also under risk the representation theorem is
accompanied with a theorem that shows the uniqueness of the method of assign-
ing utility values to risky prospects. The theorem says that the utility assignment
is unique up to affine transformations. In other words, all utility functions that
result from a given function, when its values are multiplied by a constant and
another (possibly the same) constant is added to the products, is also a utility
function. This means that if u is a utility function that satisfies the three axioms
of the representation theorem, then v is also an equally valid utility function if
v(x) = k × u(x) + b (3.2)
where k and b are constants with k > 0. Here x denotes an option under consid-
eration. Thus, there are infinitely many utility functions representing the same
preference relation over risky prospects even though the relation satisfies all three
axioms. However, once the zero point and unit of the utility scale are fixed, this
infinity reduces to unity, i.e. when zero point and unit are fixed only one utility
function remains that represents the DM’s preferences.
In the most general setting, namely that of uncertainty, an analogous axiomat-
ization exists (see Harsanyi 1977: 41–47, for proofs; see also Anscombe and
Aumann 1963). A complicating factor is the absence of objective probabilities.
Instead, the representation theorem establishes the conditions for the existence
of a utility function with the subjective expected utility (SEU) property. We
are now dealing with uncertain prospects, that is, unknown probability distribu-
tions over certain outcomes. It is helpful to think of these prospects as outcome
scenarios where the materialization of each outcome is conditioned by some
events and the probability of these events is unknown. For example, an uncertain
prospect might be one in which one wins 10 euros if team A wins an ice-hockey
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match, but loses 1 euro if the game ends in a tie or team B wins. As in cer-
tainty and risk modalities, we try to determine which conditions on preferences
over uncertain prospects have to be fulfilled to guarantee the existence of a
utility function that represents those preferences and has, moreover, the SEU
property.
Robert J. Aumann (born 1930) is one of the most influential game theorists of
modern times. His contributions extend to many areas of game theory: solution con-
cepts, classifications of games, repeated games, market games. Several age cohorts
of leading game theorists have been trained under his supervision. Aumann’s
most important book-length works are Values of Non-Atomic Games (with Lloyd
Shapley) (1974), Lectures on Game Theory (1989), Repeated Games with Incom-
plete Information (with Michael Maschler) (1995) and Collected Papers (2000).
In 2005 he became a Nobel Memorial Prize winner in economics.
The first axiom requires that the DM has a complete and transitive preference
relation over uncertain prospects. That is, for any pair of such prospects, she is
able to say which one is at least as preferable as the other. Furthermore, this
preference relation has to be transitive. The second axiom requires that the DM’s
utility function over risky prospects has the EU property. This is to say that the
axioms pertaining to the risk modality have to be fulfilled. The third axiom is
called the monotonicity in prizes for uncertain prospects or sure thing principle
for uncertain prospects (Harsanyi 1977: 44). It states that whenever two prospects
have identical conditioning events (such as victory, loss or tie) and the former
results in at least as preferable payoffs as the latter under each contingency, then
the former prospect is preferred to the latter.
The representation theorem establishes that the satisfaction of the above three
axioms by a DM’s preference relation is equivalent to an observer being able to
represent her preferences by a utility function that assigns uncertain prospects
utility values according to the SEU principle. This principle gives each prospect
the utility value which is a weighted average of the utilities possibly associated
with the prospect using as weights the subjective probabilities of the condition-
ing events. Hence, a DM who acts according to her preferences and whose
preferences satisfy those axioms is ipso facto an SEU maximizer, that is, is in
fact maximizing her expected utility using as probability weights her subjective
judgments of the probability of the conditioning events.
As in the case of certainty and risk, the principle of assigning utility values to
uncertain prospects is not unique; there are literally an infinite number of equally
justifiable utility assignments. However, as in the case of risk, once the zero
point and the unit of utility is fixed, there is only one way of attaching utilities
that satisfies the three axioms. Hence, the utilities under risk and uncertainty
are called cardinal utilities in contradistinction to ordinal ones. Cardinal scale
measurements are distinguishable from ordinal ones in guaranteeing one property
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that remains invariant regardless of the way in which utilities are assigned. To
wit, the ratio of differences between measurements is the same regardless of
which cardinal measurement is used. To see this, consider two cardinal utility
functions: u and v defined by equation (3.2). Let us now assign utilities to four
options x, y, z and w using v and measure the ratio of the utility difference between
the first two to the utility difference of the latter two options.
v(x) − v(y)
v(z) − v(w) =
k × (u(x) + b) − k × (u(y) + b)
k × (u(z) + b) − k × (u(w) + b) =
u(x) − u(y)
u(z) − u(w)
Thus, it turns out that the ratio of utility differences does not change when
one cardinal measure is replaced with another. This is the defining property of
cardinal scale measurement.
We have now outlined the basic model of rational decision maker, homo
œconomicus. The crucial – and sole – defining feature is the action in accordance
with preferences. This and some fairly mild assumptions regarding preferences
ensure that rationality is tantamount to utility maximization. Thus, the question of
how large a portion of human action is based on utility maximization turns on the
extent to which those assumptions regarding preferences characterize our opin-
ions. So, the question of whether utility maximization is the guiding principle
of human action does not require an a priori answer, but depends on empiri-
cal evidence. It is, after all, an empirical question to determine to what extent
people’s preferences can be expressed in terms of preference relations having
certain formal properties (completeness, transitivity).
Despite their intuitive plausibility the axioms of rational behavior have been
challenged since empirical evidence seems to suggest that reasonable people often
deviate from the dictates of the EU or SEU maximization. In the next chapter
we shall turn to some of these challenges.
3.7 Suggested reading
Two volumes written nearly half a century ago make still very pleasant and
informative reading as introductions to decision theory: Luce and Raiffa (1957)
and Chernoff and Moses (1959). Axiomatic characterizations are also discussed
in Harsanyi (1977). The concept of thin rationality is introduced in Elster (1983).
Informative assessments of rational choice explanations are given by Dowding
(1995) and Blais (2000). The former focuses on coalition formation and the
latter on the act of voting. The distinction between decision theory and decision
analysis is pursued in Raiffa (1994). Useful overviews are French and Xie (1994)
as well as Schoemaker and Russo (1994). All three last mentioned articles are
included in Ríos (1994).
4 Economic man under attack
As we have seen, rational behavior can, under a few relatively undemanding con-
ditions, be seen as utility maximization. That is, people who act in accordance
with their preferences and whose preferences can be represented by complete
and transitive preference relations act as if they were maximizing the value of
their utility function. It is sometimes argued that very often people just do not
aim at maximizing their own utilities. Rather, they aim at guaranteeing the best
possible outcomes for their families, children, pets etc. So – the argument goes –
the model of economic man is doomed to fail for the simple reason that it applies
to a very restricted set of circumstances, namely to the transactions of economic
actors. This argument, which appears in various camouflages in the literature,
is based on a misunderstanding of thin rationality by extending an example of
what a person might want to maximize, profit or wealth, to the entire spectrum of
human behavior. Utility is not necessarily measured in monetary terms. Person
1’s preference over outcomes or the acts leading to them might well be condi-
tional upon person 2’s expressed or anticipated happiness or pleasure under those
outcomes. Consequently, the argument of person 1’s utility function might be a
variable or set of variables that have very little or nothing to do with person 1’s
income or welfare level in various outcomes.
The criticism of the rational choice theory that equates rationality with egoism
is, thus, based on a misunderstanding. Essentially more serious critique against
the theory originates from studies that purport to show that reasonable people
tend to deviate from the predictions of the theory in a systematic fashion. In other
words, under certain types of environments one can expect that deviations from
EU or SEU maximization are frequently encountered. Moreover, not only are
the deviations rather commonplace, but they seem to make sense, intuitively
speaking.
4.1 Classic paradoxes
The first serious criticism against the expected utility theory was presented
much prior to the axiomatization of the theory itself. The decision setting
called the St. Petersburg paradox was discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738
(see Bernoulli 1954 and Bernoulli 1968 for English translations).14 Suppose that
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a person, call him Peter, tosses a coin until heads face up. He promises to pay
another person, Paul, 1 ducat if heads show on the first throw, 2 ducats if heads
show on the second, 4 ducats if heads show on the third, etc.15 The problem
is to determine Paul’s rational payoff expectation or alternatively the amount he
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Obviously, the expected payoff is infinite. Thus, Paul should be willing to
pay any amount of money he can get his hands on to participate. Yet, regard-
less of the rate at which the ducat is converted into the currencies of our time,
very few of us would be willing to pay even the weekly salary for the oppor-
tunity to take Paul’s place. Does this demonstrate that we are irrational? No,
says Daniel Bernoulli, since our expected utility is not the same as the expected
payoff. Rather, ‘the utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be
inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods previously possessed’ (Bernoulli
1968: 17). In his argument, Bernoulli resorts to logarithmic utility function
so that
u(x) = log(x)
Here, however, x includes the wealth already in the possession of the decision
maker, i.e. Paul. Supposing that Paul is in the possession of 50,000 ducats, his
expected utility of participating in Peter’s game is:
u(50,000 + y) = 1
2
× u(50,000 + 1) + 1
4
× u(50,000 + 2) + 1
8







log(50,004) + · · ·
Even though the payoff sum increases without a limit, the sum of weighted
logarithms approaches a finite limit. Solving for y yields the value of roughly
9 ducats (Machina 1987: 123). In other words, the price Paul should be willing
to pay for participation is at most 9 ducats.
The crux in resolving the St. Petersburg paradox is the introduction of the
concept of utility and the principle of decreasing marginal returns: the higher
the existing utility level, the smaller the utility increase that accompanies a fixed
payoff increase. This principle can be seen to underlie, for example, progressive
income taxation: the loss of a given amount of income causes a smaller utility
loss at higher income levels than at smaller ones. Stated in a somewhat different
fashion: utility is typically not linear in money. If one is very poor, the value
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of an additional euro is relatively large, but decreases with the increase of the
amount of wealth. The curve depicting utility as a function of income is thus
normally concave upwards.
Of more recent origin is the paradox that bears the name of the French Nobel
laureate Maurice Allais (1953). In its standard version, the paradox appears in a
choice situation where one is invited to first choose one of two risky prospects and
thereafter to make another choice between two other risky prospects. By defining
the prospects in a suitable way, Allais was able to observe choice behavior which
is not compatible with the EU maximizing view. Consider first prospects r1 and
r2 defined as:
r1 = (1,000,000, 1.0)
r2 = (5,000,000, 0.10; 1,000,000, 0.89; 0, 0.01)
The former prospect gives the payoff of one million euro (the currency can be
chosen freely) with a probability of one, while the latter gives a five times larger
payoff with a probability of 0.1, the payoff of one million with a probability of
0.89 and the zero payoff with a probability of 0.01.
Consider another pair of risky16 prospects: r3 and r4.
r3 = (5,000,000, 0.10; 0, 0.90)
r4 = (1,000,000, 0.11; 0, 0.89)
These are both genuine (that is, non-trivial) risky prospects. Now the para-
dox Allais observed consists of the empirical finding that when asked to choose
between r1 and r2 there was a tendency among his experimental subjects to
choose the former and when faced with the choice between r3 and r4 they also
tended to end up with the former. Yet, this choice behavior can be shown to
be inconsistent with EU maximization. To see this, let us compute the expected
utilities of the four risky prospects. If the decision maker is an EU maximizer,
her choice behavior should reflect this.
EU (r1) = 1 × u(1,000,000)
EU (r2) = 0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.89 × u(1,000,000) + 0.01 × u(0)
EU (r3) = 0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.90 × u(0)
EU (r4) = 0.11 × u(1,000,000) + 0.89 × u(0)
Now, if one prefers r1 to r2 and is an EU maximizer, this means that
u(1,000,000) > 0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.89 × u(1,000,000) + 0.01 × u(0)
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Solving for u(1, 000, 000) yields:
u(1,000,000) >
0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.01 × u(0)
0.11
(4.3)
If, on the other hand, r3 is preferred to r4, as we assumed, we get:
0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.90 × u(0) > 0.11 × u(1,000,000) + 0.89 × u(0)
and thus
u(1,000,000) <
0.10 × u(5,000,000) + 0.01 × u(0)
0.11
(4.4)
Inequality (4.1) says exactly the opposite of what (4.2) asserts. This means that
our assumption regarding EU maximization cannot hold for a decision maker
whose preferences we have considered.
The crux of the paradox is not the empirical frequency of its occurrence, but
the fact that the choice behavior that gives rise to it is intuitively plausible.17
There is nothing strange in choosing r1 rather than r2 and r3 rather than r4. What
makes r1 attractive vis-à-vis r2 is that it guarantees a sizable payoff with certainty,
whereas r2 may lead to a zero payoff, albeit with a very small probability. In the
latter pair, on the other hand, the most likely outcome under both prospects is that
the payoff is zero. Moreover, the probability difference of winning something is
nearly non-existent. Thus, it makes sense to choose the option that gives a much
larger payoff.
Maurice Allais (born 1911) is a French economist who in the 1940s published
two works which provided the main motivation for the Nobel Committee to nom-
inate him the Nobel Memorial Laureate in economics in 1988. The works are A la
recherche dune discipline économique, première partie: L’économique pure (1943)
and Économie et intérêt (1947). The former deals i.a. with the optimality prop-
erties of market equilibria extending and formalizing the earlier results of Adam
Smith, Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto. The latter focuses on capital accumulation
and transaction cost-induced demand for money (Vane and Mulhearn 2005: 168).
The experiments on choice behavior under uncertainty were conducted after the
publication of these major works.
There is yet another decision making paradox that can be called classic, namely
Ellsberg’s paradox. As Allais’ paradox also this one constitutes a violation of EU
maximization. Its setting, however, differs from Allais’ in focusing on uncertain
rather than risky prospects. Consider a jar containing altogether 90 balls, 30 of
which are red. The remaining 60 consist of white and blue balls in an unknown
proportion. You are asked to choose an uncertain prospect from a pair of prospects
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Table 4.1 Ellberg’s paradox
Color (and number) of balls
Red White or blue (60)
Options (30) White Blue
1 $100 $0 $0
2 $0 $0 $100
3 $100 $100 $0
4 $0 $100 $100
and thereafter pick a ball from the jar at random. Its color together with your
choice of prospect determines your payoff. Then the procedure is repeated with
another pair of uncertain prospects, i.e. you make your choice of prospect and
pick a ball again.18 The first pair of prospects consists of 1 and 2, the other
consisting of prospects 3 and 4. Prospect 1 gives you $100 if the ball you pick
happens to be red, otherwise you get nothing. Prospect 2 gives you $100 if the
ball is blue, but nothing otherwise.
Prospect 3 gives you $100 if the ball is either red or white. If it is blue this
prospect gives you nothing. Prospect 4 finally results in payoff $100 if the ball
is either white or blue. Otherwise the prospect gives you nothing. The payoffs
related to prospects are summarized in Table 4.1.
Daniel Ellsberg (born 1931), American scholar and political activist, is best-known
among the general public for his role in the Watergate scandal that led to the
resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in the early 1970s. Ellsberg wrote his
PhD thesis on risk, ambiguity and decision making in the early 1960s (published as
a book in 2001). He then worked in the RAND Corporation as a strategic analyst
focusing mainly on nuclear war issues and decisions in crisis situations. His work
on the war in Vietnam brought him to the Defense and State Departments of the
US government. He contributed to a secret study on the background of and the
reasons for the Vietnam war. This study, later known as The Pentagon Papers, led
to a substantial erosion of the support of the Vietnam war. Recently, Ellsberg has
strongly protested the US invasion of Iraq.
In his experiments, Ellsberg (1961) found that many people would choose 1
over 2, but 4 over 3. This choice behavior is inconsistent with EU maximization.
To see this, let the probability of blue balls be q. Since we know that the proba-
bility of a red ball being drawn is 1/3, the probability of a white ball is 2/3 − q.
Let us assume that the utility of 0 payoff equals 0. Now, for an EU maximizer
the preference of option 1 over option 2 entails:
1/3×u($100)+2/3×u($0)>1/3×u($0)+(2/3−q)×u($0)+q×u($100)
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or
1/3 × u($100) > q × u($100) (4.5)
On the other hand, the preference of option 4 over option 3 yields:
2/3 × u($100) + 1/3 × u($0) > 1/3 × u($100) + (2/3 − q) × u($100)
+ q × u($0),
whereupon we get:
q × u($100) > 1/3 × u($100)
which contradicts the inequality of equation (4.5).
Allais’ and Ellsberg’s paradoxes show that intuitively reasonable behavior may
result in choices that do not maximize the expected utility of the decision maker.
This then means that at least one of the axioms discussed in the preceding sections
has been violated. A common culprit or suspect has been the monotonicity in
prizes or sure-thing principle. There is also experimental evidence that points to
difficulty in forming transitive preference relation over risky prospects. Consider
the following list of risky prospects:
1. ($5.00, 7/24; $0, 17/24)
2. ($4.75, 8/24; $0, 16/24)
3. ($4.50, 9/24; $0, 15/24)
4. ($4.25, 10/24; $0, 14/24)
5. ($4.00, 11/24; $0, 13/24)
The expected values of payoffs increase from top to bottom (from value $1.46
to $1.83). Tversky (1969) found in his experiments that a sizable subgroup of his
experimental subjects exhibited behavior whereby in adjacent pairwise choices,
they preferred the prospect with the higher maximum value (and smaller expected
payoff), but in the comparison between the extreme prospects preferred the one
with the higher probability of winning (and higher expected value). As an exam-
ple, one could single out behavior preferring the first prospect to the second one,
the second to the third one, the third to the fourth one, the fourth to the fifth one
and, yet, the fifth prospect to the first. These subjects thus exhibited intransitive
preference relations.
Yet, the behavior is by no means intuitively irrational. The fact that the
consecutive comparisons end up with the higher prospect of being preferred
to the lower one can be explained by the minuscule difference in probabili-
ties in contrast to easily distinguishable payoff differences. However, when the
prospects are further apart, the probability differences also enter the calculus.
Thus, the fifth prospect offers a probability of nearly 50% of winning something,
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while the first option contains less than one-thirds of the probability for a non-zero
payoff.
One should not, however, lose sight of an important consequence of pref-
erence intransitivity, namely that a person with intransitive preferences can be
financially exploited almost ad libitum. Suppose that Mr Smith is offered a ticket
to one of the following sports events: (1) Liverpool vs. Manchester United
football game, (2) New York Islanders vs. Calgary Flames ice hockey game
or (3) Real Madrid vs. Barcelona football game. Smith likes (1) more than
(2) and (2) more than (3), but when faced with the choice between (1) and
(3), he prefers (3). He might consider football typically more boring than ice
hockey (which explains his preference of (2) to (3)), but he anticipates that the
atmosphere at Liverpool’s home ground is likely to be intense enough to turn
his preference of games around. On the other hand, he finds Spanish football
much more to his liking than English football. Hence, given a choice between
the two football matches he chooses (3). Clearly, Smith’s preference relation is
intransitive.
Suppose now that Mr Jones has a ticket to each of these three events. He gives
Smith one of them, say (1). Smith is obviously pleased, but knowing that Jones
also has tickets to the other events, offers to give Jones the ticket back and give
him $x if Jones gives him a ticket to (3). After all, he prefers (3) to (1). Jones
accepts the offer. While counting his money he reminds Smith that he also has a
ticket to (2) which he is willing to impart if Smith pays him something and gives
back his ticket to (3). Smith accepts the offer, receives a ticket to (2) and gives
Jones $y plus the ticket to (3). Jones now has $x + y and tickets to (1) and (3).
Smith realizes that he prefers (1) to (2) and thus offers to give Jones his ticket
to (2) back sweetened with a small amount, say $z, in cash if Jones gives him a
ticket to (1). We have now reached the situation we started from, namely Jones
giving Smith a ticket to (1). There is a crucial difference, though: Jones has
become $x + y + z richer on the way. The process may be continued as long
as Smith has any money left to offer. This process is called the money pump. It
shows that no matter how intuitively plausible an intransitive preference relation
may be in some circumstances, following it in one’s choice behavior is a receipt
of economic disaster.
Not just transitivity but also the completeness of preference relation may come
into question. A well-known case where completeness seems to fail is the pref-
erence reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). The phenomenon
occurs when a person says that she prefers option A to option B, but at the
same time indicates that she is prepared to pay more for B than for A. The phe-
nomenon is paradoxical to the extent that very often willingness to pay is used
as an indicator – indeed the sole indicator – of preference.
Figure 4.1 represents two lotteries, the left and right circle. Each lottery
involves a random throw of a dart. In the left lottery the payoff is $0 if the
dart hits the vertical line shown in the figure. Otherwise the payoff is $4 in
the left lottery. The lottery on the right, in turn, gives $16 if the dart lands on
the smaller area of the circle. Otherwise, there is a zero payoff.
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Figure 4.1 The preference reversal experiment.
Experimental evidence seems to suggest that when asked which of the two
lotteries the experimental subjects prefer, a sizable portion of them indicate pref-
erence for the left lottery. However, when asked how much the same subjects
would be willing to pay for participating in each lottery, the right lottery seems to
be given a higher price (see also Grether and Plott 1979). Obviously the willing-
ness to pay cannot always be used as a synonym for preference. An open question
still, more than 30 years after the initial observations of preference reversal, is
to what extent economic and political phenomena are vulnerable to it. Yet, some
attempts to account for them have been made. We shall discuss one such attempt
shortly.
Charles R. Plott (born 1938), an American economist and political scientists, is
one of the pioneers of laboratory experimentation of choice behavior, markets and
other socio-economic mechanisms. Plott has also made important contributions to
axiomatic social choice theory and to the study of regulatory and de-regulation poli-
cies. He has established a leading center of experimental economics at California
Institute of Technology in Pasadena. Some of his most important works are col-
lected in Collected Papers on the Experimental Foundations of Economics and
Political Science, vols 1–3 (2001). Another important text is The Allocation of
Scarce Resources (with David Grether and Mark Isaac) (1989).
4.2 The prospect theory
The significance of the preceding puzzling findings is in their systematic nature.
In other words, the observations cannot be accounted for by referring to random
variation in human behavior patterns. Rather the occurrences seem to have some
invariant characteristics. Yet, the findings referred to above are by no means
universal. Indeed, in most cases it is only a minority of experimental subjects
that exhibits the behavior that is inconsistent with the EU theory. With this caveat
in mind, we now briefly review some of the literature that has evolved in the
decision making field in an effort to account for the findings.
Prospect theory is based on the idea that the deviations from EU maximiza-
tion observed in experimental settings are due to differences the experimental
subjects perceive in prospects that are associated with identical expected utility
values. For example, suppose that a person’s utility for money is of the
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form: u(x) = x where x is a given sum of money. Now it may well be the
case that this person sees a clear difference between receiving 50 euro and par-
ticipating in a lottery that gives her the same amount in expected value, e.g. as
a result of the toss of a fair coin. In other words, the person may perceive that
u(50) = 12 u(100) + 12 u(0).
If she thinks that the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand one, she
is risk averse. If the converse is true, she is a risk taker. Just in case she
finds both sides equal, she is risk-neutral. These three possibilities are called
risk postures.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the observed systematic deviations
from EU maximization behavior are due to various aspects of prospects that are
not taken into account in EU calculus. These aspects are reflected in three effects
observable in experiments. The first is called the certainty effect. An instance of
this effect can be seen in the Allais paradox discussed in the preceding section.
In the comparison between r1 and r2 the first thing that strikes the observer is
that r1 is, in fact, not risky at all, but guarantees a large payoff with certainty.
In the second comparison, namely that between r3 and r4, the EU considerations
call for the choice of the former under the rather reasonable assumption that the
utility of 10% chance of $5,000,000 is greater than the utility of 11% chance of
$1,000,000. In the latter pair of prospects both are genuinely risky, while in the
former pair one is a certain prospect.
Daniel Kahneman (born 1934) and Amos Tversky (1937–1996) developed the
prospect theory which accounts for the deviations of choices from the predictions
based on expected utility maximization under risk. Over two decades, these two
psychologists singled out several intuition-based principles or heuristics and sys-
tematic biases in human decision making. Kahneman has also studied individuals’
perceptions of fairness in economic transactions. Tversky’s interests extended to
the foundations of measurement theory as well. Their main works can be found
in two collections: Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman
et al. 1982) and Choices, Values and Frames (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).
Kahneman became a Nobel Memorial Laureate in economics in 2002.
One of the principles of prospect theory states that prospects involving certainty
get special treatment in decision makers’ calculus: their attractiveness exceeds
that of risky prospects with the same expected utility. This, however, holds only
for utility gains. Another finding or effect found by Kahneman and Tversky is
related to losses. It is called the reflection effect. It states that the risk posture
changes when the payoffs are seen as losses compared to situations where they
are seen as gains. Consider for example a person who exhibits risk aversion
when confronted with the choice between two options: (1) she can participate
in a lottery that gives her 100 euro with a probability of 0.5 and nothing with a
probability of 0.5, and (2) she is given 50 euro. Being risk-averse means that she
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will choose option (2). Suppose now that the same person is presented a choice
between (3) and (4) where (3) is the prospect of losing 100 euro with a probability
of 0.5 and losing nothing with a probability of 0.5 and (4) means losing 50 euro
with certainty. In the Kahneman and Tversky experiments it turned out that a
majority of subjects was risk-averse when the options involve gains, but risk-
acceptant when they involve losses. In other words, in dealing with losses the
subjects tended to choose (3) rather than (4).
The prospect theory contains yet another effect, namely the isolation effect or
framing. This is, in fact, a combination of the two preceding effects. It occurs
whenever the choice behavior regarding risky prospects is changed by how the
options are presented to the decision maker. The isolation effect is based on the
fact that risky options can be presented in several ways. If the way in which
the option is presented changes its probability of being chosen by the decision
maker, then we have an instance of the effect. Consider, for example, the risky
option r5 = (100, 0.5; 0, 0.5). It can be presented as a two-stage prospect where
in the first stage the experimental subject is given 50 euro and in the second
stage she participates in the following lottery r6 = (50, 0.5; −50, 0.5). Or, it
can be presented as a three-stage prospect where the subject is given 50 euro
in the first stage, another 50 euro in the second stage and in the third stage she
participates in the lottery r7 = (0, 0.5; −100, 0.5).
In one of their experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) confronted half of
their experimental subjects with the choice between options (i) and (ii) and the
other half with the choice between (iii) and (iv). Option (i) gives each subject first
1000 and then gives her a ticket to a lottery which gives an additional payoff of
1000 with probability 1/2 and nothing with probability 1/2. Option (ii) also gives
the subject first 1000, but then gives an additional 500 with certainty. Option (iii)
gives the subject first 2000 and then assigns her the lottery with payoffs −1000
and 0, each with probability 1/2. Option (iv) similarly gives the subject first
2000, but withdraws −500 from this with certainty. An overwhelming majority
of Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental subjects preferred (ii) to (i) and a
somewhat smaller majority preferred (iii) to (iv). Yet, it can be seen that (i) is
in fact identical with (iii) and (ii) is identical with (iv). Yet, the preference of
the majority of subjects seems to reverse depending on the way the options are
framed.
The preference for (ii) over (i) is consistent with risk aversion on the positive
domain, i.e. when the payoffs are gains rather than losses. The preference for (iii)
over (iv), on the other hand, indicates risk acceptance on the negative domain,
i.e. with negative payoffs. In the latter choice situation the subjects are already
in the possession of the 2000 given to them at the outset. Hence they are making
choices which at best result in them being able to hold on to the 2000.
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory accounts for the above effects in
qualitative terms. Its basic features are embodied in Figure 4.2. The horizontal
axis represents positive (gains) and negative (losses) payoffs, while the ver-
tical axis stands for the subjective value assigned to each payoff. The curve
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Figure 4.2 Valuation of gains and losses according to prospect theory.
representing prospect valuations according to the prospect theory has the
following characteristics:
• it is monotonically non-decreasing in the positive domain,
• it reflects diminishing marginal valuations on the positive domain (i.e. the
utility increments corresponding identical payoff increments become smaller
when moving from left to right),
• it expresses risk aversion on the positive domain,
• it is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain (i.e. similar pay-
off increments are accompanied with much larger utility increments in the
negative domain than in the positive one), and
• it reflects risk acceptance in the negative domain.
In essence, the prospect theory implies that the observed deviations from EU
maximization are not random but systematic responses to uncertainty. It states
that people tend to value certain gains more than risky prospects resulting in
identical gains in expected value. Similarly it states that, given a fixed certain
loss, we are more willing to risk even higher losses if these are accompanied with
real chances of losing nothing. It also says that losses loom larger than gains with
identical absolute value.
4.3 Further anomalies
The prospect theory explains some crucial features of behavior patterns under
risk. In particular, it accounts for the special ‘treatment’ that options with certain
payoffs enjoy in choice behavior. Similarly, the effects of the framing of options
are clearly revealed in this theory. In a way, the prospect theory is an attempt
to improve upon EU maximization just as the introduction of utilities helps to
understand certain anomalies, such as the St. Petersburg paradox. Prospect theory
argues that the utility values of alternatives are relative in an important sense.
Value 
Losses Gains 
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That’s to say, the utility of an alternative varies with the reference point of the
decision maker. If she is looking at an alternative as a gain with respect to her
present level of welfare, she is likely to exhibit risk aversion, while she accepts
risk if she is dealing with losses. By describing a risky prospect in different ways
one is able to move the reference point of the decision maker, thus, making
downright contradictory choices intelligible. This is analogous to transforming
the EU values of options by taking into account the reference point with respect
to which the options are evaluated.
None the less, there is a fundamental similarity between EU maximization
and prospect theory, namely in both cases the choice behavior is explained in
terms of something that pertains to the options at hand. The options are seen as
possessing a property – call it attractiveness – that determines the choices. The
underlying principle of choice is the same in both theories: the decision makers
choose alternatives that are most attractive and the attractiveness is a property of
options as such.
There are, however, other choice patterns contradicting EU maximization
that cannot be accounted for by the prospect theory. An important class of
those patterns consists of behaviors that seem to condition the choices not
only on reference points but also on the set of options available. In other
words, there are situations in which the choices seem to depend not only on
the properties of the options but also on which other options are available. This
context-dependence has been observed, for example, in consumer choice exper-
iments (Huber et al. 1982; Simonson 1989; Shafir et al. 1989, 1990, 2000;
Nurmi 1998: 32–37).
Two effects are of particular interest since they suggest that not only pairs of
alternatives, but the entire choice context – the entire alternative set, the position
of alternatives with respect to ‘third’ ones – affects the choice behavior. The
first one pertains to situations where one of the available alternatives can be
seen as a compromise between the others. A three-alternative case is depicted
in Figure 4.3. Suppose that alternatives X, Y and Z are described in terms of
two properties represented by the horizontal and vertical axis. The alternatives
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could be, for example, consumer goods and the axes could represent aesthetic
and economic value so that larger coordinate values represent superior values on
both dimensions. X is thus the best alternative in aesthetic and Y in economic
terms. Suppose now that X is removed and the experimental subject is asked
to choose either Y or Z. Once she has made her choice, X is added to the
figure and she is asked to choose from the set of all three alternatives in the
indicated configuration. There is some evidence that the probability of Z being
chosen vis-à-vis Y is higher when X is present than when it is absent. This is
known as the compromise effect for the obvious reason that in the three-alternative
configuration Z can be seen as a compromise alternative: better than Y in terms
of aesthetic but not economic value, and better than X in economic but not in
aesthetic value.
Compromise solutions are quite common in politics, but they appear also in
other group choice situations. In selecting a departmental secretary, for example,
some academics might emphasize the applicants’ language skills, while others
might appreciate mainly their text-processing prowess. It is not difficult to
envision a setting where three applicants X, Y and Z can be placed in a two-
dimensional space as in Figure 4.3, with the horizontal axis representing the
level of knowledge of languages and the vertical one the degree of mastery of
text-processing techniques. It might well be that Z’s chances of being elected are
improved vis-à-vis Y when X is present from what they would have been had
X not applied. The presence of X among applicants might call attention to the
linguistic skills dimension and, thus, indirectly to the fact that Z is not the worst
applicant on either dimension. Both X and Y are: X on the text-processing skills
dimension and Y on the linguistic capability one.
Another effect that pertains to context-dependence of choices is exemplified
in Figure 4.4. As Figure 4.3, this figure should also be considered together with
another one where one of the alternatives has been removed. In Figure 4.4,
alternative X represents a better alternative than Z both in horizontal and ver-
tical dimension. It can, thus, be said to dominate Z. Alternative Y, in contrast,
although superior to Z on the vertical dimension is inferior to the latter on the
horizontal dimension. Hence, Y does not dominate Z nor does Z dominate Y.
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Consider now Figure 4.4 without alternative Z. In this setting one alternative is
better than the other on one dimension and worse than the other on the other
dimension. The superiority of X or Y depends on the weight assigned to the
dimensions: if the vertical dimension is given the primary weight, then Y is bet-
ter, but if the horizontal dimension is the dominant one, then X is better. With the
introduction of Z the situation changes. There is now one contestant alternative,
namely Z, that is defeated by one, but only one of the others, namely X. Hence, it
could be argued that X is better than Y in virtue of defeating (dominating) some-
thing that Y cannot defeat. Indeed, this argumentation would seem to underlie
what is known as the asymmetric domination effect, i.e. the observation that in
situations resembling that of Figure 4.4, individuals’ probability of choosing X
rather than Y is higher than their probability of choosing X rather than Y in the
setting where Z has been removed.
As the compromise effect, that of asymmetric domination also makes sense,
intuitively speaking. The notion of one alternative being better than another often
has to do with winning some kind of contest. When one alternative dominates
another – as X does Z in Figure 4.4 – it can be seen as winning a pairwise contest.
If the idea of overall winning is one in which the best alternative is the one that
defeats as many others as possible, then it is natural to deem X better than Y
since it defeats Z, while Y does not.
What compromise and asymmetric domination effects purport to demonstrate
is that there are circumstances under which plausible choices seem to depend
on the entire choice situation. Thus, no theory that makes choices contingent on
properties of alternatives can account for these choices. If the probability of X
being chosen rather than Y is dependent on whether Z is available or not (as in
Figure 4.4), then obviously the choice is not determined solely by properties of
X and Y. It is worth pointing out that prospect theory is also vulnerable to this
type of criticism.
The crucial question, however, is whether the choices that constitute the com-
promise and asymmetric domination effect pertain to rationality of the choices.
That these choices make intuitive sense in some circumstances is not the pri-
mary issue. Rather one should ask: is the choice of a ‘compromise’ alternative
always rational? Similarly, is it always rational to pick of two alternatives the
one that dominates a third, provided that the other one does not? It seems
that the answer to both questions has to be ‘no’. Although there are circum-
stances under which such choices can be defended as reasonable, it simply does
not follow that those choices would always be rational. Consider the situation
depicted in Figure 4.3 and assume that one of the dimensions, say the verti-
cal one, represents a property that is essential for the success of the chooser,
while the other, horizontal, dimension represents a property that is largely irrel-
evant. To continue the preceding example, suppose that the academic secretary
is working in an English-speaking community and will be dealing only with
text-processing tasks. Under these circumstances, language skills are largely
irrelevant for the task at hand. Thus, choosing Y would seem the only ratio-
nal choice, regardless of the presence or absence of X. Similarly, in the case
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of asymmetric domination, if one of the dimensions is largely irrelevant, the
fact that one of the alternatives asymmetrically dominates a third one does not
make its choice rational. What counts is which alternative is best on the essential
dimension.19
The context-dependence of choice behavior, therefore, does not seem to chal-
lenge the standard maximization concept of rationality. Over the past few decades
a considerable literature has emerged on other systematic violations of some of
the basic assumptions of probability and decision theory (Kahneman et al. 1982;
Kahneman and Tversky 2000). The most dramatic ones have been reviewed
above. Now, how badly do all these other anomalies shatter the status of homo
œconomicus? The scholarly community has not reached consensus on this. To the
extent that the effects are systematic, they do, of course, call into question
the descriptive and predictive value of the standard rationality assumption. The
normative importance is, however, a different matter. Even though people sys-
tematically violate, say, the transitivity axiom in some risky contexts, the money
pump argument still applies, i.e. these people lose money regardless of the
outcomes of the conditioning events. Thus, one could argue that systematic vio-
lations of rationality are experimental peculiarities that do not survive in the real
world. Learning from mistakes would wipe out behaviors that lead to systematic
losses. Yet, some effect patterns are relatively frequent. Rather than consider-
ing them as unimportant peculiarities, their prevalence calls for the study of the
general conditions under which they occur.
Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude with Grether and Plott (1979: 634): ‘The
fact that preference theory and related theories of optimization are subject to
exception does not mean that they should be discarded. No alternative theory
currently available appears to be capable of covering the same extremely broad
range of phenomena.’ Some 25 years later this conclusion still seems correct.
All alternatives to the EU and SEU theory seem either more limited in scope or
poorer in informative content.
The extensive literature on behavioral economics and experimental study of
human decision processes has, however, demonstrated the limits of the stan-
dard rationality. Its field of application is the setting where choice is to be
made under fixed institutional circumstances from a given set of alternatives.
Political economy extends far beyond these types of settings. In particular,
the emergence of the institutional settings themselves is often of interest, as
are the processes whereby the alternative sets become ‘given’. Nobel laureate
Vernon L. Smith (2005: 135–150) distinguishes between two types of rational-
ity: constructivist and ecological. The former is in line with the standard view
of rationality in emphasizing conscious planning of choices through deliberate
use of reason. The latter, in turn, emphasizes emergent outcomes, arrangements
and institutions planned by no one and yet surviving and benefiting individuals
and communities. The standard homo œconomicus clearly belongs to the con-
structivist type. It can, however, be used in analyzing and evaluating institutions
and arrangements.
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Vernon L. Smith (born 1927) is a pioneer in experimental economics. His first
works in this field were published in the early 1960s. Of particular importance
are his results on market institutions, most notably the findings demonstrating
that markets seem to result in an equilibrium in a wide variety of experimentally
controlled conditions. His results on the role of financial incentives in inducing
rational behavior provide the experimental background for the mushrooming of
various management incentive schemes in the modern corporate life. Smith’s main
results are reported in the three volumes of Research in Experimental Economics
(1979, 1982, 1985). He was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics
in 2002.
4.4 Suggested reading
The observed deviations from the EU principle have provided inspiration to
the series of conferences entitled ‘Foundations and Applications of Utility and
Risk Theories’. The proceedings of these conferences – e.g. Allais and Hagen
(1979), Munier (1988) and Munier and Shakun (1988) – contain many important
contributions. Critical examinations of and theoretical alternatives to the EU
theory have been proposed by several authors: Allais (1979), Binmore (1987)
and (1988), Fishburn (1988), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Machina (1982)
and Simon (1972), to name the most prominent ones. More recent alternatives to
EU theory are collected in Kahneman and Tversky (2000). The journal Theory
and Decision is one of the main scholarly outlets in decision theoretical research.
5 Games: descriptions and solutions
Thus far our interest has been on individual decision making in environments
characterized by the concept of state. The latter suggests that the environment is
in a way passive, but capable of transiting from one state to another unbeknownst
to the decision maker. Yet, it is assumed not to anticipate or react to the latter’s
choices. It is not even assumed to have priorities with regard to its own states or
those resulting from the choices of the decision maker. It is, in a word, taken to
be a non-strategic entity. Clearly, many settings in political economy do not fit
this description. Entrepreneurs cannot assume that entering a new market will go
unnoticed by the firms already operating in those markets. Political leaders typi-
cally design the campaigns explicitly for the purpose of attracting new supporters
from the ranks of other parties. The representatives of the latter are an essential
part of those designs. Indeed, almost all purposive action of some interest to
political economy takes place in a strategic environment, i.e. one characterized
by several goal-directed actors who are aware of the presence of each other and
of the fact that the outcomes emerge out of the interactions taking place between
them. Game theory provides the most important tools for modeling precisely
strategic environments.
5.1 Games, game forms and strategies
To illustrate some basic concepts of game theory, let us consider a slightly
modified version of an example discussed by Dutta (1999: 54–55). In 1996 the
United Nations was in the process of electing the Secretary General for the period
1997–2001. One of the candidates for the office was Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
an Egyptian diplomat, who had already served as the Secretary General from
1992. He was facing two serious contestants, the Norwegian Prime Minister
Mrs Gro Harlem Brundtland and a United Nations diplomat, Mr Kofi Annan
of Ghana. As things turned out, the most important actors – ‘kingmakers’ – on
the UN scene in this issue were the United States and the coalition of African
countries. The US government was rumored to be in favor of a female Secretary
and opposed to Boutros-Ghali, while the coalition wanted to continue the latter’s
term of office. From the media one could infer that the US had the following
order of preference over candidates: Brundtland  Annan  Boutros-Ghali.
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The African countries, in turn, had the preference: Boutros-Ghali  Annan 
Brundtland.
In the election of the Secretary the UN resorts to a procedure that aims at
guaranteeing that no voter ends up with her very worst alternative elected. A way
to make sure that this will not happen is to give each voter a chance to veto a
candidate. Suppose that the US goes first and vetoes one of the candidates. The
African coalition may then veto one of the remaining candidates, whereupon the
candidate who remains is the winner. Let us denote the choices of the US by A for
Annan, B for Boutros-Ghali and H for Harlem Brundtland. For each choice by the
US the African coalition can respond in two different ways. Hence, the number
of available choices of the coalition is 23 = 8. We denote these by triples of the
type (BAB) where the first element B denotes the choice of the coalition if the US
has vetoed A, the second element A denotes its choice if the US has vetoed B and
the third element B its choice if the US vetoes H. Assume that the players get the
utility value 1 if their favorite is elected, value 0 if their second-best alternative is
elected and value −1 if their last-ranked candidate wins. We can form Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 UN Secretary General election game
USA
Coalition
BAA BAB BHA BHB HAA HAB HHA HHB
A 1, −1 1, −1 1, −1 1, −1 −1, 1 −1, 1 −1, 1 −1, 1
B 1, −1 1, −1 0, 0 0, 0 1, −1 1, −1 0, 0 0, 0
H −1, 1 0, 0 −1, 1 0, 0 −1, 1 0, 0 −1, 1 0, 0
The rows of the matrix represent the choices of the US, while the columns
stand for the alternatives open to the African coalition. In game theoretical
terminology the rows and columns are called strategies. Sometimes a distinction
is made between acts and strategies so that the former denote elementary behavior
alternatives, while the latter embody more complex acts: rules of choosing acts
under various circumstances (see e.g. Chernoff and Moses 1959). Thus, in the
above matrix the US choices are acts, while those of the coalition are strategies
since they are conditional on the US choices. In game theory it is, however, quite
common not to make any distinction between acts, choices and strategies. In this
text these concepts will be used interchangeably.
The entries of Table 5.1 represent all outcomes resulting from the US – or
row player in this game – choosing one of its available acts and the African
coalition – here the column player – also choosing one of its available strategies.
For example, the entry at the intersection of the row B and column BHA stands
for the outcome resulting from the US vetoing B and the coalition following the
strategy BHA which calls for vetoing H if the US has vetoed B. So, the outcome
is A since both B and H have been vetoed. Now, instead of 0, 0 one could write
A on row B’s column BHA. This would reveal only the outcome resulting from
the choices of players, not the value it carries to the players. If we are interested
I I I I I I I I I 
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in the outcomes of choices rather than their value to the players, this would be
a perfectly reasonable description of the choice situation. In fact, we would then
be dealing with a game form rather than a game. A game differs from the game
form by adding the information concerning the outcome values. Thus, Table 5.1
defines a two-player game.
The entry 0, 0 at the intersection of row B and column BHA indicates the value
that the outcome A has for the players. By convention, the values are separated
by a comma with the left digit denoting the value for the row player and the right
digit the value for the column player. Table 5.1 gives an exhaustive account of
the outcomes of the game in terms of the value that the outcomes are associated
with in the players’ opinion. This way of describing and defining a two-person
game is called the matrix form. Sometimes it is also called the strategic form
since it reveals all possible strategy combinations of players and indicates the
resulting outcome values. The latter are often called payoffs.
Upon inspecting the entries of Table 5.1 we observe that in each cell the sum
of entries equals zero. This feature defines a zero-sum game. In these games
the players extract payoffs basically from each other: whatever is achieved by
one player is lost by the other. The players obviously have a conflict of interest.
Similar conflict characterizes all games where the sum of payoffs of each outcome
is a constant. These are, accordingly, called constant-sum games.
We have now transformed an interaction situation into a form that is amenable
to game-theoretic analysis. As in any scholarly activity, the aim is to make
the player behavior intelligible ex post or predict what will happen ex ante.
Let us begin with the prediction. Starting from the assumption that the players
are rational in the thin sense, we look for strategy choices that lead to the best
outcomes for the players. Looking along the rows and columns we observe that
each choice of one player can lead to several different outcomes and payoffs.
For example, the choice of A (i.e. vetoing Annan) by the US can lead to B or H .
In other words, choosing A the US may come up with its best or worst outcome.
Similarly, choosing BAA the African coalition may end up with either Brundtland
or Boutros-Ghali, its worst or best candidate depending on whether the US
vetoes Annan, Boutros-Ghali (both resulting in Brundtland) or Brundtland. These
outcome possibilities express the strategic uncertainty facing the players when
making their choices.
If there is a strategy that gives a player her best outcome no matter what
the choice of the other player, there would be no reason to choose any other
strategy. Not only would this strategy guarantee the player her best outcome, but it
would also do away with strategic uncertainty. A rational player would almost by
definition choose such a strategy. A glance at Table 5.1 reveals, however, that this
prescription is not applicable. No row has only 1 entry as the left element in each
column. Similarly, no column has only 1 entry as the right element in each row.
So, we have to look closer at the payoffs associated with the strategy choices.
Let us consider the strategies in pairs to see if there is a way of telling which in
each pair is superior to the other. Let us focus on the US strategies A and B first.
We see that the former leads to a better outcome in two columns, while B is better
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in four other columns. In two columns the outcomes are the same regardless of
whether A or B is chosen. Considering now A and H rows, we end up with
a similar conclusion: the former leads to a better outcome for the US in four
columns, while H is better in two. In two columns, the payoffs for the US are
the same. The third pair of the US strategies, B and H , proceeds in the same
fashion. Here we see, however, that B is better than H in six columns, while both
strategies yield identical outcomes in two columns. Therefore, in the terminology
of section 3.5 B weakly dominates H .
Thus, the answer to the question of which strategy would be best for the US
is somewhat disappointing: it depends on the choice of the African coalition.
What we can say, though, is that H is not the best strategy for the US since there
is another strategy (B) that weakly dominates it. Let us now look at Table 5.1
from the viewpoint of the coalition. Now we are able to give a more informa-
tive answer. Comparing the two left-most strategies reveals that one of them is
unequivocally superior: BAA yields at least as high a payoff as BAB to the coali-
tion no matter which is the choice of the US. Furthermore, there is one choice
by the US for which BAA gives not only as high but strictly a higher payoff
than BAB. In game-theoretic terminology this means that BAA weakly dominates
BAB. But we can do better than say that BAA is to be preferred to BAB by
the coalition. To wit, there is a strategy that weakly dominates all the others.
This strategy is HHA. It is the dominant strategy for the coalition and thus the
unambiguously best option. As in decision theory, this prescription follows from
pairwise comparison of the alternative strategies in terms of a uniform criterion
which determines the pairwise winner. If there is an alternative that wins when
compared with any other, then this should be chosen. We shall encounter this
intuitive notion of what constitutes the best choice several times later on.
What the dominant strategy prescribes the coalition to do is to veto Brundtland
both in the case when the US vetoes Annan and in the case it vetoes Boutros-
Ghali, but to veto Annan if the US has vetoed Brundtland. This makes perfect
sense, given the preference of the coalition and, in particular, their view of
Brundtland as the least-favored candidate. Therefore it is sensible to veto her in
all cases except when she has already been vetoed by the US.
Now assume that both players know the information in Table 5.1, i.e. the
strategies and payoffs of each other as well as the fact that both know it and that
they know that the other player knows, etc. This assumption is called the common
knowledge assumption in game theory. This implies, in particular, that the US
knows that the coalition has a unique strategy that dominates all the others. This,
in turn, can be viewed as a very strong prediction that the coalition will choose
its dominant strategy HHA. In other words, in pondering upon its choice the US
may focus its attention solely on the HHA column. Taking into account the fact
that H is weakly dominated by B for the US, we can eliminate the last row in
Table 5.1 to end with Table 5.2.
The best response of the US to the dominant strategy of the coalition is
clearly B. The end result, then, is that the US vetoes Boutros-Ghali, while the
coalition vetoes Brundtland. Thus, Annan is elected.
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Games like the one described in Table 5.1 are called dominance-solvable since
by eliminating dominated strategies we end up with a unique outcome, in this
case the choice of Annan. More generally solutions in game theory are to be
understood as predictions of what will happen in the game assuming that the
players are rational. In some games both players have dominant strategies. The
solution is then to be found in the intersection of those strategies. It may also
turn out that neither player has a dominant strategy. Various game theoretic
solutions have been suggested for those games as well. We shall turn to some of
them later, but before that let us focus on another important way of describing
games.
5.2 Strategies and extensive form
As pointed out above, the choices of the African coalition differ from those
available to the US in being conditional. If they were not, we would have a 3×3
matrix with identical row and column heads A, B and H . We assumed, however,
that the process of vetoing is sequential so that the US goes first whereupon
the coalition has two remaining options to choose from. Thus, the conditional
nature of the coalition choices follows from the way the game is played out
in reality. Along with the matrix form there is another way of describing the
essential features of the game, namely the extensive form. It is particularly useful
in games with two players who make their choices sequentially.20
In extensive representation the game forms a tree where the branches stand for
strategies available to the players represented by nodes. The sequence of moves
is from top to bottom. In Figure 5.1 the US makes the first move, i.e. eliminates
either A (chooses the left-most branch), B (the middle branch) or H (the right-
hand branch). Depending on its choice the African coalition finds itself either in
the left, middle or right node. In each of these it is to choose from two options
which depend in part on the choice made by the US: in the left node, it can veto
either B or H, in the middle one either A or H and in the right node either A or B.
Once both players have made their choices we reach one of the outcomes with
payoffs indicated at the bottom of the tree.
At the beginning of the tree there is a lot of strategic uncertainty involved in
making choices: A can lead to payoffs 1 or −1, B to 1 or 0 and H to −1 or 0
for the US. At the bottom of the tree the uncertainty is completely absent: once
B 
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Figure 5.1 UN game in extensive form.
a sequence of moves has been made an outcome is reached and, thus, there is
no ambiguity left. To distinguish a rational play from a not rational one, let
us consider the two left-most outcomes in Figure 5.1, i.e. (1, −1) and (−1, 1).
Which one of these will materialize is determined by the coalition if the US
has first chosen A. Since this choice is in fact one between the worst and best
possible outcome, it is reasonable to expect that the coalition chooses H and
thus the outcome (−1, 1). This is simply another way of phrasing the assumption
that the players are rational. By the same token, should the US choose B we
can reasonably expect that the coalition chooses H , thus ending up with a (0, 0)
payoff instead of (1, −1). Finally, if the strategy of the US is H , we can expect
that the coalition chooses A whereupon the payoffs are −1 for the US and 1 for
the coalition.
In other words, we know what to expect once the last ones in the sequence of
decisions are made by the players. What we do not yet know is which decisions
are made before reaching those last decisions, i.e. which branches of the tree
have been followed up to that point. Indeed, the assumption of player rationality
enables us to reduce the game tree of Figure 5.1 to that shown in Figure 5.2.
This reduction is based solely on the assumption of rationality: since the player
at the final decision node can determine which of two outcomes will be the result
and since she has a preference relation over the outcomes, the prediction is that
Figure 5.2 Reduced UN game in extensive form.
us 
H 
1, -1 -1,1 1,-1 o, 0 -1, 1 0,0 
us 
A 
(-1, 1) (0, 0) (-1, 1) 
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she will choose the preferred one. Assuming that all the information regarding
the extensive form is available to both players and that they both know that the
other player knows this, and that the other player knows that they know, etc.,
the US faces the reduced game tree when making its choice at the outset of the
play. What this amounts to is that essentially the US determines which one of
the following two payoffs will materialize: (−1, 1) or (0, 0). Obviously, the latter
is preferable to the US. Hence we can reduce the game still further so that it
amounts to only one outcome, i.e. the election of Annan and thus the payoff 0
to both players.
What we have just resorted to is Zermelo’s algorithm which is also known as
the method of backward induction (Zermelo 1913). As just shown, one begins
with the last decision nodes in the game tree, that is, the starting point is the
last move by the player who is last in the sequence in which the game is played.
At this node the player no longer has any strategic uncertainty. Assuming that
this particular node is reached – which is not known – the player simply chooses
the outcome which gives her the larger payoff. Since there are typically several
such last decision nodes, we can thus insert the final outcomes that the player
considers best for her into the decision node. Thus, instead of several branches
emanating from the node we now have a single payoff indicating what will be
the outcome if this node is reached. Let us assume that the last move is the kth
(in the UN example k = 2). The player making the (k − 1)th move now knows
the outcomes ensuing from her moves since the strategic uncertainty has been
removed by assuming that the last moving player is rational. Now we can make
precisely the same assumption regarding the player who makes the (k − 1)th
move. In other words, we assume that she chooses the outcome which is best
for her. Hence, we can also replace this player’s decision node by an outcome,
i.e. the one that gives her the highest payoff. Continuing this process, we will
eventually reach the starting node of the game tree.
Now we have two predictions for the UN game: the one resulting from discard-
ing dominated strategies in matrix form and the outcome of backward induction.
A reasonable question to ask now is: how do they relate to each other? As was
pointed out in the preceding section, the dominant strategy for the coalition is
HHA and against this strategy the dominant option for the US is B. Thus, the
players following the dominant strategies end up playing B and H , whereupon
Annan emerges as the outcome. Using backward induction we observe that taking
into account the coalition’s preferences with respect to the final outcomes, the
US effectively has to choose either (−1, 1) or (0, 0). The latter is clearly prefer-
able and results from its choice of B. Thus, the backward induction outcome is
reached when the US chooses B and the coalition chooses H . Hence, we end up
with identical prescriptions for players using dominant strategies and backward
induction.
This turns out to be true under very general conditions. Whenever there is a
dominant strategy for one of the players, it obviously ‘survives’ the process of
backward induction. So, we end up with the same outcomes using either one of
these procedures. Thus far the analysis of games is not far removed from everyday
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thinking: if a strategy leads to better outcomes than any of its competitors under
all circumstances, then it is reasonable to choose it. Similarly, if one’s opponent
has a strategy that guarantees her the best outcome under any circumstances,
it makes sense to assume that she picks that strategy. This is not to say that
recognizing dominant strategies would always be easy. Indeed, the repertoire of
choices may be very large, e.g. in stock market operations. What can be stated,
none the less, is that when there is a unique dominant strategy, it is rational to
choose it.
5.3 Solutions
The UN game discussed above is dominance-solvable and thus enables the analyst
to make a prediction of what will happen in this game. Alternatively, it gives her
a plausible explanation of why the actors behaved the way they did in electing
Annan. Not all games, however, are dominance-solvable. Consider the following
fictitious competition between two firms entering a new market. Each is able to
take over the entire market by resorting to aggressive marketing tactics, nega-
tive advertising and cut-throat pricing. However, these methods yield the desired
result – market dominance – only if the other firm acquiesces by resorting to nor-
mal marketing devices. If both forms engage in aggressive forms of competition,
the end result is disastrous for both. If both firms resort to non-aggressive market-
ing, they essentially split the market. Table 5.3 presents this type of payoff matrix.
We can assume, for concreteness, that the entries indicate profits expressed in
millions of dollars. Thus, for instance, if one firm resorts to non-aggressive (soft)
and the other to aggressive (tough) marketing, the payoff is $1 million for the for-
mer and $4 million for the latter. We also assume that aggressive market behavior
turns off some consumers so that whenever these behaviors are exhibited the total
market diminishes to some extent (here from $6 million to $5 million).
The game of Table 5.3 is one of the best-known two-person non-constant sum
games called Chicken. A glance at Table 5.3 reveals that neither player has a
dominant strategy. For both, playing soft is better if the other is playing tough,
while choosing tough gives a better payoff if the other is playing soft. In a word,
the best choice depends on the other player’s choice. This is, of course, what
one would often expect in game situations. Yet, the dominant strategy argument
seems to leave us without a prediction or solution in this situation.
In a classic paper from 1951, John Nash proposed a solution to two person
games. Today it is called the Nash equilibrium. It is defined as an outcome that




Soft 3, 3 1, 4
Tough 4, 1 0, 0
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results from strategy choices that are the best responses to each other. In other
words, an outcome is a Nash equilibrium if neither player has an incentive to
deviate from it, given that the other player’s choice is fixed. The solution is
intuitively plausible application of the concept of equilibrium state: once reached
this state is relatively stable under unilateral (i.e. one player) disturbances.
John F. Nash Jr. (born 1928) is one of the three Nobel Memorial Laureates in
economics of the year 1994. Like the other two – Harsanyi and Selten – he is a
game theorist, indeed, perhaps the best-known of them all to the general public.
This is largely due to Sylvia Nasar’s biography A Beautiful Mind (1998) and the
film based on it. Nash is a mathematician by training. His solution concepts to
non-cooperative and bargaining games are classic. They have motivated a large
number of younger game theorists to define more refined solutions to various types
of games. Nash’s central works can be found in Essays on Game Theory (1996)
and Essential Nash (2002), edited by Kuhn and Nasar.
To determine the Nash equilibria in Table 5.3 we start from the outcome 3, 3
which results in both players choosing the soft strategy. This outcome is not a
Nash equilibrium since, given the choice of soft by Firm 2, Firm 1 is better off by
choosing the tough rather than soft strategy. The same conclusion can be made
of Firm 2 when Firm 1’s choice of soft strategy is given.21
Also the outcome which assigns each firm the payoff of 0 is not a Nash
equilibrium. In this case both players prefer any other outcome to this one. Hence,
we are left with 1, 4 and 4, 1 as possible candidates for Nash equilibria. It turns
out that both of these outcomes are, indeed, equilibria. To see this consider 1, 4.
Firm 2 enjoys its highest payoff here and thus, would not benefit from unilateral
deviation from this outcome. The same is true of Firm 1 since the only outcome
it could achieve by unilateral deviation from 1, 4 is 0, 0, which is even worse
for it. Thus, neither firm would benefit from choosing otherwise than it does
at 1, 4, provided that the other firm sticks to its strategy choice. The analogous
argument shows that also 4, 1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus we have two predictions for the Chicken game. They are obviously quite
different: one guarantees Firm 1 its highest payoff and Firm 2 its next-to-lowest
payoff, while the other switches the roles of the firms. The extensive form of the
game Table 5.3 is presented in Figure 5.3.
The dotted line connects two decision nodes representing Firm 2’s choice.
As the firms are supposed to make their choices without knowing the choice of
the other player, we cannot, without distortion, draw the extensive form as if the
choices were made in sequence. The dotted line is intended to underline this fact.
The nodes connected by the line constitute one information set. An information
set is thus a set of decision nodes that are indistinguishable to the decision maker.
Here Firm 2 does not know whether it is ‘located’ at the left or right one of the
two nodes in the information set.
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Figure 5.3 Chicken game in extensive form.
Applying Zermelo’s algorithm reveals the ambiguity that characterizes
Chicken. Since Firm 2 decides whether 0, 0 or 4, 1 is the outcome, provided
that Firm 1 chooses the tough strategy, it seems likely that by choosing ‘tough’
Firm 1 ends up with 4. By the same token, the choice of ‘soft’ by Firm 1 would
seem to give it 1. On this basis, then, we can expect Firm 1 to choose ‘tough’.
But since the moves are simultaneous – or at any rate made under ignorance
regarding the other player’s choice – Firm 1 does not know whether Firm 2 has
already decided upon playing ‘tough’. If it has, then the choice of ‘tough’ by
Firm 1 would lead to the disastrous 0, 0 outcome. It seems, then, that both Nash
equilibria survive the elimination process of backward induction.
Nash equilibria seem to provide a solution for games where neither player has a
dominant strategy. In fact, it is useful to see the Nash equilibria as generalizations
of the dominant strategy equilibria since whenever there is a dominant strategy
equilibrium in a game, it is also the unique Nash equilibrium. So, the Nash
equilibria essentially extend the intuitive idea of a dominant strategy solution to
more general settings.
The generalization is not, however, entirely satisfactory for predictive pur-
poses. As was shown in the Chicken game, there may be more equilibria than
one would hope for. Indeed, the situation can in this regard be even worse as
shown by Rubinstein’s (1982) example (see also Nurmi 1998: 55). Consider that
a fixed sum of money, say, $1 million is to be divided among two players. They
can make division proposals to each other. In case the proposal satisfies the con-
dition that the entire amount is shared, the players get exactly what is proposed.
Otherwise, they get nothing. So, the players, 1 and 2, are to find two numbers
q and 1 − q with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 so that player 1 gets $q million and 2 gets $1 − q
million. It can be seen that any proposal – i.e. any value of q in the unit interval –
is a Nash equilibrium. To wit, if player 1 proposes 3/4 for herself and 1/4 for
player 2, this is surely a Nash equilibrium, since once player 1 has specified her
own part 3/4, the best player 2 can do is to accept 1/4 since otherwise she will
get nothing. Similarly, if player 2 first lays down her demand of 1/4, the best
player 1 can do is to accept 3/4. So, when the proposal of (3/4, 1/4) split has
been made, it is a Nash equilibrium. The same is true of any proposal (q, 1 − q)
where q is a point in the unit interval.
Firm 1 
Tough 
0,0 4, 1 1, 4 3,3 
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Another problem pertaining to the Nash equilibrium concept is that there are
games with no such equilibria in terms of pure strategies, that is, when the
strategies considered involve no random, probabilistic or stochastic element.
Many situations of pursuit–evasion variety can be seen as constant-sum games
without Nash equilibria. Every year millions of dollars are lost by governments
around the world because of the fact that firms and individuals do not disclose
in their tax forms all sources and amounts of income that should, by law, be
reported. Similarly, considerable losses to competitors, governments, consumers
and investors are caused by fraudulent practices (misleading reports, collu-
sions, price fixing, etc.) sometimes resorted to by firms in attempts to maximize
profits, market shares or political influence. To counteract these types of illegal
activities the authorities in market economies have established various control
mechanisms. Many of these amount to conducting special audits in firms and
other organizations suspected of illegal activities. To illustrate the setting in
which there are no Nash equilibria consider a highly stylized game involving the
leadership of a firm which could benefit considerably from resorting to illegal
accounting practices and the competition authority in charge of executing the
legislation in the field. In matrix form the game can be presented as Table 5.4.




Play fair a, A c, C
Cheat b, B d, D
The strategies available to the firm are cheating or playing according to the
competition rules, while the competition authority may either subject the firm
to a special audit or look elsewhere. The payoffs are expressed as amounts of
utility where the lower-case letters refer to the utilities of the firm and the upper-
case ones to those of the authority. Let us assume that cheating is profitable if
unnoticed, but costly if spotted. This means that b > a and c > d. Let us also
assume that inspection costs money, but makes sense if the firm is cheating.
In other words, A > C, but D > B. Under these conditions which characterize
pursuit–evasion games in general, it can be seen that there are no Nash equilibria
if the players can choose only among the two strategies each.22 Namely, if the
(play fair, overlook) outcome is looked upon, we see that the firm would be better
off by cheating if it knew that the authority looks the other way. So, this cannot
be a Nash equilibrium. Neither could the (cheat, inspect) outcome be that since
the firm is better off by playing fair if it knows that it will be submitted to special
audit. Thus, both outcomes along the main diagonal of the payoff matrix are not
equilibria because the firm has an incentive to deviate from them, provided that
the authority has chosen the strategies leading to those outcomes. Similarly, the
off-diagonal outcomes (b, B) and (c, C) are not equilibria. In these cases it is the
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authority that has the incentive to deviate from the outcomes, given that the firm
has chosen the strategies leading to them. In sum, none of the four outcomes in
Table 5.4 is a Nash equilibrium.
An important result of Nash states, however, that all finite two-person games
have equilibria if we allow for a generalization of the strategy sets to include the
so-called mixed strategies. These are strategies dictating the choice of each of
the pure strategies with a given probability so that the probabilities assigned sum
up to unity. For example, if { play fair, cheat} is the set of pure strategies, then
S = ( play fair, 1/2; cheat, 1/2) is a mixed strategy which amounts to playing fair
with a probability of 1/2 and cheating with a probability of 1/2. According to
Nash’s theorem all two-person games where the players have a finite number
of pure strategies at their disposal have at least one equilibrium outcome which
results either from pure or mixed strategies. To see the meaning of this fundamen-
tal result, let us consider a simple special case, namely, one that is obtained from
the game of Table 5.4 by assuming that it is zero-sum. We could, for example,
think that the game is one of winning or losing and that whatever the authority
wins is lost by the firm. The authority wins when the firm predicts its action
incorrectly and vice versa. A tie (0, 0) occurs when the firm plays according to
rules and the authority does not undertake an audit. The worst outcome (−3)
for the firm occurs when it gets caught cheating, while the best (2) for it is to
cheat unbeknownst to the authority. If the firm is inspected and found ‘clean’, its
reputation is improved (1), while the authority suffers a loss due to unnecessary
work. We thus obtain Table 5.5.




Play fair 0, 0 1, −1
Cheat 2, −2 −3, 3
Let us first define the value of a game for a player. It is the highest payoff that
she can guarantee herself unilaterally, that is, without any favor from the other
player. It can be determined by looking at the minimal payoff associated with
each strategy and then picking that strategy which gives the largest minimum
payoff. In Table 5.5 play fair gives the firm at least 0 payoff, while cheat has the
minimum payoff of −3. The value of the game with just pure strategies taken
into account for the firm is then the larger of these two minima, 0. Similarly,
the pure strategy value of the game for the authority is −1. These values are
associated with the play fair and inspect strategies.
We now look at the mixed strategies. Suppose that the firm chooses the
play fair strategy with a probability of 1/3 and cheats with a probability of 2/3.
If the authority plays the overlook strategy, the expected payoff of the firm
is: 1/3 × 0 + 2/3 × 2 = 4/3, while in the case where the authority chooses to
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inspect the firm’s expected payoff is: 1/3 × 1 + 2/3 × (−3) = −5/3. Obviously,
this mixed strategy is not an improvement over the pure strategy play fair.
The firm may, however, do considerably better in expected payoff terms.
A look at the preceding expected payoff calculation shows that the firm does
better by assigning a smaller probability to cheating. Consider the value 1/6 to
cheating and 5/6 to playing fair. This gives the expected payoff 1/3 regardless of
whether the authority plays inspect or overlook . Hence, the value of the game
for the firm also increases to 1/3 when the mixed strategies and expected payoffs
are taken into account.
It turns out that the mixed strategy (5/6, play fair; 1/6, cheat) is the best the firm
can do. This can be seen by modifying the probabilities of pure strategy choices
a little and computing the expected payoffs. For example, the mixed strategy
((5/6)+ ε, play fair; (1/6)− ε, cheat) gives the expected payoff ((1/6) − ε)× 2 =
(1/3)−2ε when the authority overlooks, and the payoff (5/6) + ε + ((1/6) − ε)×
(−3) = (1/3) + 4ε when the authority inspects. The former expected payoff is
obviously smaller than 1/3 which was shown to result from the firm’s resort-
ing to the (5/6, play fair; 1/6, cheat) strategy. Thus, increasing the probability of
choosing play fair does not increase the value of the game for the firm. A similar
argument shows that the firm cannot increase the value of the game by decreasing
the probability of the play fair choice, either. Thus, the value of the game for
the firm is, indeed, 1/3 and results from the (5/6, play fair; 1/6, cheat) strategy.
Finding Nash equilibria in two-person zero-sum games where each player has
two pure strategies (i.e. 2 × 2 games) proceeds as follows (see e.g. Brams
1975; Hamburger 1979). Firstly, determine whether either player has a dom-
inant strategy. If at least one of them has, then we are done since the best
she can do is to choose it, while the other chooses her best response to this
choice. This is the Nash equilibrium. Secondly, provided that neither player has
a dominant strategy, examine all pure strategy outcomes in order to find out if
any of them satisfies the requirement that unilateral deviations do not benefit
the deviating player. If such outcomes are found, these are the pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Thirdly, to find mixed strategy Nash equilibria, introduce mixed
strategies and compute expected payoffs conditional to the other player’s pure
strategies. To illustrate, consider the general two-person 2×2 zero-sum game of
Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 2 × 2 zero-sum game
Player 1
Player 2
Column 1 Column 2
Row 1 a, −a c, −c
Row 2 b, −b d, −d
Suppose that a is the highest payoff and that d is the next highest one. In
fact, we can make this assumption without jeopardizing the generality of our
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analysis. To wit, the strategic uncertainty of the players is not changed if one
switches the order of rows or columns. Regardless of whether row 1 is above
or below row 2 in the matrix, the strategic uncertainty facing player 1 is that by
choosing the strategy labeled row 1, she knows that her payoff will be either a or
c, depending on player 2’s choice. The same applies to columns. Thus, starting
from any 2×2 zero-sum game matrix we can – by switching rows and/or columns
– end up with the configuration where player 1’s highest payoff is in the upper
left-hand corner. But can we also reach a configuration where, in addition, player
1’s second-highest payoff is in the lower right-hand corner? Not necessarily, but
should this not be possible, we already have what we are looking for, namely a
Nash equilibrium. To wit, if the second-highest payoff is not in the lower-right
corner, it must be either in the lower-left or the upper-right one. Suppose it is in
the lower-left corner. In this case we have player 1’s highest and second-highest
payoffs in the first column. Consequently, player 2’s highest and second-highest
payoffs must be in column 2. This strategy is, therefore, the dominant choice
for player 2 and we find the Nash equilibrium at the intersection of column 2
and player 1’s best response to it. If the second-highest payoff of player 1 is in
the upper-right corner, then row 1 is the dominant strategy for player 1 and the
preceding analysis applies.
So, the only configuration where further analysis is required is the one where
a is the highest and d the second-highest payoff. In this configuration player 1
ponders upon mixed strategies that would maximize her expected payoff. She
knows that if she chooses row 1 with a very high probability, player 2 will choose
column 2 with high probability, since the game is zero-sum. Similarly, the higher
the probability that player 1 chooses row 2, the higher the probability that player 2
chooses column 1. Indeed, by making her expected payoff independent of player
2’s choice, player 1 guarantees herself the maximum expected payoff. This can be
seen by focusing on player 1’s expected payoffs for the mixed strategy dictating
the choice of row 1 with probability q and row 2 with probability 1 − q. Given
that player 2 chooses column 1, this is q × a + (1 − q) × b. If player 2 chooses
column 2, the expected payoff of player 1 is q × c + (1 − q) × d. Let us call the
former expected payoff (i) and the latter (ii).
Setting these two expected values, that is (i) and (ii), equal to each other and
solving for q we get:
q = d − b
a − b − c + d
Substituting this value for q in (i) or (ii) yields
ad − bc
a − b − c + d
as the value of the game for player 1. That it is, indeed, the highest value that
player 1 can unilaterally guarantee herself can be seen by giving q marginally
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larger or smaller values and observing that these lead to expected values that
make the value of the game smaller for player 1. For example, increasing the
value of q marginally (by ε), yields a smaller payoff expectation, and hence the
value, than (ii). Similarly, decreasing the value of q results in expectation which
is smaller than (i).
A similar argument can be built to show that player 2 maximizes her expected
payoff by randomizing her choice of column 1 and column 2 using probability
values so that the expected values are identical when player 1 chooses row 1 and
when she chooses row 2.
By Nash’s (1951) theorem we can generalize this procedure to all finite two-
person games. In other words, one can find a Nash equilibrium either in pure or
mixed strategies. In fact, there are games in which there are both pure and mixed
strategy equilibria. The game known as the battle of the sexes is an example. This
is shown in Table 5.7. There are several slightly different but game-theoretically
equivalent versions of the story, most apparently set in the bygone age of gender
stereotypes. A more up-to-date version told by Holler and Illing (2003: 11)
goes as follows (see e.g. Osborne (2004: 55–98) for other illustrations). Tina
and Oskar have just met and fallen in love. They are planning for an evening
out. It turns out that Tina likes football and would very much like to go to the
local stadium to see an important match this evening. Oskar, on the other hand,
does not much care about football, but would love to see the new Woody Allen
film showing the very same night in the local cinema. Both enjoy each other’s
company to the extent that the worst outcomes for both are ones in which they
make different choices. Their planning, however, comes to an abrupt end when
Oskar realizes that he has some really urgent business to attend to. So sudden
is his departure that afterwards they both realize that they only had time to say
that they absolutely need to meet again that same evening. However, the place
of meeting was left open. So, where do they go to look for each other: football
stadium or cinema?




Stadium 3, 1 0, 0
Cinema 0, 0 1, 3
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this non-zero-sum game, namely
the strategies leading to 3, 1 and 1, 3 outcomes. In addition there is a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium consisting of (1/4, stadium; 3/4, cinema) for Tina and
(3/4, stadium; 1/4, cinema) for Oskar. This can be seen by observing that once a
player, say Tina, has adopted her mixed strategy, the other player, Oskar, cannot
benefit by deviating from his mixed strategy. Thus, we have a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium.
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5.4 Subgames and trembles
Several equilibria in a game that has four possible outcomes can with some
justification be deemed too many for any practical purpose. This observation has
led to a search for other solution concepts that would single out the most plausible
of the available Nash equilibria and eliminate the intuitively implausible ones.
These solutions are aptly called refinements of Nash equilibria. The best-known
of them is the subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten 1975).23 This concept aims at
solving a specific problem pertaining to some Nash equilibria, namely that they
may call for choices that are not rational, given the extensive form representation
of the game. In other words, there are Nash equilibria determined on the basis
of the matrix-form presentation that make no sense when looked upon from the
viewpoint of the corresponding extensive form. Consider Selten’s (1978) chain
store example presented in matrix form in Table 5.8 and in extensive form in
Figure 5.4.




Cooperative 2, 2 5, 1
Aggressive 0, 0 5, 1
Table 5.8 describes a situation where a chain store is in a dominant market
position in several cities facing, however, potential competition in each of them.
The table describes a situation in one city. The competitor ponders upon entering
the market or staying out, while the chain store basically has two strategies
at its disposal, a cooperative or an aggressive one. The chain store makes its
decision after the competitor has made her move, i.e. the moves are made in a
sequence.
Figure 5.4 Chain store game in extensive form.
Competitor 
Cooperative 5, 1 
2,2 0,0 
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Reinhard Selten (born 1930) is a German game theorist and one of the 1994 Nobel
Memorial Laureates in economics. His main contributions focus on refining the
Nash equilibria. In his work he has emphasized the importance of extensive form
games. Selten also belongs to the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His main
works are Game Theory and Economic Behaviour: Selected Essays (1999), Models
of Strategic Rationality (1988) and A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in
Games (with John Harsanyi) (1988).
Looking at the matrix-form game, we observe that there are two pure strategy
Nash equilibria, i.e. (cooperative, enter) and (aggressive, stay out). Both satisfy
the defining condition of a Nash equilibrium: unilateral deviations from these
outcomes are not beneficial for the deviating player.24
Let us now look at the extensive-form representation of the game (Figure 5.4).
The idea of a subgame perfect equilibrium is to exclude those Nash equilibria
which call for strategy choices that are irrational in some subgames. A sub-
game starts at a decision node in the extensive form and contains all successive
branches and nodes from that node onwards. In other words, a subgame traces
the moves after a selected decision node. In Figure 5.4 there are two subgames.
One begins at the node following the competitor’s enter choice, that is, where
the chain store chooses either a cooperative or an aggressive strategy. The other
subgame contains the entire extensive form. Now, the (cooperative, enter) strat-
egy is also a perfect equilibrium since the choices it calls for are rational in all
subgames. The (aggressive, stay out) strategy pair, on the other hand, is not a
perfect equilibrium, for it calls for the chain store to choose aggressive which
would not be rational in the subgame that begins after the competitor has chosen
to enter. In that subgame aggressive would result in 0 while cooperative would
give 2 to the chain store. Hence, the (aggressive, stay out) strategy pair is a Nash
equilibrium but not a subgame perfect one.
The idea of subgame perfection is based on the observation that the extensive
form representation is in a way more informative than the matrix form. Especially
the move sequences are represented in game trees (i.e. extensive forms) in a
more transparent manner than in strategic forms. Subgame equilibria embody
the common-sense wisdom that one should not accept policies that – under some
contingencies – dictate irrational behavior.
The chain store game and the unacceptable (aggressive, stay out) Nash equi-
librium suggest another consideration that plays an important role in determining
which patterns of conduct can be deemed rational in games. To wit, the elimina-
tion of this Nash equilibrium rests on the observation that should the competitor
choose to enter, the chain store would be better off not choosing the aggres-
sive strategy. However, in the Nash equilibrium strategy pair, the chain store’s
strategy is paired with the stay out strategy of the competitor. Hence, the fact
that the game has led to the node which follows the competitor’s enter strategy
choice is something of a surprise. Given the chain store’s component of the
Games: descriptions and solutions 75
Nash equilibrium strategy pair, it is irrational. In view of this, it is to be expected
that a strategy that is rational against a rational player does not necessarily work
when one is faced with an irrational opponent.
This reasoning leads to the question of whether it is rational to assume that
one’s opponent is rational. Common sense would suggest that in general it is not.
Especially in situations where the players make mistakes in choosing actions,
perceiving the states of the environment and have only partial knowledge of
the game, it is plausible to consider the possibility that one’s opponent is not
rational with probability 1. This suggests an equilibrium concept which is closely
related to the subgame perfect equilibrium, namely the trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium (Selten 1975). Trembling-hand perfect equilibria are strategy pairs
that are not only best responses to each other, but also to small perturbations
(mistakes) in the opponent’s strategies.
To illustrate the notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, consider the
chain store game again. Consider the implausible (aggressive, stay out) equilib-
rium again. Suppose that the competitor makes a mistake with a very small, but
nonzero probability ε, while the chain store sticks with its aggressive strategy.
This yields the chain store the expected payoff:
(1 − ε) × 5 + ε × 0 = 5 − 5ε
if it plays aggressively. If, in the face of those mistakes, the chain store chose to
play cooperatively, its expected payoff would be:
(1 − ε) × 5 + ε × 2 = 5 + 3ε
which is larger than the payoff resulting from aggressive strategy no matter how
small the value of ε. Hence, even the smallest perturbation of the competitor’s
strategy in the implausible Nash equilibrium destroys the equilibrium. Therefore,
(aggressive, stay out) is not a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
The other Nash equilibrium, i.e. (cooperative, enter), in contrast, is a
trembling-hand perfect one. This can be seen performing the same calculation as
above under the assumption that either player makes trembles, that is, makes
a mistake with a small probability. If the competitor trembles with nonzero
probability δ, the chain store’s expected payoff is:
(1 − δ) × 2 + δ × 5 = 2 + 3δ
if it plays the cooperative strategy, while the aggressive one would yield 5δ.
Thus, choosing the cooperative strategy leads to a higher expected payoff for the
chain store for any tremble probability.
Similarly, if the chain store trembles at the (cooperative, enter) equilibrium
with a nonzero probability δ, the expected payoff for the competitor is (1 − δ) ×
2 = 2 − 2δ if it chooses to enter, while it is (1 − δ) × 1 + δ× = 1 if its choice
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is to stay out. Thus, as long as the tremble probability is smaller than 1/2, the
competitor is better off entering than staying out. Hence, the (cooperative, enter)
equilibrium is a trembling-hand perfect one.
The subgame perfect and trembling-hand perfect equilibria are but two – albeit
perhaps the best-known – refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. In their
specific ways they represent attempts to overcome the apparent shortcoming of
the Nash equilibrium that it is too liberal in including intuitively implausible
outcomes. Other refinements have the same goal, namely, to retain the nice
properties of the Nash equilibrium but adding other desirable properties so as to
exclude some Nash equilibria. We shall not discuss further refinements. The basic
point of both the Nash equilibrium and all its refinements as well as other solution
concepts is to predict what will happen or make intelligible what has happened in
social interactions modeled as games. Armed with some basic solution concepts
we now move on to some particular game types that have played and continue
to play an important role in applications of game theory. It is what the game-
theoretical analysis can contribute to our understanding of these important game
settings that determines the current value of game theory for political economy.
5.5 Special games
In the preceding we have not followed the classic distinction between zero-sum
and non-zero-sum games, but discussed both types of games in parallel. Yet,
there is obviously a clear difference between zero-sum and non-zero-sum set-
tings, or rather, between situations where these basic game types are the most
appropriate models. In zero-sum settings the players essentially extract payoffs
from each other, while in non-zero-sum settings at least some joint losses or gains
can result from certain strategy pairs. The very possibility of joint gains or losses
has motivated the characterization of non-zero-sum games as mixed motive ones.
The class of non-zero-sum two-person games is extremely heterogeneous, rang-
ing from pure coordination settings to highly conflictual ones. In fact, the very
heterogeneity of these games has given rise to literature that tends to focus on
special game types rather than general features of non-zero-sum settings. Two-
person games where each player has two strategies are called 2 × 2 games.
There are altogether 78 different 2 × 2 non-zero-sum ordinal games, that is,
games in which the payoffs have only ordinal significance and which differ from
each other in terms of the strategic uncertainty faced by the players. In other
words, there are 78 strategically different games if the players are capable
of putting the four outcomes into strict preference ranking (see Rapoport and
Guyer 1966; Brams 1983; Brams and Wittman 1981). Of these 78, by far
the most extensively studied game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD, for short),
but Chicken has also often been used as a model of certain kinds of interac-
tion situations. In the following we shall approach the games by characterizing
the general features of those settings in which various game types seem most
appropriate.
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5.5.1 Collective action games
It is quite common to assume that people join interest groups in order to receive
the collective benefits or goods that these provide. One of the central arguments
in Mancur Olson’s ([1965] 1971) The Logic of Collective Action is that this is
not the case, at least not among rational actors. In other words, Olson maintains
that rational people do not join organizations in order to receive the public goods
that these organizations provide. In other words, wage earners do not join labor
unions, entrepreneurs do not join employers’ unions, countries do not join mili-
tary or economic unions if they are rational and the good or service provided by
those organizations is genuinely public (see also Sandler 1992, 2004). According
to Samuelson’s (1954, 1955) definition, a good is a pure public good if two condi-
tions are met: (i) when the good is available, no member of the group in question
can be excluded from its consumption, and (ii) a group member’s consumption
of the good does not restrict the consumption opportunities of other members.
The former condition is known as non-excludability and the latter jointness of
supply. If only condition (i) is satisfied, the good is called public. So, pure public
goods involve no scarcity or competition among consumers.
Mancur Olson Jr. (1932–1998), an American economist, was one of the founders of
the public choice school of thought. This tradition emphasizes the role of economic
reasoning, especially the utility maximization calculus, in social affairs in general
and, most importantly, in political life. Olson’s best-known work The Logic of
Collective Action ([1965] 1971) applies economic reasoning to collective action
and interest groups. The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) extends the analysis
to national economic systems, their adaptability to technological change and their
growth potential. His last – posthumously published – book, Power and Prosperity
(2000), draws upon lessons from the transformations of the former socialist systems
in Europe.
Olson argues that if the benefit provided by the interest groups is of the nature
of public good (salary increase for certain groups of wage earners, tax or tariff
exemptions for certain types of firms, etc.) a rational actor does not contribute
to the provision of that good if she can receive the same benefit without con-
tributing. This argument can be expressed in the form of a two-person game.25
To illustrate, we assume the simplest possible setting of a two-person society
which faces a security threat calling for a joint investment on a pure public good,
e.g. an alarm system warning of intruders. Suppose that the investment needed
for the installment of the system is A units. Once the system is operational, its
benefit to each member of the society is equivalent to B units. Since we are
dealing with collective security, the benefit that the system provides for one
member does not diminish the benefit available to the other member, i.e. the
good is a pure public one. In case both players contribute, the cost A is divided
equally between them. If just one player contributes, she pays the entire cost.
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If neither contributes, there will be no alarm system, that is, the status quo
continues.
Paul A. Samuelson (born 1915) is one of the most influential economists of the
20th century. His contributions extend over an unusually wide area in economics.
Perhaps the most notable fields are public economics, consumer choice, macro-
economics and international trade. In addition to his many publications in leading
journals of economics, Samuelson has also written several very influential books,
among them the most widely used economics textbook ever, Economics (first
edition 1948) and Foundations of Economics (1947). Samuelson became the Nobel
Memorial Laureate in economics in 1970.
Let us assume that the circumstances prevent the players from making binding
contracts. In other words, the players cannot commit themselves to making any
specific choices, e.g. to cooperate. This means that the game is non-cooperative.
They have two choices: either to contribute to the provision of the security or
refrain from contributing. Let us denote the first choice by C and the second by D.
This enables us to represent the decision situation in matrix form (Table 5.9).




C B − (A/2), B − (A/2) B − A, B
D B, B − A 0, 0
We denote the status quo payoff by 0. Looking at the game from player
1’s point of view, we observe that if 2 were to choose C, 1 would be better
off choosing D since the latter would give her B while the former would give
something less than that. Were 2 to choose D, 1 would be better off choosing C
or D depending on whether B − A > 0 or B − A < 0.
If B−A < 0, the game we are dealing with is the PD, whereas if B−A > 0 it is
Chicken. These are by far the best-known games in the two-person non-zero-sum
game theory. Supposing that the public goods provision game is the PD, then it
can be seen that the individually rational choice leads to a non-optimal outcome.
This follows directly from what was just stated, that regardless of whether 2
chooses C or D, 1 is better off choosing D. The same reasoning applies, of
course, to 2. In other words, both players have a dominant strategy which is D.
Thus, the outcome will be (0, 0), i.e. the status quo. This is not optimal since
there exists an outcome that would be better for both players than (0, 0), namely
(B − (A/2), B − (A/2)).
The dilemma in the PD is that coordination of choices would be beneficial for
both players, but this requires something external to the game itself: an enforcer
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of promises, norms that modify the ‘pure’ payoffs or embedding the game into
a larger context of larger games. The role of the state has often been seen in
the enforcement of contracts between individuals or groups. The state or rule of
law eliminates the inefficiency of anarchy (Hillman 2003: 28–29). Thus, the PD
provides a kind of explanation for the emergence of the state.26
The dilemma in the PD takes on degrees which are not apparent in the definition
that pays attention to order of preference of payoffs. Consider the two PD games
of Table 5.10 and assume that the payoffs are sums of money. Both games qualify
as PDs since the order of payoffs is that the highest payoff is received by unilateral
non-contribution, the next highest by mutual contribution, the third-highest by
mutual non-contribution and the lowest by unilateral contribution. Yet, there is a
marked difference between these games. In PD 1 the best payoff total is obtained
through mutual contribution (3 + 3 = 6), while in PD 2 the largest payoff sum
is reached when one and only one player is contributing (7 + 1 = 8).
Table 5.10 Two PD games
C D
C 3, 3 1, 4
D 4, 1 2, 2
PD 1
C D
C 3, 3 1, 7
D 7, 1 2, 2
PD 2
Due to this difference in payoff sums, the players playing PD 2 may strike a
deal to play C and D in alternating fashion so as to maximize the joint payoff.
This deal would give both the average of 4 in each game, whereas cooperation
in PD 2 would give them only 3. However, this kind of deal only makes sense
in sequential PD games, i.e. in situations where the players can monitor the
compliance of the other player. In a one-shot PD the player who – according
to the deal – is supposed to cooperate may not find it worth her while to do so
since, by definition of non-cooperative games, the contracts are not enforceable.
Despite the difference between PD 1 and PD 2, the crucial characteristics of
PD are the following:
• that the non-cooperative strategy is the dominant one for both players,
• that the dominant strategy equilibrium is accompanied with a smaller payoff
to both players than the outcome resulting from both players changing their
strategy, and
• the dominant strategy equilibrium is the only Pareto suboptimal outcome in
the game.
Some comments on these points are in order. The first observation can be
verified readily upon inspecting the PD matrix. The second point states the basic
dilemma of the PD – namely, cooperation would be beneficial since it would
increase the payoff of both players from the equilibrium payoffs. At the same
EE EE 
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time this change would require both players to abandon their dominant strategies.
This, however, is made unlikely by the fact that assuming that one’s opponent
is playing cooperatively, one’s own payoff maximizing choice is the non-
cooperative strategy. This is but an implication of the dominance relation between
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies.
To elaborate the last point, let us first define a Pareto optimal change or Pareto
improvement from one outcome to another. It is a change that brings about an
increase in payoff of at least one player without diminishing the payoff of the
other players.27 Thus, in the PD the change from the equilibrium outcome to
that resulting from both players choosing the cooperative strategy is a Pareto
improvement since it brings about the payoff 3 instead of 2 to both players.
The outcome is Pareto optimal if no Pareto improvements from it are possible.
In other words, all changes of strategy in a Pareto optimal outcome lead to a
smaller payoff to at least one player.
The PD illustrates in a very concise way the conflict between individual and
collective rationality. If the former is understood as dictating the choice of a
dominant strategy whenever there is one and the latter is viewed as the Pareto
optimality requirement, then the PD shows that these two can be incompatible.
Indeed, the conflict between these two rationalities is about as drastic as it can be.
To wit, looking at the PD matrix form we see that there are three Pareto opti-
mal outcomes: all those outcomes that result when at least one player chooses
the cooperative strategy. In PD 1 these lead to (3, 3), (4, 1) and (1, 4) payoffs.
Given any of these outcomes, no Pareto improvement is possible. Hence, we see
that the individually rational equilibrium outcome is the only one that is Pareto
suboptimal, i.e. not Pareto optimal.
Interchanging the smallest and next to smallest payoffs – or replacing the
B < A assumption with the B > A one in Table 5.9 – in the PD payoff
matrix turns the game into Chicken, another extensively discussed game of
collective action. In Chicken, there are no dominant strategies and the worst out-
come for both players results from both choosing the non-cooperative strategy.
As in the PD we can construct variations of the Chicken game where the players
are better off choosing cooperative and non-cooperative strategies in alternating
fashion.
The crucial characteristic of Chicken:
• no dominant strategy for either player,
• there is an outcome that yields both players their lowest payoff,
• there are two Nash equilibria, and
• there are three Pareto optimal outcomes.
As in the PD, the outcome resulting from both players choosing the non-
cooperative strategy is the only Pareto suboptimal outcome. However, in con-
tradistinction to the PD, the incentives for choosing the non-cooperative strategy
are essentially weaker: only if the opponent is likely to ‘give way’ yields this
strategy a better payoff than the cooperative one.
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The difference between the PD and Chicken pertains to the order of the smallest
and next-to-smallest payoffs. Another game that has also been widely discussed
differs from the PD in terms of the highest and next-to-highest payoffs. It is
presented in Table 5.11.




C 4, 4 1, 3
D 3, 1 2, 2
This game shares two properties with Chicken: (i) there are two equilibria, and
(ii) there are no dominant strategies. In contradistinction to Chicken in this game –
which is known as the Assurance game – one equilibrium is a Pareto improvement
over the other. There are strong incentives for the players to choose C since the
largest payoff is obtained by both players when they choose C. However, should
the other player for some reason choose D, then D would be the best response
to it.
The Assurance game has sometimes been considered as a proper model of a
situation preceding the adoption of some joint standard of measurement of weight,
length or value. Adhering to an established standard reduces transaction costs and
makes communication between trading partners easier. However, if one’s partner
turns out to defect from the standard that one abides by, then the outcome is next
best for the defector and worst for the adhering party. The state of affairs where no
standard is established is next to worst to both players. Obviously, the Assurance
game can also be seen as a game of collective action. In this case, however, the
universal acceptance of the norm or standard is valued highest.
Both the Assurance and the Chicken games demonstrate that the assumptions
regarding the rationality of one’s opponent is an important ingredient in deter-
mining the best game strategy. If one can assume that the opponent is rational
in the sense of trying to avoid the most disastrous outcome in Chicken, then the
payoff-maximizing way to proceed is to play D. If, however, there is a good
chance that the opponent plays D regardless of the consequences, then C is the
sensible strategy to play. In Assurance the best way to proceed is to choose
exactly as your opponent does. Obviously, if she aims at the highest payoff, she
plays C which means that C is the best response. If, however, she aims at maxi-
mizing the security level payoff, she chooses D to which D is the best reply. The
security level is the minimum payoff associated with each strategy. Thus, in the
Assurance game, the security level is 1 for C and 2 for D. Hence, the player who
aims at maximizing her security level payoff chooses D – and, eo ipso, gives up
any chance of receiving 4.
Let us now return to Olson’s argument according to which rational people
do not contribute to collective goods if by not contributing they can enjoy the
EE 
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same benefit. The undeniable fact that people do participate in large numbers
in various kinds of collective activities is in Olson’s view to be attributed to
selective incentives which are of private nature. In other words, there are goods
or services available only to contributing individuals and the appreciation of these
accounts for the blossoming of various forms of collective action. The preceding
discussion of various non-zero-sum games shows that Olson’s argument is based
on the view that collective action is representable as the PD. Yet, there are
public goods provision settings which resemble more the Chicken game than
the PD. In these settings we simply do not have a clear-cut recommendation
for individually rational way of acting. The same ambiguity characterizes the
Assurance game situations.
But even in PD-like contexts, there are considerations that speak in favor of the
cooperative strategy. Several arguments supporting the cooperative choice have
been presented in the literature over the past decades. Perhaps the earliest one of
these ‘solutions’ to the PD is Howard’s (1971) metagame argument. It is based
on the idea that the players are in effect choosing between metagame strategies
rather than between C and D. A metagame is constructed by looking at player
choices as responses to each other. Thus, for example, player 1 chooses between
four strategies:
1. to play C against a C-playing opponent and against a D-playing opponent,
that is, to play C unconditionally,
2. to play exactly as the opponent,
3. to play in exactly the opposite way as the opponent, that is, if she chooses
C, choose D, and if she chooses D, choose C, or
4. to play D regardless of the opponent’s choice.
These player 1 strategies are thus conditional on player 2’s choices. Forming
now a 4 × 2 payoff matrix where the columns represent player 2’s two strategies
and rows player 1’s four strategies, we observe that the equilibrium remains one
where both players choose D. In the metagame it is at the intersection of the
unconditional D strategy of player 1 and the D choice of player 2.
However, if one moves one step further and constructs a metagame where
player 1’s strategies are those four just mentioned and player 2’s strategies are
conditional upon these, we get a 4 × 16 matrix where the columns are vectors
with four components each representing a response to player 1’s strategy choice.
Thus, for example (C, C, D, D) represents player 2’s metastrategy that dictates
C if player 1 plays strategy 1, C if player 1 plays strategy 2, D if player 1 plays
strategy 3, and D if player 1 plays strategy 4. Since there are four metastrategies
of player 1 and to each player 2 can respond in two (C or D) ways, there are
altogether 16 player 2 metastrategies.
In the ensuing 4 × 16 payoff matrix, it turns out that there are two equi-
librium outcomes: one resulting from player 1 choosing metastrategy 2 and
player 2 choosing (C, C, D, D), and the other resulting from player 1’s choosing
the metastrategy 2 and player 2’s choice of (D, C, D, D). Both of these yield
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the (3, 3) payoff. In other words, the cooperative choice of both players leads
to an equilibrium in the metagame. There is, thus, an admittedly complex, but
nevertheless plausible, argument for the choice of the C strategy in the PD. It is,
however, based on considerations deeper than those of simply choosing C or D
in a one-shot PD. In fact, one might argue that this solution concept implicitly
assumes that the game is repeated.
The common component in these two cooperative equilibria is player 1’s
strategy of choosing whatever the opponent chooses. This is known as the TIT-
FOR-TAT strategy (TFT, for short), although its proper setting is a sequential
rather than a one-shot game. The crux of the cooperative equilibrium is then that
one of the players is committed to a strategy of simple reciprocation. A rational
response to this commitment is then the choice of the cooperative strategy.
It seems that the emergence of reciprocity in the form of TFT or some similar
principle may constitute a fundamental explanation for the ubiquity and stability
of cooperative activity in the provision of collective goods.
5.5.2 Norms of reciprocity and coordination
The metagame provides an interesting and undoubtedly relevant angle to the PD
in invoking considerations that pertain to norms of action. When engaged in
social interaction people often justify their actions by rules or norms of conduct.
It is quite common to explain action by the norms that prevail in the community
surrounding the actors. Hence, it makes sense to argue that also in PD situations
the choices are not made purely ad hoc. The metagame strategies are nothing but
norms – albeit simple – of conduct in interactions involving two actors. Thus,
even in one-shot PDs, the players could be envisioned to be acting in accordance
with general rules or norms. Even more appropriate is to assume that players
involved in several consecutive PD games, so-called sequential PDs, resort to
norms that specify choices to be made in each subgame of the sequential PD.
In the late 1970s Robert Axelrod (1980a, 1980b) conducted a survey among
prominent game theorists about strategies applicable in the sequential PD. The
idea was to find out which strategies would be successful when confronted with
each other. The strategies were given in the form of computer programs which
made the evaluation of their success a primarily technical exercise. The instruc-
tions to the designers of the programs included the description of the specific
version of the PD which was to be used (Table 5.12) as well as the general




Cooperate 3, 3 0, 5
Defect 5, 0 1, 1
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success criterion to be used: the cumulated payoff over a sequence of games
against other programs submitted to the competition. The rules of the tourna-
ment indicated that the competition was, indeed, a tournament which means that
all the programs were playing against each other. They also confronted their own
twin and a program which makes purely random strategy choices in each game.
Before reviewing the tournament results, let us consider the setting where the
length of the game sequence is fixed, say 10 rounds. With this information one
could begin the program construction from the end, rather than the beginning,
of the sequence. In the 10th PD the choice of defect dominates cooperate. Hence,
it makes sense to defect regardless of what the other player does in the last game.
So, what is to be done in the last game is in fact known on the basis of the
dominance relation. Take now the preceding, i.e. ninth game. Since we already
know what is to be done in the last game, we can simply assume that this is the
last one. By the same (dominance) argument we can infer that the player will
defect in the ninth game as well. We can continue this argument until the first
game where the prescription is the same, i.e. defect.
What we have done here is to apply Zermelo’s algorithm to the sequential PD
of known length. The result is disastrous: if both players follow the algorithm
they acquire a payoff sum of 10 each even though the sum of 30 would have
been achievable. Surely, the defect always strategy – ALL-D as it is called by
Axelrod – is not the best way to accumulate payoffs. Yet, at the same time, it is
impossible to beat ALL-D (AD, for short). If one does something else than AD,
one is bound to play cooperate at some point when the AD program plays defect.
In that game the AD player receives the payoff of 5 while the other player gets 0.
The AD player thus beats – in the sense of receiving a larger payoff sum than –
any other strategy she might be confronted with. Only when facing another AD
player does this sequential game strategy break even with her (twin) competitor.
More precisely, AD is a collectively stable strategy. This means that no player
resorting to any other strategy can receive a higher payoff sum when playing
against an AD player than AD players get when playing against each other.
In technical terms, no other strategy played by a single player can invade a
population which consists of AD players.
In Axelrod’s PD tournaments the success of a strategy was determined as the
average of the payoffs obtained in playing 200 PDs with each of the participating
programs, including the twin of the program. The programs (strategies) con-
fronted by any given program were unknown to the persons invited to participate
in writing the programs. Thus, tailoring strategies for certain types of opponents
was not possible. Competing in the first tournament there were 15 programs,
14 submitted plus the program choosing C and D randomly. One of the sub-
mitted programs was TFT which in this setting amounted to the following two
rules:
1. choose C in the first round of PD, and
2. from game 2 onwards, choose whichever choice was made by the opponent
in the preceding round.
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In terms of the payoff averages the TFT, submitted by Anatol Rapoport, was
victorious. Its success was to a large extent accountable by the fact that a majority
of the submitted programs were ‘nice’ in the sense of not choosing D first.
Obviously, TFT does not choose D first either, which means that in a sequential
PD where TFT faces another nice program, both receive the payoff 3 on every
round. Yet, it is equally obvious that TFT cannot invade AD since the latter
receives the highest payoff 5 in the first round, while TFT receives 0. Thereafter
both get 1 in each subsequent round. This means that no matter how long the
game sequence, AD gets a payoff sum which is 5 units larger than that of TFT.
Thus, had the tournament submissions been more of the AD variety, TFT would
not have been victorious.
All the more surprising, then, is the observation that TFT also won the other
tournament arranged by Axelrod shortly after the first one. In this contest there
were more than 60 submitted programs. The participants knew of the success of
TFT and could, thus, anticipate that it would be present in the second tournament.
It turns out that it is very difficult to envisage a metagame strategy that could
exploit TFT after the first round. Thus, the longer the sequence of games, the less
the weight of the first payoff in the overall payoff sum. Hence, even though TFT
can be ‘fooled’ in the first round, it cannot be exploited thereafter. This follows
from the simple logic of reciprocity that underlies it. If the 3, 3 outcome is not
reached in any given round, the outcome is 0, 5 where TFT gets ‘the sucker’s
payoff ’ 0. The only way out of the subsequent 1, 1 is through 5, 0. In a manner
of speaking TFT takes back what it lost in the initial defection by its opponent
program.
TFT seems to capture the norm of reciprocity in a very succinct way. The
success of the program in the PD tournaments where a wide variety of different
strategies are confronting with each other seems to suggest that reciprocity is so
prevalent in human societies because it guarantees high payoff levels to those
who adopt it. Theoretical support for this argument is provided by Axelrod’s
(1981) two theorems (see also Axelrod 1984). The first pertains to the conditions
under which TFT can be a collectively stable strategy. These depend on the
valuation of future payoffs by players. As the concept of collective stability
involves a comparison of accumulated payoffs of players in an indefinitely long
sequence of PDs, the weight of future payoffs in each player’s payoff calculus
is of crucial importance. It determines whether a ‘newcomer’ strategy receives a
higher payoff against a player resorting to the prevailing strategy than the payoff
accruing to those players who play the prevailing strategy against each other.
Consider TFT as the prevailing strategy and AD as the potential invader.
It is reasonable to assume that each player has a discount parameter, denoted
by w, which is used to multiply the present value of a payoff obtained after one
time period. A payoff x after one time period has the present value of wx. The
parameter takes on values in the [0, 1] interval. A payoff y obtained after two
periods has the present value of w2y, etc. Suppose now that w = 0, that is, no
payoff received after the first PD game has any value in the player’s calculus.
In this case AD invades TFT since in the first game against a TFT player AD
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receives 5 while the TFT player gets 0. The TFT players get 3 when playing
against each other. Hence, the invasion succeeds since no payoffs after the first
game are taken into account.
But obviously, the clever aspects of TFT never show up if only the first
game counts. So, in the following we assume that the players have a non-zero
discount rate. Instead of fixed cardinal number payoffs, we shall – following
Axelrod – consider the general PD payoff matrix of Table 5.13 where T > R >
P > S. For TFT to be collectively stable it is necessary and sufficient that any
other strategy, when played against TFT, receives a discounted payoff sum that is
smaller than the sum accruing to the TFT players when playing with each other.




Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T, S P, P
Consider now a strategy that in itself is collectively stable, namely AD. Let us
denote the discounted payoff sum of players adopting strategy x against players
adopting strategy y as V (x|y). In finding out whether TFT is collectively stable
against AD we need to compare V (AD|TFT ) and V (TFT |TFT ). Let us expand
these two:
V (AD|TFT ) = T + wP + w2P + · · · = T + wP
1 − w .
V (TFT |TFT ) = R + wR + w2R + · · · = R
1 − w .
Now, AD invades TFT if the former payoff is larger than the latter, that is, if
T + wP






T − P .
The opposite condition, that is, w > (T − R)/(T − P) gives the values under
which TFT is collectively stable under AD attacks.
In the payoff matrix of Table 5.12 we get the cut-off value 1/2 for w. In other
words, if the discount parameter is larger than one-half, then TFT cannot be
invaded by AD if the payoffs in each game are those used in Axelrod’s PD
tournaments.
I I 
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The far-sightedness of players thus provides one explanation for the survival
of norms of reciprocity. But how does this norm become prevalent in AD-type
environments? A partial answer to this question is provided by Axelrod’s (1981)
second theorem. It connects the invasion success of TFT with the properties of
the group of TFT players that is immersed in the AD community. It is clear that
a single TFT player cannot invade an AD community because her payoff will
never reach the level of that obtained by AD players in their mutual interactions.
The only way in which TFT may become the prevailing strategy or invade AD,
is that a sufficient number of TFT interactions take place with other TFT – or
otherwise ‘nice’ – players. Thereby the losses incurred in AD interactions may
be offset by gains in the TFT ones.
Consider a setting where a group of TFT players is scattered among the
prevalent AD player community. Assume that with probability q a TFT player
encounters another TFT player and with probability 1−q an AD player. We also
assume that the TFT group is relatively speaking so small that when computing
the payoffs of the AD players, the interactions with TFT players can be ignored.
Let us see what the expected payoff E(TFT ) for the TFT player is:
E(TFT ) = qV (TFT | TFT ) + (1 − q)V (TFT | AD)
= q R
1 − w + (1 − q)(S + wP + w
2P + · · · )
= q R





The expected payoff for the AD players, on the other hand, is E(AD) = P +
wP + w2P + . . . = P/(1 − w).
The invasion of TFT succeeds if E(TFT ) > E(AD) which amounts to
q
R







1 − w .
Solving for q yields:
q >
P − S − w(P − S)
R − S − w(P − S) .
Given the PD payoff matrix and the discount parameter this expression tells
us the relative frequency of those interactions that have to take place with other
TFT players for a group of them to succeed in invading an AD community. As an
illustration, consider Axelrod’s tournament payoffs and assume that the discount
parameter is 0.8. The above inequality then indicates that whenever q > 1/11,
the invasion succeeds. In other words, of the interactions of the TFT players not
more than 10% need to be with other TFT players to guarantee a higher expected
payoff than that enjoyed by the AD players when playing against each other.
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The emergence and prevalence of reciprocity can thus be seen as a result of a
mechanism that makes intuitive sense. The particular version of reciprocity, TFT,
may, however, be questioned. It has been argued that as a principle of criminal
justice, this strict version belongs to a (hopefully) bygone age. It is simply not
deemed acceptable in modern civilized world to punish criminal offenders on a
strictly TFT basis. For example, criminals who have caused other people some
bodily harm are not harmed in the same way by the representatives of the criminal
justice system. This does not, however, diminish the importance of Axelrod’s
analysis of the reasons for emergence of some type of reciprocity in societies.
Once the reciprocity norm has been adopted, it may undergo changes due to other
factors than those discussed in the tournament setting.
There are other reasons to question the applicability of the TFT as a model of
how norms evolve in sequential PD settings. To wit, if sequential game strate-
gies are conditional on each other, they must be based on observations of other
players’ actual choices over time. The observations cannot plausibly be assumed
to be error-free. Rather, over extremely long sequences of plays some obser-
vation errors are bound to happen. In the simple PD setting, these are of the
type that an opponent’s C choice is interpreted as a D choice or vice versa.
Per Molander (1985) shows that the success of TFT in long sequences of PDs is
crucially dependent on the absence of ‘noise’ in the channel of communication
between players. More specifically, arbitrarily small probability of interpreting
the C choice as the D choice is accompanied with a dramatic decrease in aver-
age payoff: from R to (T + R + P + S)/4. As a countermeasure against this
decrease Molander suggests a small increase in the level of unconditional coop-
eration probability from that dictated by TFT. In other words, when the level
of disturbance in communication is low, the introduction of pure generosity or
altruism seems a prudent strategy for risk-averse players, that is, players who
strictly prefer a certain payoff x to a lottery with the expected value equal to x
(see also Axelrod and Dion 1988: 1387). So, it seems that deviating from strict
TFT in the direction of generosity or altruism has a rational foundation.
Thus far we have largely ignored a feature that intuitively seems important in
game-like settings, namely the perception that the players have of each other.
It is known that institutions of various type – firms, parties, universities – spend
a lot of time and effort in building an image of themselves. This image may
be distorted or truthful but in any case it is seen as a factor in determining the
success of the institutions. We shall now turn to one aspect of the image that has
been given considerable attention in game theoretical literature: reputation.
5.6 Reputation makes a difference
In the above chain store example we dealt with the game situation where a chain
store is faced with a potential competitor in one of the several locations it is
operating. In Selten’s (1978) chain store paradox we take a broader look at the
situation involving potential competitors of the chain in several locations. As we
saw, there are two Nash equilibria in the chain store game with one entrant.
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Only one of them, however, is subgame perfect. This calls for the competitor to
enter and the chain to cooperate. The outcome in each game is, thus, 2 for both
players. Suppose that there are 20 locations where this game is being played in
a sequence and that what we have just considered is the last one. Suppose that
the competitor decides to enter. Since it is the last game, the chain does not need
to think about any long-term repercussions of its choice, but it can simply pick
whichever alternative yields a higher payoff. Clearly, it is cooperate. Knowing
this, the competitor is, indeed, better off by choosing enter. Thus, we end up
with (cooperate, enter) in the last game.
In the 19th game both players know what will happen in the last, 20th, game.
So, in essence the 19th game is the last ‘undecided’ game. By the same argu-
ment as above, it makes sense for the competitor to enter and for the chain to
cooperate. So, even the 19th game is a foregone conclusion as far as the outcome
is concerned. Now, this argument can be traced back to the very first game with
the same conclusion: enter is the rational thing to do for the competitor and
cooperate the rational response.
But clearly this does not make sense for the chain. In 20 games it gets the
modest payoff of 40 which is clearly much less than it could acquire. In particular,
if it announced before the first game that at least in the early games it will
respond aggressively to each and every entrant, it could possible gain much more.
Selten calls this way of proceeding the deterrence theory. Suppose that the chain
announces that in the first 18 games it will punish every entrant with aggression.
Suppose, furthermore, that its policy will be tested in some of these games.
Say, entrants 3, 5, 7 and 11 decide to enter despite the chain’s announcement.
This means that in these four games the chain’s payoff drops to zero. However,
in the 14 games where it is not tested the chain receives 70 units of payoff,
i.e. a lot more than it would have received in the sequence of 20 games had it
followed the backward induction argument. And it still has two games left to
play. In these games it may settle with the induction argument and receive an
additional 4 units. Thus, by deterrence one might do considerably better than
following the induction argument.
Of course, the success of the deterrence depends on whether the other players
are deterred. If they are not, then the chain ends up with the meager 4 which it gets
in the last two games where it plays cooperatively. This is just 10% of what the
induction strategy would have given it. Obviously the chain’s success in resorting
to deterrence depends on the credibility of its threat of aggression, but there is
another even more direct consideration, namely the effectiveness of the threat.28
This increases with the absolute difference in the payoffs of the threatened player
ensuing from (i) her defying the threat and (ii) her complying with the threat.
The larger the difference, the more effective the threat. Credibility, on the other
hand, depends on the consequence that carrying out the threat would have on the
threatener herself. Suppose that in the chain store-competitor game the former
announces a threat to take aggressive measures against each competitor that enters
the market. The efficiency of such a threat depends on the difference between
outcomes we have denoted by 1 and 0 in Table 5.8. This is the difference in
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payoffs of the competitor in case she complies with the threat versus her payoff,
should she decide to challenge it. The credibility of the threat, on the other hand,
is measured by the difference between payoffs 2 and 0, that is, between carrying
out the threat versus ignoring the challenge.
As stated, the threat does not seem credible. If the competitor enters, the chain
store only loses by aggression. Suppose the chain issues a probabilistic threat:
if a competitor enters, the chain will respond aggressively with probability p
and cooperatively with probability 1 − p. Let us now do the payoff calculus
for the competitor. If she stays out, her payoff will be 1. If she enters, her
expected payoff is p × 0 + (1 − p) × 2 = 2(1 − p). This is smaller than 1 if
p > 1/2. In other words, if the chain will retaliate with a probability larger than
1/2, then the competitor is better off (in expected payoffs) by staying out. The
probabilistic threat is more credible than the deterministic one. After all, it does
not commit the threatener to acts that are disastrous to both parties. In Chicken
games probabilistic threats make a great deal of sense just because they do not
commit the threatener to suicidal acts.
The implausibility of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the chain
store game where the chain cooperates and the competitor enters suggests that
there may be something relevant missing in the game description. Rosenthal
(1981) questions the plausibility in assuming that the potential entrants know
the payoff structure of the chain. Suppose that several entrants have experienced
to their disappointment that the chain store does not respond to entrance with
cooperation but with aggression. Certainly this experience would diminish the
plausibility of a new competitor’s assumption that the chain will cooperate and
that the competitor should thus enter. At some point it is likely that the competitor
questions whether her assumptions regarding the chain store’s payoffs are correct.
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) combine this observation with the solution concept
known as the sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982a).
The characteristics of sequential equilibrium:
• When making her choice, each player has some assessment regarding what
has happened in the past and – in particular – at which node she is located
in the game tree. This assessment is expressed in probability distribution.
• For any strategy to be an equilibrium, it must be consistent with this
assessment.
• Starting from every information set, the player makes the choice that is
optimal against the opponent’s strategies. The optimal choice reflects the
past moves of the opponent as well as the assessment concerning the payoffs
of the opponent.
If the chain store responds with aggression to entrants, then the assessment
of its payoffs is to be modified from the one of Table 5.8. This modification,
in turn, calls for modification of the optimal action to be taken, etc. Kreps and
Wilson consider the setting in which the entrants are facing either a weak or tough
chain store. The difference between these two is in the payoffs. The weak chain
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store has the payoffs indicated in Table 5.8, while the tough one interchanges
the payoffs 0 and 2. That is, the tough chain puts a premium on appearing
competitive. This makes aggression the dominant strategy for the chain and thus
the competitor is better off staying out. In the course of the play, the entrants
update their beliefs about whether they are facing a tough or weak chain store.
Their optimal response is modified accordingly. In equilibrium the assessments
of the opponent, the beliefs about the game history and the strategies chosen are
consistent.
In updating the beliefs regarding the opponent the most common rule stems
from Bayes’ theorem which enables the conversion of a priori probabilities into
a posteriori ones. The theorem is a rule for updating one’s probability assessment
in the light of evidence. To illustrate, let us assume that a competitor knows
from previous experience that 40% of chains that resort to aggressive strategies
contact the top personnel of the competitors and offer them lucrative positions in
the chain’s organization. Also some cooperative chains do that, but their share
is only 10% among the cooperative chains. Previous experience also indicates
that about 70% of the chains fight aggressively their prospective competitors.
Let us denote the event that the chain contacts the competitor’s top personnel
with attractive job offers by E and the event that the chain is tough by A. What




where A′ denotes the absence (or complement) of event A, in this case the event of
being a cooperative chain. Now, suppose that event A is observed, i.e. the chain
representatives contact the personnel of the competitor with job offers. What is
the likelihood that the competitor is facing a tough rather than cooperative chain?
The answer is given by Bayes’ formula:
P(A|E) = P(A)P(E|A)
P(A)P(E|A) + P(A′)P(E|A′)
which in our example yields:
P(A|E) = 0.70 × 0.40
0.70 × 0.40 + 0.30 × 0.10 = 0.90.
Thus, on the basis of this evidence the competitor is advised to update her
probability of being faced with a tough chain from 0.7 to 0.9. This, in turn,
implies that the optimal strategy gives more probability weight to staying out
than before the updating.
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The solution concepts touched upon above – subgame perfect, trembling-hand
and sequential equilibrium – are a sample of refinements of Nash equilibria (see
e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Van Damme 1987; Van Damme 2002, as well
as Hillas and Kohlberg 2002 for comprehensive discussions). In other words, they
are all Nash equilibria, but sometimes constitute proper subsets of the latter. The
basic motivation of these and other refinements is typically the implausibility of
some Nash equilibria. Sometimes acting in accordance with the dictates of Nash
is downright irrational. Especially, in situations which are not supposed to arise
at all, following Nash equilibrium strategy may be irrational. Which paths in the
game tree are most likely is to a large extent determined by the reputation of the
players. The evidence gathered in the course of the play may, in turn, modify
the reputation. The recognition that the belief systems and their evolution play a
central role in determining optimal strategies has been one of the main features
underlying modern game theory.
5.7 … and much hinges upon the quality of information
Reputation is but one of the factors that – in addition to the strategy sets and payoff
function – complicates reasoning over what would constitute a rational play of
the game.29 Reputation pertains to the information the players have about each
other and the circumstances under which the game is being played. In modern
game theory it is customary to make two seemingly closely related distinctions:
(i) one between games of perfect and imperfect information and (ii) the other
between complete and incomplete information. The former distinction is related
to the rules of the game. In games of perfect information, each information set
contains just one node (Binmore 1992: 501). In other words, when making her
choice, each player knows precisely what has happened earlier in the game. She
also knows all the possible consequences of her choice contingent on the choice
of the other player. In games of imperfect information at least one information
set consists of several nodes.
Games of incomplete information are, in fact, not games at all in the game-
theoretic sense.30 That is, they do not contain all the information needed to
construct a strategy set for each player and the payoff function specifying the
payoffs to each player as a function of the strategy choices made. When deal-
ing with games of incomplete information, we typically lack information about
player preferences or beliefs. In some cases also the rules of the game may be
in doubt. The so-called Harsanyi transformation maps the games of incomplete
information into those of imperfect one (Harsanyi 1967, 1968a, 1968b). More
specifically, it assumes a set of player types and probability distributions over
these types. Given that the players do not know which kind of player they are
confronted with, they assign each player type a probability. The type, in turn,
determines (or is defined by) the preferences and beliefs of the player. Thus, each
player has a probability distribution which tells her the probability of being paired
with a player of a specific type. This assumption thus transforms an incompletely
specified game into a set of games, each with a specific probability of appearing.
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Among games of incomplete information of special interest for political econ-
omy are games where the information is distributed asymmetrically. In those
games one player is in possession of information that the other does not have.
The information may be related to the properties of the player (her skills, attitudes,
values, physical or mental strength, etc.) or some acts she has performed. For
example, if you are to hire a research assistant, the skills, motivation and working
habits of the applicants are probably of great interest to you. Yet, it is possible that
not all relevant information is disclosed in the application documents. Similarly,
it may happen that some of the persons applying for the job have already received
offers from elsewhere, unbeknownst to you. The distribution of information is
asymmetric to the extent that the applicants know their own properties and acts
better than you do.
Not all games of asymmetric information are those of incomplete information.
Suppose that your friend says that she would like to withdraw from the distrac-
tions of her office to her vacation home deep in the wilderness in order to finish
the book she has been working on for some time. She does not own a laptop
computer and turns to you, the proud owner of a brand new device. The two of
you strike a deal whereby she pays you $50 per week for the laptop. Both of
you know the properties and condition of the computer. At the time of striking
the deal you do not know how careful your friend is going to be in handling
your computer. She may return it after one week, pay you $50 as agreed and the
computer might be a complete wreck. Or she might return your laptop in perfect
condition after a few weeks. It all depends on how gently she has handled the
computer. Settings like this are quite common in everyday life. They are called
moral hazard. Its essential features are that at the time of the agreement, both
players know that the eventual payoffs depend in part on what will happen in
the future and one of the players has more control on the developments than the
other. Examples of moral hazard include insurance, share holder and manage-
ment interaction and many other kinds of principal–agent games. In these games
one player, the principal, hires another, the agent, to do certain tasks for her.
To the extent that hiring contracts are made, as they typically are, in advance
of the actual performing of the tasks, these contracts always involve a moral
hazard.
Sometimes a distinction is made between two types of moral hazard. On the
one hand we have settings where the lack of information pertains to properties of
players (skill, ability to learn languages, etc.) rather than to their acts. These are
called moral hazard with hidden information. On the other hand, we have moral
hazard settings due to hidden actions (Rasmusen 1989: 133). Our example above
is of the latter variety. The usefulness of the distinction between these two types
is somewhat questionable. In fact, it is often difficult to draw a line between
moral hazard due to hidden information, on the one hand, and some settings of
incomplete information games.
Informational asymmetries feature also in games of incomplete information
(Rasmusen 1989: 181–222). The paradigmatic setting is called adverse selection.
It is the basic contract setting where one of the parties does not know the strategies
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and/or payoffs of the other. Typically, the former player is the principal who at
the time of signing the contract does not know the agent to whom she assigns
some tasks. The eventual payoff of the parties depends on the performance of
the agent, but in the agent’s case also – to an extent unknown to the principal –
on other factors. An example is the interaction between a voter and the MP who
represents her in the parliament. At the time of voting the voter may have some
information about the values and interests that the MP – if elected – would pursue
in the parliament, but over the election term new issues will appear in the agenda.
Since the overall performance of the MP in the voter’s opinion depends partly
on these unknown issues, the ‘type’ of the MP is fundamentally unknown for
the voter at the time of the election. This setting is nearly indistinguishable from
moral hazard.
A special class of adverse selection games consists of situations where the
players may send information about themselves to the other player. These
situations are called signaling games (see Banks 1991 for a survey). The sig-
nals transmitted may concern policy plans, budget requests, educational choices
or other kind of information which is deemed relevant for the payoffs. The infor-
mation may or may not be accurate and the signaling act itself costless or costly.
An example of signaling game models is one constructed and analyzed by Banks
(1989). It is based on Niskanen’s (1971) theory of budgetary process whereby
agencies send budget requests to a committee. In this model the agency makes a
budget proposal which the committee can accept, reject or subject to an audit. If it
accepts, the proposal will become the budget of the agency, and if it rejects, there
will be no transaction. If the committee decides to submit the agency to an audit
the outcome of the audit determines the budget. The audit is, however, costly.
Two procedures are considered: the closed one and the open one. In the former,
the committee is restricted to the above three alternatives. In the open procedure,
on the other hand, it may present its counteroffer which the agency may accept
or reject. Under specific assumptions regarding utility functions of the players
and varying the costs of auditing, Banks shows that in the closed procedure there
is a fundamental tradeoff between equity and efficiency which is determined by
the cost of auditing. Efficiency loss may occur due to either no exchange or
to auditing. If there is no exchange, both players would suffer, while if there
is an audit, the committee would receive the same budget but without the cost
of auditing. Equity refers to the distribution of surplus between the committee
and the agency. If the auditing costs are high, the agency benefits from inflated
budget requests, while if the costs are very low, the committee takes the entire
surplus.
With open procedure, it turns out that the budget requests have no signifi-
cance in determining the agency’s budget in equilibrium. Indeed, they have no
informational role at all. Instead the auditing costs are crucial in determining
the outcome. Somewhat paradoxically, Banks shows that in the equilibrium the
closed procedure is more preferable to the committee than the open one, despite
the fact that in the latter it can make counteroffers.
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5.8 The role of two-person game theory
When the rules of the game, strategies and payoffs are all common knowledge
among the players, we are dealing with games of complete information. It is use-
ful to study these games since they enable us to focus on the basic elements of
strategic behavior, strategies, outcomes, payoffs and various solution concepts.
From the viewpoint of practical application, the games of complete informa-
tion may, however, be unrealistic. Knowing another person’s preferences or her
beliefs regarding which actions are available to her or even her beliefs of the
causal mechanism whereby actions result in outcomes, is a strong assumption,
indeed. Consequently, when predictions concerning outcomes fail, this may be
due to several things. Firstly, the actors may simply be irrational and thus con-
tradict the behavior predictions based on rationality assumption. Secondly, their
view of the interaction situation may differ from the one that the analyst comes
up with. In particular, the players may believe that outcomes ensuing from the
strategy choices are not those envisioned by the analyst. Thirdly, the players
may assign the outcomes subjective values that differ from the analyst’s payoff
assignments. Fourthly, the players’ knowledge of each other’s preferences and/or
strategy sets may be cursory or downright incorrect. In other words, various types
of informational asymmetries may be involved and/or the game may be one of
incomplete information.
So, there are many reasons for predictions based on two-person game theory
to fail in real world games. Indeed, it is not common to see the theory being
applied in purely predictive settings. Although international conflicts, labor dis-
putes, plea bargaining, etc., feature in game theory texts, it is not typical that
the theory would be used as a tool for predicting what is still unknown. Rather
the theory is used as a benchmark against which empirical data are being evalu-
ated. Thus, one compares the outcome of the interaction with various solutions
to the corresponding game. The role of the theory is rather in explaining than
predicting facts. The theory provides a structure for analyzing and accounting for
events that have occurred in terms of goals of actors, their options, knowledge
and beliefs.
To explain why the US and its allies invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, it is
illuminating to know the interests and goals of the US and Iraq, their strategic
options and crucial beliefs: in the case of the US the strategic options included
strengthening of the trade embargo, military operations of limited scope, and an
all-out invasion. The primary interest of the US (at least in media reporting) was
to fight terrorism or, more specifically, its particular movement, al Qaeda, which
was believed to be responsible for the September 2001 attacks on the US. The
crucial belief of the US was that Iraq was involved in the al Qaeda activities and
was, therefore, a threat to the US and its strategic allies through its programs
to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction. Iraq’s strategic options
included cooperation with the UN inspector teams, making concessions in the
form of disarming some of its forces and dismantling weapons programs or
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ignoring the UN resolutions and assuming a nonconciliatory posture in negotia-
tions. Iraq’s crucial beliefs, in turn, may have included one according to which
the US’s threshold for going to war against it is critically higher than in the case
of invasion to Afghanistan.
Of course, seeing the US and Iraq as players involves an enormous simplifica-
tion since in both countries there were several conflicting or mutually reinforcing
political forces that could with equal justification be called players. Yet, for the
analysis of the conflict on the level of powers most directly involved it is useful to
regard the country leaderships as players. This does not exclude the possibility
to consider the policy formation within both countries as a lower-level game
between various power-holders.
To account for an event by invoking considerations that made its occurrence
inevitable in the light of the actors’ preferences, knowledge, beliefs and strategies
is basically what we normally do in trying to make certain types of events intel-
ligible. Game theory adds to this commonplace activity a standard language and
a set of analysis techniques. Siebe (1992: 180) writes of an encounter with an
ambassador who had been involved with many an international negotiation and
enjoyed considerable esteem among his peers because of his success in those
negotiations. Yet, this ambassador had never heard of game theory. The story is
in a way telling. Like the proverbial person who had been conducting his con-
versations in prose throughout his life without knowing the meaning of the word
‘prose’, people use game theoretic reasoning quite instinctively without realizing
that there might be an abstract theory which sheds more general light on why
certain negotiators are successful and others are not. Especially in the field of
diplomacy the game theoretic reasoning is quite natural and often employed with-
out direct reference to the theory. Notions like strategy, goals, options, beliefs,
regarding the opponent’s preferences, etc., belong to the normal parlance of
diplomacy and news reporting.
So, the two-person game models are more often to be found in accounts
that aim at explaining why some things happened than in predictive settings.
It is simply easier to distinguish strategies, beliefs and preferences after the fact
than before it. Game situations in the real world are always embedded in larger
contexts. The labor negotiations are rarely a once-for-all encounter. Similarly,
international political conflicts are rarely ‘purely political’, but often involve
economic, cultural and human rights issues. Thus, game situations encountered
in the real world are typically nested: what seems to be irrational and even self-
destructive strategy in one game may be just one necessary step in an effort to
maximize payoff in the larger game. The analogy of losing a battle in order to
win the war is often an apt one.
The two-person game models have, however, another role in political econ-
omy, namely that of providing a test-bed for evaluations. The evaluations may
pertain to strategies resorted to by the players, but more often to the norms or
arrangements underlying the game. A case in point is the enormous interest that
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game aroused in the scholarly community. The reason
for this interest is mainly due to the fact that this simple game situation enables
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us to analyze the consequences of adhering to conflicting norms of behavior.
At the same time this conflict has been seen as common in many spheres of
social life. So, understanding this simple game opens vistas for accounting for
significant aspects of social, political and economic systems. Indeed, one could
argue that a crucial activity of the public sector is to provide cooperative solutions
to PD’s. Ullman-Margalit (1977) analyzes the norms that have been devised to
resolve PDs. Thus, seeing norms and institutions in the light of the PD or some
other game model provides a new angle towards understanding what norms and
institutions do or what they are good for.
Much of the early criticism of game theory was directed towards its alleged
normative bias. Since many examples – notably the Battle of the Bismark Sea –
were models of military confrontations, it was felt that this theory was just another
weapon in the arsenal of the big powers.31 Thus, the whole enterprize was deemed
morally questionable. Today these suspicions are less commonly encountered and
for good reason. The simple 2×2 games do not provide strategic actors with new
insights. These models do not ‘teach’ them anything they do not already know.
To the contrary, the real world actors have provided game theorists good reasons
to modify, elaborate and refine their concepts, especially solutions. The fact that
the players sometimes stick to cooperative strategies in Chicken or PD games and
sometimes fail to do so begs the question of whether the game models contain all
relevant information about the situations in which the players find themselves.
Especially the assumptions that the players make of each other’s preferences and
beliefs, the information they have of each other’s behavior patterns as well as the
long-term payoff opportunities are all considerations that have been suggested
by contrasting simple game models with the real world behaviors.
The understanding that game theory gives of political economy is inherently
reductionistic in the sense that the states of affairs, processes, structures and pat-
terns of behavior are accounted for by seeing them as outcomes of strategic
interaction involving agents with at most partial control over the outcomes.
Given the players, their strategy sets and assumptions concerning the principles
governing their behavior (e.g. rationality), the theory enables us to simulate
games that have not yet been played. This is perhaps the most important role of
game theory especially when it comes to designing institutions.
5.9 Suggested reading
The classic opus in game theory is von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), but
it makes difficult reading for a beginner. Much more accessible is Luce and
Raiffa (1957). Brams (1975) is also a very useful text for a reader interested in
political applications of game theory. More up-to-date and advanced general texts
on game theory are Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Myerson (1991), and Owen
(2001). Dutta (1999) and Osborne (2004) as well as Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994), in turn, are of introductory nature and, especially the two first-mentioned
ones, appropriate as first texts in game theory. Collective action is dealt with in
Hardin (1982) and (1995). While most literature focuses on finding reasons for the
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emergence of ‘beneficial’ cooperation, the latter book also discusses cases where
cooperation is arguably not beneficial for the excluded parties. For readers of
German language, Holler and Illing (2003) is a cogent introduction and overview
of game theory. It is written mainly for students of economics, but can be used
in other academic fields as well. Good introductions to asymmetric information
games are Banks (1991), Calvert (1986) and Rasmusen (1989).
6 Bargaining and coalitions
Two-person games discussed above are non-cooperative. In other words, it has
been assumed that the players are not able to make enforceable commitments
regarding their future strategy choices. They may announce plans to play certain
strategies, but by definition these announcements are not binding. Many nego-
tiation, deal-making and bargaining activities take place under circumstances
where binding commitments can be assumed. In other words, in these situations
the parties typically keep their word once the deal has been made. For example,
in labor negotiations of the modern developed world the parties know that they
will be facing each other again in the not-too-distant future and that it therefore
makes no sense to renege from one’s commitments given at the negotiation table.
In other contexts, there may be a contract-enforcing body with adequate powers
to ensure that contracts are being adhered to. It thus makes sense to study rational
behavior under cooperative settings.
6.1 Classic solutions
Let us begin with a fictitious example of a two-person negotiation. The negoti-
ation parties are Union 1 and Union 2, the former representing employees and
the latter employers. The subject of negotiation is a five-year contract on general
standards to be followed in individual labor contracts within an industry. In the
course of lengthy negotiations five proposals have been put on the table. The
first – alternative 1 – is Union 1’s favorite, guaranteeing a sizable wage increase
as well as strengthening of employment security and health insurance benefits.
Alternative 3 is Union 2’s proposal containing a small wage increase accompa-
nied with a slight deterioration in occupation related benefits. Alternative 2 has
been presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal by Union 1 once it has become
apparent that the time reserved for negotiation is running out and strike is immi-
nent. This proposal involves a somewhat smaller wage increase than alternative 1
combined with keeping the benefits on their present level over the contract period.
Alternatives 4 and 5 represent early proposals involving relatively small changes
in the status quo.
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Figure 6.1 Two-person bargaining.
In Figure 6.1 the alternatives 1–5 are represented as points in a two-dimensional
space. The horizontal axis stands for Union 1’s utility values and the vertical axis
for Union 2’s values. The utility values are purely fictitious, but reflect the fact
that alternative 1 is Union 1’s favorite, alternative 3 Union 2’s, and alternative 2
is a compromise between these two. The assumption that Union 1 has made
the compromise proposal is reflected by the horizontal distances between 1, 2
and 3: the compromise alternative is closer to Union 1’s than Union 2’s favorite.
The point q in Figure 6.1 represents the utility values for unions in case no
agreement is reached. It is called the threat point.
The dotted lines represent theoretical alternatives. Consider the line segment
connecting point 1 to point 2. The coordinates of the points on this line segment
are weighted averages of the coordinates of the end points of the line (i.e. 1 and 2).
If we assume that the bargaining process is repeated indefinitely many times and
the parties choose outcome 1 half of the time and alternative 2 half of the time,
their payoffs (expected utilities) are represented by the point in the midway
between the end points of the dotted line connecting 1 and 2. If they choose
alternative 1 more often than alternative 2, then the expected utilities are closer
to point 1. In fact, all points in the dotted line represent the expected utility of
some probability mixture of alternatives 1 and 2. And vice versa, all probability
mixtures of 1 and 2 can be represented by a point on this line.
Thus, if the parties agree on an outcome that is represented by some point
on the line segment 12, then they can presumably also agree on how to achieve
this, given that 1 and 2 are achievable outcomes. The same applies to points
along the line segments 23, 34, 45 and 15. That is, the outcomes along these line
segments represent probability mixtures of the outcomes represented by the end
points. In other words, given that the parties are engaged in a cooperative game,
all these outcomes can be achieved. The outcomes on the dashed-line segments
between end points, however, are theoretical in the sense of representing expected
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Not only the vertices and edges of the Figure 6.1 pentagon but also the
points located inside it represent probability mixtures of alternatives. Thus, for
example, the coordinates of point q can be computed as a weighted average of
the coordinates of points 1–5. The same applies to every point in the interior of
the pentagon. This is due to the construction of the pentagon. The dotted lines
together with the vertices define a convex hull generated by points 1–5 in two
dimensions. This is by definition the set characterized by three conditions:
• all generating points (1–5) belong to the set,
• every line connecting any two points of the generating point set also belongs
to the set, and
• no proper subset of the set satisfies the two preceding conditions (i.e. the
constructed set is the smallest possible one).
The earliest solution concept for two-person bargaining games has been
attributed to von Neumann and Morgenstern (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 118; Riker
and Ordeshook 1973: 232). It invokes two intuitively reasonable considerations.
Firstly, neither player settles for smaller payoffs than she would receive with-
out negotiations. Secondly, the players do not accept Pareto inferior, i.e. Pareto
suboptimal outcomes. The first requirement boils down to individual rationality:
if one has to choose between two options, it is rational to choose the preferred
one. If one knows that through negotiations the outcome is worse than without
them, one walks away from the negotiation table. This requirement is often used
as a justification for breaking negotiations.
John von Neumann (1903–1957), a Hungarian-born mathematician was – together
with Oskar Morgenstern (1902–1977) – the founder of modern game theory. His
exceptional mathematical talent was recognized very early on in his career. In his
early thirties he became one of the professors of mathematics in the new Institute
of Advanced Study in Princeton. This institution was to become quite central
in the development of game theory. von Neumann was also one of the pioneers
of modern computer science (automata theory), mathematical logic and the theory
of measurement. The range of his scholarly activities is truly astonishing. His
best-known work in game theory is Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
(with Oskar Morgenstern) (1944).
The second consideration, on the other hand, appeals to collective rationality:
the players should not settle for outcomes that are not Pareto optimal. The argu-
ment is straightforward: if either player proposes a Pareto suboptimal outcome,
the other player can always propose another outcome that guarantees the first
one at least the amount of her proposal and the second player strictly more than
in the suboptimal proposal.
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R. Duncan Luce (born 1925) is an American mathematical psychologist. In addition
to his work on decision and game theory he has made major contributions to the the-
ory of measurement as well as to the theory of choice. His main book-length works
are Games and Decisions (with Howard Raiffa) (1957), Individual Choice Behavior
(1959), Foundations of Measurement, Vol I (with P. Suppes, D. Krantz and
A. Tversky) (1971), Foundations of Measurement, Vol II (with P. Suppes, D. Krantz
and A. Tversky) (1989), Foundations of Measurement, Vol III (with P. Suppes,
D. Krantz and A. Tversky) (1990) and Response Times (1986). In 2003 he was
awarded the National Medal of Science by the president of the United States.
The outcomes that satisfy these two requirements, individual rationality and
Pareto optimality, constitute the negotiation set. Outcomes in the negotiation set
guarantee each player at least the same payoff as the threat point. Moreover, these
outcomes are Pareto optimal, i.e. an improvement in either player’s payoff can be
achieved only at the cost of reducing the payoff of the other player. In Figure 6.1
the negotiation set consists of line segments r2 and 2s. The horizontal and vertical
lines through point q, the threat point, delineate the area in the two-dimensional
space which satisfies the individual rationality condition: outcomes above the
horizontal and to the right of the vertical lines represent individually rational
payoffs. The individually rational area within the convex hull can further be
restricted by the Pareto optimality requirement. All outcomes inside the area
are Pareto dominated by at least one point along the line segments r2 and 2s.
In other words, for any outcome x inside the quadrangular area qr2s there is
another outcome on the two line segments that gives both players at least as high
payoff as, and to at least one of them strictly higher payoff than, x.
Howard Raiffa (born 1924) is an American decision theorist who has made major
contributions also to study of negotiations, auctions and other allocation mech-
anisms. Raiffa is one of the founders and the first director of the International
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. His most important
books are Games and Decisions (with R. Duncan Luce) (1957), Decision Analysis
(1968), The Art and Science of Negotiations (1982), Negotiation Analysis (with John
Richardson and David Metcalfe) (2002) and Smart Choices (with John Hammond
and Ralph Keeney) (2002).
The plausibility of the negotiation set as a solution concept for two-person bar-
gaining games is obvious. Its major drawback is that it specifies a large number
of outcomes as solutions. To restrict the number of solutions has led to sev-
eral theoretical approaches to what is known as the bargaining problem. The
earliest one resulted in the Nash solution (Nash 1950). This has nothing to do
with the Nash equilibrium which pertains to non-cooperative games. The Nash
solution to the bargaining problem is obtained by imposing restrictions – called
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axioms – on outcomes. In the same way as individual rationality and Pareto
optimality can be seen as restrictions on plausible outcomes, one may try to
find further restrictions which are mutually compatible and lead to manageable
set of solution outcomes. Nash shows that there is a set of such restrictions
which does even better, that is, it leads to a unique solution to the bargaining
problem. The approach Nash resorts to is known as axiomatic method. This has
been used extensively in many branches of science, notably in the foundations
of measurement in general and the measurement of probability and preference,
in particular (e.g. Krantz et al. 1971; Luce 1967; Roberts 1979; Fishburn 1970).
In the following we shall briefly outline the Nash axioms.32
The first axiom we have already encountered: Pareto optimality. The second
is independence of linear transformations. It states that if the utility scales of
players are linearly transformed, so are the solutions. For example, suppose that
the players’ utilities are identical with monetary payoffs. Let the point (x0, y0)
be the solution when the values are expressed in US dollars. Transform now the
payoffs (linearly, that is, by multiplying each value with the same constant) into
South African rand and compute the solution. Denote it by (v0, w0). Independence
of linear transformations requires that the decision alternatives which bring about
the (x0, y0) outcome in the first case are identical to those associated with the
(v0, w0) one in the second.
The third axiom is called symmetry. It pertains to solutions in games that
are symmetric in the sense that whenever the point (x, y) represents a possible
outcome in the game, point ( y, x) also does. Assuming that q is on the diagonal,
the symmetry axiom requires that in symmetric games the solution payoffs to
players must be identical. The fourth axiom is also familiar from the preceding:
individual rationality. These four axioms characterize several plausible solution
concepts. Adding the following fifth one puts the Nash solution into a class of
its own. This axiom is known as independence of irrelevant alternatives. It states
that if the solution outcome belongs to a subset of decision alternatives, then it
should also be a solution in case all other alternatives except this subset were
excluded. To illustrate, assume that the players negotiate about the amount of
funds to invest in a joint venture. The amounts considered range from USD 5000
to USD 10, 000. Assume that the solution is associated with amounts of 7000
from each player. The independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that in
case it turns out that one of the players can only invest from 5000 to 7000, the
solution should still remain the same, i.e. 7000 from each.
The axioms are not of much assistance in determining the Nash solution in a
given two-person bargaining game. What is needed is the computation formula.
It is based on distances of Pareto optimal points from the threat point. More
specifically, the Nash solution singles out that particular point from the set of
Pareto optimal outcomes that maximizes the product of the horizontal and vertical
distances from the threat point. This is intuitively plausible since the larger the
horizontal (vertical, respectively) distance, the larger player 1’s (player 2’s) pay-
off with respect to the threat point. Let the coordinates of the threat point be
(q1, q2) and denote by S the convex hull generated by the decision alternatives.
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Then for any point (xi, yi) in S, the expression (xi − q1)( yi − q2) is the Nash
product associated with the point. The Nash bargaining solution is the point in
S which maximizes this product.
The plausibility of the Nash solution hinges on the axioms underlying it. More
informally, it can be defended on the grounds that:
• it is always a point in the negotiations set,
• it does not depend on the particular utility units used in measuring player
preferences,
• it is anonymous, i.e. the names of the players do not affect the solution,
• small errors in measuring utilities are not accompanied with large errors in
the solution, and
• the threat capabilities of players should be reflected in the solution (Luce
and Raiffa 1957: 123; see also Osborne 2004: 481–489).
Yet, the axiom that is specific to this solution, namely the independence of
irrelevant alternatives, can, with some justification, be held in doubt. An often-
cited example of Luce and Raiffa (1957: 133) illustrates these doubts. Its slightly
modified version is shown in Figure 6.2.
The figure depicts two bargaining games. The origin represents the threat point
in both games. As in the preceding, the coordinate axes measure the utilities of
various outcomes for player 1 (horizontal axis) and player 2 (vertical axis). The
negotiation set is spanned by points A, B and C in the left game and by points D,
B and C in the right one. B is the midpoint on the line from A to C. It is the Nash
solution in the left game.33 In the right game the outcome A is infeasible. Thus,
the outcomes spanning the convex hull of feasible outcomes are C, B and D. This
does not affect the Nash solution: it is still point B since at this point the Nash
product is maximized. This stands to reason: since the product is maximized at
B in the original, larger, set of outcomes, it is also maximized at the same point
when a proper subset of outcomes is considered. Yet, this is implausible, argue
the critics. The Nash solution in the right game gives player 2 her maximum
attainable payoff, while player 1 has to settle for much less than her maximum.
Figure 6.2 Is independence plausible?
D 
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The argument can be strengthened by assuming that player 1’s maximum feasible
payoff is very small, say one percent, compared to the maximum payoff of
player 2. Under these circumstances it may, indeed, seem unreasonable that in
the right game the worse-off player has to settle for less than her (very small)
maximum, while the better-off one gets all she can get at the Nash solution.
Considerations like these call into question the independence of the irrelevant
alternative axiom. However, an obvious counterargument would point to the fact
that if one deems the maximization of the Nash product desirable in the first place,
then inter-player payoff comparisons should not play any role in determining the
solution. If they do, they should be introduced as axioms.
The Nash solution has, indeed, found competitors in the literature. In most
cases the competing solution concepts have retained all but one of the Nash
axioms, i.e. the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution replaces the independence axiom with one known as restricted mono-
tonicity (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975). This axiom states that if the maximum
attainable payoffs for both players are the same in two games, one of which
consists of a proper subset of the outcomes of the other game, then the payoffs
associated with the solution of the larger game may not be smaller than those
of the smaller game. In other words, adding strategic opportunities of players is
never accompanied with smaller payoffs at the solution.
To find the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution to a two-person bargaining game one
first finds the maximum achievable payoffs for both players. Call these values
c1 and c2, respectively. One then draws the vertical and horizontal lines x = c1
and y = c2. These intersect at (c1, c2). One then draws the line from this point
to the threat point q. The point at which this line intersects the negotiation set
is the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. The point (c1, c2) is sometimes called the
utopia point for the obvious reason that it represents the outcome where both
players get the maximum achievable outcome. This is feasible only under very
special circumstances, namely when the convex hull spanned by the decision
alternatives forms a quadrangular area. Hence the label of utopia point is, in
general, appropriate.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the behavior of the Kalai–Smorodinsky (KS) solution.
The feasible outcomes are the same as in Figure 6.2. The arrows point to the
KS solution which in the right game is different from the Nash one. In other
words, the KS solution does not satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternative
axiom. That the KS solution satisfies the restricted monotonicity axiom cannot
be verified on the basis of this example since the maximum achievable payoffs
are not the same for player 2 in the two games.
From the axiomatic point of view, the KS solution differs from Nash’s
in satisfying restricted monotonicity instead of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (Roth 1979). Several other solutions to two-person bargaining games
have been introduced and axiomatized. Most of them boil down to specify-
ing a general principle to single out a unique outcome from the negotiation set
(see Moulin 1988a; Roth 1979; Salonen 1987; Thomson 1981; Thomson and
Lensberg 1989). As in the example of Figure 6.2 the principles are related
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Figure 6.3 The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.
to various criteria one can impose on reasonable or fair outcomes. Thus, the
two-person bargaining game setting allows us to analyze – in highly simplified
models – the issues related to justice. However, in order to persist, these principles
have to possess another feature in addition to fairness, i.e. stability.
6.2 Stability, core and bargaining sets
A defining characteristic of equilibria is some kind of stability. In the case of
the Nash equilibrium this amounts to the requirement that the strategy choices
of players are best responses to each other. In multi-player games, generally
known as n-person games, stability considerations also play an important role.
The earliest solution concepts to n-person games are the core and the stable set.
To outline them, we need some conceptual apparatus. Multi-person games are
typically about coalitions that the players form and about the way they distribute
the payoffs among themselves. Sometimes these games deal with other strategies
in addition to coalition building ones, but the classic solution concepts concern
just coalitions. The multi-person or n-person games are usually divided into those
with transferable (TU) and those without transferable utility (NTU). The former
are games in which the payoff accruing to a coalition is divisible in arbitrary
ways among the coalition members. In the NTU games, the payoffs are not
arbitrarily divisible, but each coalition is associated with consequences, each of
which is a fixed division of the payoff among the coalition members (Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994: 268). Our focus is on the TU games.
The n-person games are defined in terms of a characteristic function, typically
denoted by v(S) where S is a coalition, i.e. a distinct group of players.34 Given
any coalition S, the function v indicates the value, worth or payoff of this coali-
tion. It is something that the members of S (individual players or sometimes
smaller groups of them) can divide among themselves independently of what
other players – that is, those not belonging to S – do. The main goal of n-person
game theory is to suggest solutions to games defined in terms of characteristic
functions. Solutions contain a specification of both the coalitions that will form
and the payoff distribution among players. It is common to assume that the games





Bargaining and coalitions 107
players is larger than or equal to the sum of the values of all coalitions in any
partition of the player set N . A partition is an assignment of each player into
one of mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets (coalitions). In cohesive games,
then, the largest value that the players can obtain is by forming the grand coalition
of all players.35
The core of a (TU) voting game is a coalition structure and a payoff distribution
over players which has the property that no group of players can form a new
coalition that guarantees its members a strictly larger payoff than the prevailing
one. In other words, each player group lacks either the will or desire to form a
new coalition. In this sense the coalition structure represents the best response
of each coalition to the prevailing coalitions formed by other players. Thus, the
core is very much in the spirit of the Nash equilibrium.
To illustrate the core concept, let us consider a three-person game discussed by
Young (1994: 85). Three towns, A, B and C are planning to build a joint water
distribution system. They can build completely separate systems, but would make
substantial savings if they cooperate with one or both of the other players. The
costs expressed in millions of dollars are c(A) = 11 for A, c(B) = 7 for B and
c(C) = 8 for C. If two towns join hands the respective costs are c(AB) = 15,
c(AC) = 13, and c(BC) = 10, while it is c(ABC) = 20 if all three join in. We are
here dealing with a cost-sharing game where the definition of the core can be
expressed as the requirement that no player or coalition pays more than its stand-
alone cost, i.e. the cost indicated above for each town and town coalition. Thus,
for a distribution to be in the core, it would have to charge B and C together
no more than 10 million. Similarly, A and C can be charged jointly no more
than 13 million, while A and B can pay jointly at most 15 million. Denoting the
cost allocations at the core by x(A), x(B) and x(C), respectively, we thus get the
following system of inequalities:
x(A) + x(B) ≤ 15
x(A) + x(C) ≤ 13
x(B) + x(C) ≤ 10
The two first inequalities amount to: x(B) ≤ x(C) + 2. Substituting this to the
third one yields: x(C) ≤ 4. Thus, at the core x(A) ≤ 9, x(B) ≤ 6 and x(C) ≤ 4,
but this is not compatible with c(ABC) = 20. Hence, there is no core in this
cost-sharing game.
A slight modification of the coalition costs transforms this game into one
with a core. To wit, assigning town coalitions AC and BC the costs 14 and 13,
respectively, restores the compatibility between the cost-share restrictions. It can
be argued, however, that the outcomes in the core are not always plausible.
In fact in some cases one can be almost certain that the core outcomes will not
materialize. Raiffa et al. (2002: 444–446) gives one example involving three
parties A, B and C. The characteristic function assigns each singleton coalition
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the value 0. The coalitions AB, AC and ABC are given 10, while BC is given 0.
Thus, A has to be present in any coalition if it is to have non-zero value, but A
needs at least one partner. There is a core in this game. In fact, it is the unique
distribution of payoffs that gives A, B and C 10, 0 and 0, respectively. This
outcome would, however, seem highly unlikely since, unless A is joined by at
least one other player, she will receive nothing. One could argue that this fact
necessitates that the other players are given some payoff in the outcome.
In the debate on the core as the solution concept it has also been maintained
that the mere impossibility of deviation from a given coalition structure and
the associated payoff distribution is not all that determines the stability of the
outcome. It may happen that even though deviation is possible it is likely to
trigger a process of countermoves that results in outcomes that are inferior to the
players making the first move. Considerations like this have given rise to two
types of solutions: (i) the stable set, and (ii) the bargaining set (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994: 277–283).
To define the stable set, consider a payoff distribution that gives every player
at least the payoff that she would receive if she formed a coalition alone. These
kinds of distributions are called imputations. Consider two imputations x and y
(both are vectors indicating the payoff accruing to each player). The imputation
x is an objection of the coalition S of players to imputation y if all members
of S receive a strictly larger payoff under x than under y and if the sum of
payoffs under x is no larger than v(S). In other words, an objection amounts to
pointing out that there is a better payoff distribution for the objectors and that this
distribution is attainable given the characteristic function. The stable set consists
of certain types of imputations, namely those which are stable both internally
and externally. Internal stability of a set of payoff distributions means that no
distribution within the set is an objection of any coalition to another distribution in
the set. A set of imputations is externally stable if, given any imputation outside
the set, there exists an imputation within the set so that the latter is an objection
to the former by some coalition of players.
It turns out that there may be more than one stable set. However, the core is
a subset of every stable set (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994: 279). As a solution
concept the stable set is thus somewhat more generally applicable than the core.
Even more applicable is the bargaining set. Originally introduced by Aumann
and Maschler (1964), it deals with objections that various coalitions can present
against each other in a given situation. Thus, the bargaining set concept is condi-
tional on a given payoff distribution and a partition of the players into coalitions.
Its crucial feature is an objection that a member of a coalition, say A, presents
against another member of the same coalition, B, in this situation. The objection
is a proposal for a new coalition structure (partitioning of players) and payoff
distribution so that A’s payoff is strictly larger than before and B is not a member
of the coalition that A forms. In addition, all A’s partners in the coalition get at
least the same payoff as in the original situation. A counter-objection, in turn,
is B’s statement according to which B can build a coalition excluding A so that
B is better off than in the original distribution and B’s partners get at least the
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same payoff as in A’s objection. The bargaining set consists of those coalition
structures along with their associated payoff distributions where all objections
can be countered, i.e. for any objection of player i against player j, there is a
counter-objection of j against i.
To illustrate, consider a majority government formation in a multi-party
system. There are 100 seats in the parliament and they are distributed among
four parties A, B, C and D so that A and B have 30 seats each, C has 25 and D
15 seats. A viable majority government needs the support of at least 51 members
of parliament. To keep the example simple, we assume that there are only five
ministerial positions: one of prime minister (PM) and four ordinary minister
(OM) portfolios. Each four are regarded equally valuable by all parties, but the
PM post is deemed more important than two but less important than three OM
portfolios. At the beginning of the negotiations a party D representative proposes
a government coalition consisting of B, C and D with the portfolio distribution:
B gets PM, while C and D get 2 OM portfolios each. Party A is excluded. Given
this proposal, party B may present an objection against C and D by proposing
a cabinet coalition of A and B so that A gets 3 OM and B the PM and one
of the OM portfolios. This is feasible since A and B have more than 51 seats.
Moreover, B’s offer obviously gives A more than D’s proposal and B gets one
OM in addition to the PM it had in D’s proposal.
This objection cannot be countered by C and D. To counter it they would
have to keep their two OM posts each leaving only PM to be offered to the only
available coalition partner A. This is, by assumption, strictly less than what B
offers A in her objection. Thus, B’s objection cannot be countered. We conclude
that D’s proposal is not in the bargaining set since there is an objection that
cannot be countered.
Suppose that C proposes a two-party government BC where B gets the PM and
one of the OM posts, while C gets three OM ones. This belongs to the bargaining
set since all objections by the two partners can be countered. For example, if B
objects by proposing AB so that A gets two OM’s with B getting two OM’s and
the PM post, this can be countered by C who can offer A the PM post (which
by assumption is more than B’s objection gives A) and capture the four OMs to
herself.
Two examples from Danish cabinet formation after the 1957 and 1960 par-
liamentary elections and from the Finnish one after the 1999 and 2003 elections
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively, illustrate applications to multiparty politics.
The former table is from Laver and Schofield’s (1990: 174) book. The bargain-
ing set can be given slightly different content by restricting the objections and
counter-objections to individual players or coalitions. Laver and Schofield focus
on those payoff distributions in which all objections of single players (parties)
in the potential cabinet coalition against the coalition formed by the rest of the
cabinet, can be countered (see also Schofield and Laver 1985: 149). The same
principle is used in determining the bargaining set in Table 6.2.
In these cases the bargaining set ‘prediction’ – listed in the ‘b. set’ column – is
either very close to or identical with the actual portfolio distribution. In fact, the
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Table 6.1 Cabinet formation in two Danish elections
1957 Elections 1960 Elections
Party Seats Posts b. set Seats Posts b. set
Communists (DKP) 6 0 0 0 0 0
Socialists (SF) 0 0 0 11 0 0
Social Democrats (SD) 70 9 8 76 10 10
Radicals (RV) 14 4 5 11 5 5
Liberals (V) 45 0 0 38 0 0
Conservatives (KF) 30 0 0 32 0 0
Justice Party (DRF) 9 3 3 0 0 0
Others 1 0 0 7 0 0
Total 175 16 16 175 15 15
Source: Laver and Schofield 1990.
Table 6.2 Cabinet formation in two Finnish elections
1999 Elections 2003 Elections
Party Seats Posts b. set Seats Posts b. set
Social Democrats (SDP) 51 6 7 53 8 8
Centre (Kesk) 48 0 0 55 8 8
National Coalition p. (Kok) 46 6 5 41 0 0
Left Alliance (Vas) 20 2 2 19 0 0
Swedish People’s p. (Rkp) 11 1.5 1.5 9 2 2
Green League 11 1.5 1.5 14 0 0
Christian Democrats 10 0 0 6 0 0
Others 3 0 0 3 0 0
Total 200 16 16 200 18 18
bargaining set has proven to be a very good predictor of government coalitions
in Western European systems (Schofield and Laver 1985). On the other hand,
it tends to be very inclusive in the sense that, given an electoral outcome, there is
typically a large number of portfolio distributions that all belong to the bargaining
set. This has led to various modifications of the concept (see Schofield 1978).
In Table 6.2 the performance of the bargaining set as a predictor is also very
good. In looking at this table one should bear in mind that in Finland the number
of cabinet portfolios is not fixed, but can vary in the 12–18 interval. This provides
the government negotiators an additional instrument. Even so, sometimes rather
unconventional measures have been resorted to. An example is from the 1999
negotiations which resulted in a time-sharing arrangement whereby the Swedish
People’s Party and the Green League shared the responsibility of one portfolio,
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i.e. one of them nominated the minister for the first and the other for the second
half of the parliamentary term.
The bargaining set is based on an intuitively plausible reasoning: an outcome
cannot be a solution if it can be credibly and irresistibly challenged. An objection
is precisely a challenge to a proposed coalition structure and payoff distribu-
tion. A challenge is credible if it can be realized and irresistible if it cannot be
countered.
6.3 Values for n-person games
If a game has a unique solution outcome, then the players – provided that the
game is one of complete information – know what they are about to gain or lose
by playing the game. The value of the game for them is then simply the payoff
ensuing from the solution outcome. Given the plethora of solution concepts to
n-person games and the fact that many of them do not in general result in unique
outcomes, it is, however, difficult to use this principle in assigning values to
games in general. Yet, efforts to define value concepts have been present in game
theoretic literature from its beginning. In two-person zero-sum game theory, it is
natural to define the value of the game as that minimum payoff that a player can
guarantee to herself unilaterally. This principle could, of course, be extended to
n-person games as well, should these be defined in strategic forms, i.e. by listing
all strategy combinations of players with the ensuing payoffs. However, this
method does not work if the games are defined – as they typically are – in terms
of the characteristic function specifying the value of each coalition. For games in
the characteristic function form, Shapley (1953) suggested a value concept which
has – in a slightly modified version – found many applications in the study of
voting power in collective decision-making bodies. The following example from
Raiffa et al. (2002) illustrates it.
Three companies, let us call them Big, Medium and Small, have formed
a limited-period cartel in the production of cement in a country. They face
no domestic or international competition. Within the framework of the current
arrangement their earnings in millions of dollars are: 32, 23 and 6. When the
time has come to renegotiate the cartel agreement, the chief executives of the
companies have decided to call upon an independent consultant to undertake
an analysis of various merger possibilities, their advantages and disadvantages.
Having finished her analysis the consultant summarizes her findings in Table 6.3.
Obviously forming a two-company merger would bring about higher earnings
to the merge partners, but would hurt the third company. The largest total gain
results from the total merger which increases the earnings by 16 million (from
61 to 77 million). What can the companies expect in this kind of merger game?
In other words, what is the value of the game for each player?
Shapley’s solution starts from the assumption that coalitions (or mergers) are
formed over time. This means that the coalition’s first member is the player who
starts looking for partners. When she finds one, a two-player coalition is formed
and the partner thus found makes a contribution to the value of the coalition.
112 Bargaining and coalitions
Table 6.3 Company merger payoff table
Earnings














Source: Raiffa et al. (2002: 433).
Then the next partner joins the coalition and again makes a contribution to the
value of the coalition. The process continues until all players have joined the
coalition. The contribution that each new member adds to the coalition value is
simply the difference between the value of the coalition after her joining and its
value before her joining. For example, if company Big looks for merger partners
and finds Small first, the contribution of the latter is 45−30 = 15 million dollars.
The more value a player contributes to various coalitions, the more valuable a
partner she is and, hence, the more value she can expect to gain from the coalition
game.
But what determines the sequence in which the coalition partners join each
other? In general, one would expect that partners are first sought for and found
among one’s closest allies, i.e. among those who are ‘closest’ to one’s views
on the issue at hand. In politics this would naturally translate into ideological
proximity. Also in company merger processes the partners are likely to be sought
among those with shared views regarding the future of the market, technological
development, etc. However plausible such search principles might seem, it is
impossible to predict which principle will be the dominant one in the future.
So, Shapley’s insight is to deem all coalition sequences equally possible instead
of focusing on just a few most likely ones. Table 6.4 lists all merger sequences
in our example, all contributions that the players make to each coalition and the
average contribution of each player (Raiffa et al. 2002: 445). For example, in the
merger sequence Medium–Big–Small the starting point is one where Medium is
alone in the merger. Its contribution is 22 since this is the value of the coalition
consisting of just Medium, while Big and Small are in a separate coalition.
If Medium manages to attract Big into a coalition, the latter’s contribution is
59 − 22 = 37 (the value of the Medium–Big coalition being 59). If Small then
enters the coalition, its contribution is 18.
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Table 6.4 Merger contributions of companies
Contributions
Merger order Big Medium Small Total
Big–Medium–Small 30 29 18 77
Big–Small–Medium 30 32 15 77
Medium–Big–Small 37 22 18 77
Medium–Small–Big 38 22 17 77
Small–Big–Medium 40 32 5 77
Small–Medium–Big 38 34 5 77
Average 35.5 28.5 13 77
Source: Raiffa et al. (2002: 445).
The value of the merger game for the players is their average contribution,
argues Shapley. The values so obtained are, accordingly, called the Shapley
values of players.
In games with small number of players, the computation of Shapley values
can be done in the way outlined above. If, however, the number of players
exceeds 4, it gets tedious. The general formula for computing the Shapley value




(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n! × [v(S) − v(S\i)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
In this complicated looking formula N denotes the entire set of n players,
S a coalition of s players and v the characteristic function. The symbols “!” denote
factorials defined as: n! = n × (n − 1) × . . . × 2 × 1. By convention 0! = 1. The
expression underlined by brace represents player i’s contribution or value added
to coalition S. i ∈ S ⊆ N denotes all those coalitions to which player i belongs.
Thus, the contributions of the player are summed over all coalitions which she is
a member of. In the three-company example above, N = {Big, Medium, Small}

















Thus, each different merger where Big is present – including the empty one – is
considered, Big’s contribution to it determined and the contribution weighted by
a factor expressing the likelihood of this coalition emerging under the assumption
that each sequence of merger partners is equally likely.
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It could be – and has been – argued that the merger sequence should not
be important in determining the value of each player. More important is her
contribution or the net value added by her presence expressed by v(S) − v(S\i).
An alternative approach to defining the value of player i is to consider all coali-
tions that do not include i and compute her contribution to each of them. Summing
the contributions over all coalitions and dividing the sum by the number of coali-
tions that do not include i gives an unweighted average of i’s contribution to
various coalitions that she might join.
This idea underlies another well-known value concept, namely the Banzhaf
value (Banzhaf 1965, 1966).36 In the example of Table 6.4 there are 23−1 = 4
coalitions that do not include Big: empty coalition, Medium, Small and Medium–
Small. Big’s contributions to these are: 30, 37, 40 and 38 summing to 145.
Dividing this with the number of coalitions that do not include Big gives 145/4 =
36.25. This is Big’s Banzhaf value. In a similar way, the values for Medium and
Small can be determined. These are 29.25 and 13.75, respectively. Summing
the Banzhaf values yields 79.25, that is, more than the value of the game for
the coalition of all players. If the ‘cake’ to be divided among players is 77 at the
maximum, then the Banzhaf value obviously does not give everyone her realistic
share. To overcome this problem one might sum up the Banzhaf values and
divide each Banzhaf value with this sum. Thereby one would necessarily end
up with portions so that multiplying 77 with player i’s portion would give her
value. This is called the normalized Banzhaf value. We shall take a closer look
at it in the context of a much debated application, the Council of Ministers of
the European Union.
6.4 Applications to European institutions
In practice, we often do not have the characteristic function of the game to begin
with. Rather we know that certain players, when acting together, are powerful
enough to impose their common will upon the others. For example, in legislatures
the decision rules adopted indicate which groups of actors can in effect dictate
the content of legislation. If the decision rule states that the legislative proposals
are to be voted upon using the simple majority principle, then it is evident that
whenever a coalition including more than a majority of voters is formed, the
coalition determines which proposals may pass in the legislative process. It is
hard to pin down a value to such coalitions, but in a sense they are all equally
powerful: each one of them may enact laws, while no other type of coalition can.
This intuitively plausible observation was utilized by Shapley and Shubik (1954)
when they suggested a method for measuring power in collective decision-making
bodies. The method is today known as the Shapley–Shubik index.
The index is a restriction of the Shapley value to a class of games, known as
simple ones. In these games, the characteristic function has only two values, 0
and 1, the former being assigned to non-winning and the latter to winning coali-
tions. The contribution of each player then reduces to either 0 or 1 as well.
In the latter case she makes a non-winning coalition winning by joining it.
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In the former case the player’s entry makes no difference to the status of the
coalition.
The European Union has over the past decades grown from a six-member
community of countries aiming at coordinating their policies related to coal and
steel production into a 25-member one with ambitious plans for creating the
world’s most competitive economic power through common legislation combined
with harmonization of national regulations. Over the years the role of the Union
as target setter and coordinator has grown significantly. Yet, the institutions
within which all these coordinating and policy-setting activities take place have
remained largely the same. The Commission, Council of Ministers and European
Parliament (EP) have been and are still the most central institutions. Of these, the
Commission has the primary – and in most instances exclusive − role in initiating
the Union legislation. In adopting, rejecting or modifying those proposals the
Council of Ministers has thus far played a major role. The evolution of the EU
decision rules has, however, considerably increased the legislative powers of the
EP, particularly since the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 1990s. Before that the
Council was, in fact, the prime mover of the Union policy making and legislation.
The Council consists of cabinet-level representatives of the member states.
Each representative is given a number of votes that roughly reflects the size of
her country’s population relative to other members. In its decision making the
Council resorts to various rules, the most important being the qualified majority.
This has made the Council a very convenient object of power index studies (see
e.g. Brams and Affuso 1985; Nurmi and Meskanen 1999; Widgrén 1994). Once
the majority threshold for passing a motion and the distribution of votes are
known, the Shapley–Shubik index can be computed. To say that the index value
can be computed does not mean that it can be done with just paper and pencil.
In principle one has to generate all possible 2n coalitions that can be formed of n
players and then determine whether each one of them is losing. Let the coalition
under scrutiny be S consisting of s players. If S is losing, then one has to check
if adding the player to S would turn it into a winning one. If it would, then
one adds:
(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
to the player’s Shapley–Shubik score. Continuing through all coalitions yields
the player’s Shapley–Shubik index value. This follows from the fact that we are
focusing on a simple game in which only those coalitions add a players’ index
value that are non-winning without the player’s presence but become winning
with her entry. In these types of coalitions the player has a swing, i.e. she ‘swings’
a losing coalition into a winning one.
Table 6.5 reports the Shapley–Shubik index values of the member states of
the 25-member Union, or EU-25 as it is often called.37 The table also lists
two Banzhaf index values: the absolute and normalized one. The former is the
number of swings of a player divided by 2n−1 while the latter is the number of
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swings divided by the sum of swings of all players. All indices in the table are
based on the assumption that the majority threshold is 232 out of the total of
321 votes.38
Table 6.5 also reports two other power index values, the Deegan–Packel (DP)
and the Holler (H) ones (Deegan and Packel 1978; Holler 1982). To define these,
let us denote by T the set of minimal winning coalitions that can be formed from
the player set N . A coalition is minimal winning if it is winning and if a removal




S∈T 1/s[v(S) − v(S\i)]∑
j∈N
∑
S∈T 1/s[v(S) − v(S\ j)]
Hi =
∑
S∈T [v(S) − v(S\i)]∑
j∈N
∑
S∈T [v(S) − v(S\ j)]
.
Table 6.5 Some power index values in EU-25
Voting Shapley– Abs. Std. DP Holler
Country weights Shubik Banzhaf Banzhaf index index
Germany 29 0.093 0.055 0.086 0.053 0.052
France 29 0.093 0.055 0.086 0.053 0.052
Italy 29 0.093 0.055 0.086 0.053 0.052
UK 29 0.093 0.055 0.086 0.053 0.052
Spain 27 0.086 0.052 0.081 0.051 0.050
Poland 27 0.086 0.052 0.081 0.051 0.050
Netherlands 13 0.040 0.027 0.042 0.040 0.040
Belgium 12 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.040 0.040
Czech Republic 12 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.040 0.040
Greece 12 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.040 0.040
Hungary 12 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.040 0.040
Portugal 12 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.040 0.040
Austria 10 0.030 0.021 0.033 0.038 0.038
Sweden 10 0.030 0.021 0.033 0.038 0.038
Denmark 7 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.036
Ireland 7 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.036
Lithuania 7 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.036
Slovakia 7 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.036
Finland 7 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.036 0.036
Cyprus 4 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.035
Estonia 4 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.035
Latvia 4 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.035
Luxembourg 4 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.035
Slovenia 4 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.033 0.035
Malta 3 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.028 0.029
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The difference between these indices, on the one hand, and the Banzhaf and
Shapley–Shubik ones is that the former restrict attention to only minimal winning
coalitions, while the latter consider all winning coalitions, i.e. such coalitions
which – if unanimous – can dictate the outcomes of the voting game. All four
indices count the swings of the players and determine their voting power value
accordingly. In the case of DP, each swing is multiplied by 1/s, that is, the value
of the swing is divided equally among the s players forming the coalition.
To see the difference between the winning and the minimal winning coalition,
consider a 100-seat legislature that consists of three parties A, B and C with 40,
35 and 25 seats, respectively. Let us assume that the decision rule is 62, that is,
62 votes out of 100 are needed to pass a motion. The winning coalitions are:
AB, AC and ABC. Thus, A has 3, B 1 and C 1 swing. Hence, the normalized
Banzhaf index values are 3/5 for A, 1/5 for B and 1/5 for C. The minimal winning
coalitions, on the other hand, are AB and AC since B or C can be removed from
ABC without making it non-winning. Thus, A has two swings, while B and C
have one swing each. The Holler index value distribution is, thus, 1/2, 1/4 and 1/4.
6.5 Power and preferences
The indices described above are all distinctively a priori measures of voting
power. In other words, they pertain to expectations rather than actual influence
exerted by players on the outcomes. They show the theoretical effects of changes
in voting weights and decision rules assuming all players (countries) participate
in each vote. Since the player coalitions that are formed in any given time interval
are typically known only after the fact, these indices look at theoretical coalition
formation processes. The Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices focus on the value
added by the player to each coalition she joins and give this value a weight
that reflects the a priori likelihood of this coalition being formed. The weights
differ in different indices and hence the power index values of players may
differ in identical games. In Holler’s index as well as in the Deegan–Packel
one the attention is on special types of coalitions, namely minimal winning ones.
Otherwise the idea is the same as in the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices. All
these four indices base the computations on two types of data: (i) the distribution
of resources (votes, shares, etc.) and (ii) the decision rule, i.e. the minimum
required amount of resources (votes, shares) needed to back the proposal in
order for it to be passed. But it can be argued that we often know more than that.
In particular, we may have a pretty good idea of those types of coalitions that
are likely to form and of those that are well-nigh impossible.
The fact that this eventual information is not utilized by the indices has been
a source of criticism (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 1996).
In particular, it has been argued that neglecting information about which coali-
tions are most likely to form leads to a systematically distorted picture of the
power distribution. Suppose, for example, that the players’ opinions can be
expressed in a one- or many-dimensional Euclidean space. Each policy alter-
native is represented as a point in the space, that is, the alternative is described
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by its values in the coordinate axes. Let the axes be, for example, the degree
of competitiveness of the economy and the average yearly income level of the
decile of the population with lowest income. The interpretation of the crucial
variables (coordinate axes) depends on the alternatives under consideration, but
in the spatial voting models those dimensions are assumed to be the same for
all players. In addition to policy alternatives, the players can also, then, be char-
acterized by points in the space. That is, each player has an ideal point which
represents the best possible combination of variable values for the player. Since
the space under consideration is assumed to be Euclidean it follows that the
dimensions are independent. Furthermore, one can measure distances between
policy alternatives and player ideal points using the Euclidean metric:
dE(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + · · · + (xk − yk )2
where x and y are two points (ideal points or policy alternatives) in a
k-dimensional Euclidean space.
Now, given that player opinions can be represented in this fashion in the
policy space, it makes sense to assume that each player is more likely to form a
coalition with players close to her than with players far apart from her ideal point.
Garrett and Tsebelis argue that one can be more specific than this and say that
only connected coalitions are likely to form (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis
and Garrett 1996). In one-dimensional space (line) case connectedness means the
following. Suppose that a player B is located in the dimension between two other
players A and C. This means that when one draws a line connecting A and C, B is
located on this line. A coalition is connected if it includes all players between any
two coalition members. If there are more than one dimension, the connectedness
amounts to the requirement that if one constructs the convex hull of all ideal
points x1, . . . , xi of players 1, . . . , i, then the coalition is connected if and only if
the coalition includes all those players whose ideal points are in the hull. If, for
example, player i + 1’s ideal point is in the hull, but i + 1 is not included in the
coalition, then the coalition is not connected. Now, Garrett and Tsebelis maintain
that connected coalitions are likely to form, whereas unconnected ones are not.
This implies then that not all coalitions are equiprobable, an assumption that can
be seen to underly the Banzhaf indices.
The conclusion that coalitions differ in terms of frequency is correct. However,
as a criticism of the a priori power indices the argument misses the point. These
indices are measures of the theoretical probability of having one’s views rep-
resented in the collective decisions using only three predictors: the resource
distribution, the decision rule (majority threshold) and the coalition formation
process. The indices are fairly useful indicators and benchmarks in situations
where the resources distribution (voting weights) and decision rules are under
negotiation. In these settings the power distribution per se is not at issue. Rather,
one is interested in the incremental indicator values, that is, how much difference
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in relative terms a change in resource distribution or decision rule is accompa-
nied with. Thus, one compares the index values holding constant the coalition
formations process.
It is quite possible to turn the a priori voting power measures into a posteriori
ones by taking into account the differential formation probabilities of coalitions.
A straightforward method of doing this is to use the empirical relative frequencies
of coalitions formed in the past as weights for computing the weighted average
of a player’s contributions to various coalitions. This has been done by Lane
and Stenlund (1989). Also Kirman and Widgrén (1995) suggest a method for
calibrating the power index values to reflect the likelihood of coalitions. The
question, however, is where to obtain these probabilities. The same question
should also be asked in the case of spatial models. Specifically, how does one
find out the spatial dimension or dimensions in terms of which the connected
coalitions can subsequently be defined?
Steunenberg et al. (1999) suggest an approach to power measurement that –
although similar in spirit to the one proposed by Garret and Tsebelis – runs
directly counter with their injunction not to assume random distribution of policy
preferences of players.39 In fact, Steunenberg et al. go one step further than the
classic power indices in assuming not only that the player coalitions or – in the
case of the Shapley–Shubik index – player permutations are equiprobable, but
that all states of the world are equally probable. Each state of the world is an
(n+1)-tuple consisting of ideal points of the n players and a status quo point. The
mean distance between equilibrium outcomes and a player’s ideal point is used
in defining the strategic power index value of the player. To achieve a degree of
standardization Steunenberg et al. consider a dummy player, i.e. one that has no
influence on the equilibrium outcomes. The strategic power index of a player i
is computed as follows:
i = d − i
d
In the formula d is the mean distance between the equilibrium outcome and
a dummy player’s ideal point, while i is the mean distance between player i’s
ideal point and the equilibrium outcome.
For practical computation of the strategic power index values, Steunenberg
et al. construct a dimension which consists of eight points. The players –
Commission, the median member of the EP, five members of the Council, a
dummy player – and the status quo are located at one of the eight points ran-
domly and independently of each other. Since there are eight players and the
status quo to be allocated, there are 89 = 134.2 × 106 different states of the
world. For each state Steunenberg et al. determine the equilibrium outcome as
well as its distances from ideal points. Obviously, the strategic power index is
of a priori nature and thus comparable to the classic power indices. The new
feature it incorporates is the notion of equilibrium outcome which plays no role
in the classic power indices. Due to the random assignment of players to ideal
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points on the issue dimension it is subject to the same criticism as its classic
counterparts.
The theory of n-person games extends some notions of two-person game theory
to a new domain of multiple agents. It does so, however, at the cost of reducing
the strategy repertoire of the players to a dichotomy: either a player joins a
coalition or stays outside of it. It is possible to generalize this setting so that each
player is endowed with a richer set of strategies than the restricted set of to join
or not to join strategies. Thereby the theory becomes, however, essentially more
complicated. We shall now turn to a special class of n-person games where a
richer variety of choices by players is a standard assumption. The theory of this
class of games is one of the cornerstones of modern political economy, namely
the theory of voting. As we shall shortly see, voting can be considered as an
n-person game where the voters have at their disposal strategies which, together
with strategy choices of other voters and the voting rule, determine the electoral
outcomes.
6.6 Suggested reading
Roth (1979), Moulin (1988a, 1988b) as well as Thomson and Lensberg (1989)
are excellent texts on bargaining theory. However, they are all pretty technical.
Raiffa et al. (2002), in contrast, introduces the theory via examples and is, thus,
more accessible to beginners. Power indices have been studied for decades, but
the institutions of the European Union have sparked a new wave of interest.
Brams (1975) is a non-technical introduction to these indices. Felsenthal and
Machover (1998) give an extensive analysis of the indices and their back-
ground. The power index approach has also met with some criticism. Garrett
and Tsebelis (1996) as well as Tsebelis and Garrett (1996) base their objections
on the assumptions underlying the power indices. Laruelle (2002) along with
Napel and Widgrén (2004) introduce richer models containing spatial informa-
tion. Hosli, van Deemen and Widgrén (2002) contain several articles applying
game theory to the Union institutions.
7 Decision making in committees
The background of committee decision-making theory is in voting paradoxes,
the first of which were discovered more than 200 years ago during the years
preceding the French revolution of 1789. We discuss these as well as some other
voting paradoxes of more recent origin.40 We also outline two basic intuitions
of what characterizes collectively best decisions. Many important results in the
committee decision-making theory are of negative nature. They amount to show-
ing incompatibilities between various desiderata one would intuitively like to
associate with choice rules. Let us, however, begin with some basic concepts.
7.1 Basic concepts
The founding fathers of the modern committee decision theory (also known as
social choice theory, group choice theory and collective decision-making theory)
were Jean-Charles de Borda and Marquis de Condorcet who presented their basic
insights, paradoxes and solution proposals in the pre-revolution France. Borda
was a man with a practical, ‘engineering’ turn of mind. Condorcet, on the other
hand, was one of the greatest social philosophers of the Enlightenment era. It has
been argued that the foundations of the theory were laid much before that period
(McLean and Urken 1995), but it seems that Borda’s and Condorcet’s work are
the earliest ones with relevance that extends to the present day theorizing (see
Kelly (1991) for a comprehensive bibliography of this vast field up to the begin-
ning of the 1990s). The basic setting analyzed by these authors was the following:
given a committee that consists of rational persons having consistent opinions
about the issues to be decided, what is the best method of reaching a collec-
tive opinion about the issues? This is still the basic problem of the committee
decision theory. Let us outline some components of this problem formulation in
some detail.
First of all, a committee is a set of individuals forming a joint opinion regarding
the course of action (policy) to be taken, candidate to be elected, a statement to be
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issued or a body of individuals to be nominated. The set of decision alternatives
or issues is usually a fixed set A. Very often it is finite and consists of no
more than a handful of alternatives. There exists, however, a fairly extensive
literature on decision settings where each alternative is represented as a point in
a multi-dimensional Euclidean policy space. If, conversely, every point in the
space is regarded as a possible policy alternative, then we obviously have an
infinite set of alternatives. In this book we shall, however, focus on non-spatial
models and refer the reader to Enelow and Hinich (1984) for an introduction to
spatial theory. Each member of the committee is assumed to have an opinion on
the matters to be decided. This opinion is assumed to be consistent in the sense
that member i’s opinion can be represented as a complete and transitive binary
preference relation Ri over A. Thus, our starting point is the same as in decision
and game theory.
It is well known, however, that people are not always consistent in their
opinions. Finding procedures that would produce good outcomes even in contexts
involving inconsistent persons would of course be a goal worth pursuing, but the
problem would be to define ‘good outcomes’ independently of the opinions of
the persons involved. In the absence of such a definition we assume that the
committee members are consistent in the above sense. After all, if people are
inconsistent it would be a tall order to expect their collective decisions to be
consistent. Hence, we assume that the set of individual preferences is given.
To conclude our list of definitions we define a preference profile. A collection of
individual preference relations over A is called a preference profile and denoted
R = (R1, . . . , Rn).
7.2 Aggregating opinions
The problem is to find a method for aggregating the opinions of voters or forming
the collective opinion about the issue at hand. Sometimes the voting body is to
decide which public policy alternative should be pursued. Sometimes a person or
a group of persons is elected by the body to perform certain tasks. The opinion
aggregation is necessary in order to pursue consistent public policy or declare
a winner in an election. There are basically three different explications of what
exactly the method ought to accomplish.
• Social welfare function maps each profile into a complete and transitive
(collective) preference relation. This explication is the one that appears in
the famous theorem of Arrow (Arrow 1963). The method, thus, transforms
individual preference rankings into a collective one. In other words, one
ends up with a collective opinion that not only specifies the alternatives held
collectively best, but also the ranking between the remaining ones.
• Social choice function (correspondence) maps each profile and subset A′ of A
into the set of subsets of A′. This explication, in turn, gives the subset of best
alternatives once the individuals have submitted their preference rankings.
Decision making in committees 123
Social choice functions are undoubtedly the most common explications of
opinion aggregation methods in the modern social choice theory (Fishburn
1973).
• A resolute social choice function or social decision function is a singleton
valued social choice function. Sometimes a mere subset of best alternatives
is not sufficient, but one is looking for a single alternative as the winner
(e.g. in presidential elections a tie will not do as an outcome). Then the
resolute social choice functions are the constructs one needs.
Peter C. Fishburn (born 1936) is one of the leading decision and social choice
theorists. His contributions cover an astonishingly wide area ranging from foun-
dations of measurement through coding theory and utility theory to comparison of
voting systems. Some of his most important book-length works are Utility Theory
for Decision Making (1970), Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory (1988), The
Theory of Social Choice (1973), Approval Voting (with Steven Brams) (1983), and
Interval Orders and Graphs (1985). In 1996 the Institute for Operations Research
and Management Sciences (INFORMS) awarded him the John von Neumann
Prize.
Voting is based on rules determining the validity of ballots. Some ballot rules
require the voters to indicate a person, a party or a preference ranking over
alternatives. A voting procedure is a method of counting ballots to determine the
winner(s). A voting procedure is, thus, basically a social choice function.
7.3 New systems, new winners
The study of opinion aggregation methods is based on the observation that a
whole range of methods exists in real-world elections. This variety can perhaps
be best explained by historical contingencies. More important, however, is the
fact that the voting procedures make a difference in collective decision making
outcomes. This is demonstrated by the following example (Table 7.1). There are
five candidates for the vacant post of department chairperson. They are A, B,
Table 7.1 Who should become the chair?
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C, D and E. There are nine voters who make the decision. Four candidates
consider the scholarly excellence of primary importance and, on the basis of a
thorough survey of citation indices and other pertinent material, these four rank
the candidates so that A is first, E second, D third, C fourth and B last. The next
three voters focus solely on the applicants’ teaching skills. These turn out to be
negatively correlated with the scholarly excellence so that A, who is best in terms
of the latter, has the worst record as an instructor. In all, the three voters rank the
applicants as follows: BCEDA. (Henceforth we drop the  symbols for brevity
and simply write preference rankings from left to right in the order of preference.)
Finally, two voters see administrative experience as the only criterion relevant
for the task at hand. Upon consulting the applicants’ resumés they conclude that
the ranking should be: CDEBA. Table 7.1 summarizes the views of the voters.
The voter preference rankings are listed from top to bottom. This convention will
be resorted to in other tables to follow as well.
Suppose that no established system of voting exists in the department. Rather,
the voters are at liberty to decide which method of voting they use. In this
example it turns out that assuming that the voters vote according to their prefer-
ences, five common voting procedures lead to five different winning candidates.
In other words, any applicant can become the department chair, depending on
the voting rule.
The plurality or one-person-one-vote system leads to candidate A, since A
gets 4 votes, while the other candidates get strictly fewer votes. The plurality
runoff system leads first to a runoff between A and B since no candidate gets
more than 50% of the votes on the first round. On the second round B defeats A
with 5 votes to 4 (the 2 voters on the right preferring B to A can be expected to
vote accordingly). If the amendment procedure is used, one conducts pairwise
comparisons between candidates according to a fixed agenda so that the loser in
each comparison is eliminated and the winner continues the race. In this system
the agenda often determines the winner, but under special preference profiles –
such as the one we have here – one can predict the winner regardless of the
agenda. The winner is C, because it is supported by majority of voters against
any other candidate. C is, thus, the Condorcet winner.
The system proposed by Borda – nowadays known as the Borda count –
yields candidate E as the chairperson. In the Borda count, the candidates are
given points according to their rank in voter preferences. With k alternatives,
each voter who ranks a candidate first adds k − 1 points to its Borda score.
Each voter who ranks it second, adds k − 2 points, and so on. The winner is
the alternative with the highest score. In this example it is candidate E. Finally,
approval voting could be envisioned to produce yet another winner, namely D,
provided that the 4 voters on the left vote for three top-most alternatives, while the
other voters vote for their two top-ranked ones. In approval voting one can vote
for as many alternatives as one wishes under the restriction that only 1 or 0 votes
can be given to any alternative (see e.g. Brams and Fishburn 1983, Nurmi 1987,
and Riker 1982 for a description and analysis of these and many other voting
procedures).
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William H. Riker (1920–1993) was one of the most influential political scientists
of the 20th century. As the founder of the positive political theory he originated a
research tradition which focuses on the strategic aspects of political behavior and
develops research methods and techniques appropriate for the analysis of this kind
of behavior. One of Riker’s important contributions is the application of social
choice theory to the analysis of political institutions. His ground-breaking book
Liberalism against Populism (1982) has provided inspiration to numerous works
on political institutions. His other major books are The Theory of Political Coalitions
(1962), Federalism (1964), An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (with
Peter Ordeshook) (1973) and The Art of Political Manipulation (1986).
Thus, all five candidates can become department chair persons in the exam-
ple of Table 7.1 despite the fact that the voter opinions remain fixed. Voting
systems do, indeed, make a difference. Real-world examples are more diffi-
cult to come by since the preferences of voters are often difficult to find out in
detail. Often these have to be inferred from the voting behavior which, in turn,
may embody strategic considerations along with the preferences. One real-world
example of considerable practical importance can be mentioned, though: it seems
evident that the parliamentary decision to move the German parliament and the
federal government from Bonn to Berlin is an example of a context where the
decision rule played an important role in the decision outcome (see Leininger
1993).
Steven J. Brams (born 1940) is one of the best-known political scientists of our
time. He has written extensively on applied game theory, conflict analysis, fair
division, coalition formation and voting systems. In the mid-1970s he – together
with Peter Fishburn – introduced and analyzed the approval voting method. He
remains a strong advocate of this system. Brams is the author or co-author of
15 books, including Game Theory and Politics (1975), Biblical Games (1980),
Theory of Moves (1994) and The Win–Win Solution (with Alan Taylor) (1999).
7.4 Theory of committee voting in the olden days
The study of committee decision-making has from the very beginning been char-
acterized by counterintuitive findings, puzzles and paradoxes (see Nurmi (1999)
for an overview of voting paradoxes). The latter are particularly difficult and dra-
matic problems that contradict what one would normally expect in group choice
settings. The classic paradoxes, discovered in late 18th century France, bear the
name of the persons who first discovered and discussed them.41
Borda’s paradox consists in the incompatibility of two intuitively compelling
requirements that one can impose on social choices, that is, (i) that the alternative
ranked first by more voters than any other alternative should be elected, and
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Table 7.2 Borda’s paradox




(ii) that the alternative defeated by a majority in pairwise contests against any
other alternatives should not be elected. Table 7.2 summarizes the preferences
of nine voters over three candidates: A, B and C. Candidate A is ranked first
by more voters than any other alternative. It would thus win the plurality voting
in this profile. Yet, A would be defeated by both other alternatives in pairwise
comparison (both B and C would beat A with 5 votes to 4). Thus, the plurality
voting system satisfies requirement (i) but not requirement (ii). In modern termin-
ology requirement (ii) is called the Condorcet loser criterion, which dictates that
whenever an alternative would be defeated by all other alternatives in pairwise
contests with a majority of votes, then this alternative, called the Condorcet
loser, should not be elected. The better-known criterion, the Condorcet winner,
requires that when there is a Condorcet winner in a profile, it should be elected.
The Borda count does not satisfy this criterion (see Table 7.10 for an example).
7.4.1 Borda count: two ways out
Of the two requirements, Borda regarded (ii) more compelling and proposed his
own system, the Borda count, to avoid a conflict with it (DeGrazia 1953). This
system can be implemented in two ways.
First way
Given the profile of Table 7.2 compute the Borda scores as follows.
A’s score: 4 × 2 + 5 × 0 = 8
B’s score: 4 × 1 + 3 × 2 + 2 × 1 = 12
C’s score: 4 × 0 + 3 × 1 + 2 × 2 = 7
The winner is the alternative with the largest score, here B. The Borda scores
can also be used in defining the social preference ranking over the alternatives,
here BAC.
Second way
The other way is based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives. The profile
of Table 7.2 can be transformed into an outranking matrix of 3 rows and 3
columns with entry (i, j) indicating the number of voters preferring the alternative
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Table 7.3 Outranking matrix
A B C Sum
A – 4 4 8
B 5 – 7 12
C 5 2 – 7
represented by row i to the alternative represented by column j. Table 7.3 gives
the outranking matrix of Borda’s paradox. It can be observed that the row sums
of this matrix are identical to the Borda scores of alternatives. This is, in fact,
always the case. Thus, despite its ‘positional’ nature the Borda count can be
implemented in a purely binary way, i.e. through paired comparisons.
7.4.2 Problems of Borda count
Although the Borda count avoids the most serious drawback of plurality voting,
namely the election of the Condorcet loser, it has some undesirable features.
Table 7.4 exhibits the most important of these.
The collective preference ranking produced by the Borda count is DABC. Let
us now remove alternative D from the profile and recompute the Borda scores.
The ensuing ranking now becomes: BCA, i.e. the ranking between A, B and C
is reversed even though no voter has changed her mind.
7.4.3 Condorcet’s paradox
Perhaps even better known than Borda’s paradox is the phenomenon known as
Condorcet’s paradox. It is sometimes called simply the voting paradox or the
phenomenon of cyclic majorities. An example is given in Table 7.5. A committee
consisting of three groups of like-minded individuals is making a choice out of
three candidates A, B and C. The sizes of the groups are such that any two of
them constitute a majority of the committee.
Suppose that the choice is made using the widely used amendment procedure.
In that system the alternatives are confronted with each other in pairs according
to a pre-determined agenda. In each stage of voting, the alternative supported by
a minority is eliminated and the winner continues to face the next alternative in
Table 7.4 Borda count at work
Voters 1–2 Voters 3–4 Voters 5–6 Voter 7
D A B D
C D A C
B C D B
A B C A
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Table 7.5 Condorcet’s paradox




the agenda. So, after k − 1 stages of voting only one alternative is left. It is the
winner. Consider now the agenda: (1) A vs. B, and (2) the winner of the preceding
vote vs. C. Clearly, A defeats B in the first pairwise comparison, but is defeated
by C in the second. Thus, the winner is C. It is obvious, however, that C is not
a robust winner. In fact, with any other agenda C would not win. In fact – and
this is where the paradox lies – no matter which alternative one picks from the
{A, B, C} set, there is always a majority that is frustrated in the sense of preferring
some other alternative to the chosen one.
7.4.4 Condorcet’s solutions
Like Borda, Condorcet also proposed to solve the encountered paradox. In fact,
Condorcet proposed several non-equivalent solutions, three of which will be
discussed in the following.42
Successive elimination
The successive elimination solution proceeds as follows. Given a preference
profile, reverse the (pairwise) opinion with the smallest majority support and find
out if the resulting set of opinions still contains cycles. If it does not, then we have
found the collective preference relation. Otherwise, we consider the remaining
majority opinions and reverse again the one with the smallest majority support,
etc. By successively reversing the weakest relations, we eventually end up with
a connected and transitive preference relation.
Consider the profile of Table 7.6. The corresponding outranking matrix is
given in Table 7.7. The successive elimination method leads to the elimination
of collective preference of C over A. Thus, ABC is the collective ranking.
Table 7.6 A modified Condorcet’s paradox
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Table 7.7 Outranking matrix of preceding profile
A B C
A – 6 4
B 3 – 7
C 5 2 –
Maximal agreement
The other solution discussed by Condorcet can be called the maximal agreement
solution. It works as follows. Given a preference profile and one of k! pos-
sible collective preference rankings, determine, for each pair of alternatives,
the number of agreements between the former and the latter. Choose that
collective ranking with a maximum number of agreements with the given profile.
This solution is nowadays known as Kemeny’s rule (Kemeny 1959a) (see also
Slater 1961).
The preceding profile has the following number of agreements with various
collective rankings: ABC: 17, ACB: 12, BAC: 14, BCA: 15, CAB: 13, CBA: 10.
Thus, ABC is the solution.
It is worth noting that the successive elimination and maximal agreement do
not necessarily lead to the same outcome. Thus, these two solutions are not
equivalent.
John Kemeny (1926–1992) was a Hungarian-born American mathematician and
philosopher who made important contributions to a wide variety of subjects in
logic, computer science and pure as well as applied mathematics. Of particular
importance is his invention – with Thomas Kurtz – of the programming lan-
guage BASIC. He also changed mathematics instruction by introducing what he
called finite mathematics courses. These consist mainly of logic and algebra as
well as some probability theory. Kemeny’s main books are Introduction to Finite
Mathematics (with Laurie Snell and Oskar Thompson) (1959), A Philosopher
Looks at Science (1959), Denumerable Markov Chains (with Laurie Snell and
Anthony Knapp) (1966) and Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences (with
Laurie Snell) (1962). He received numerous honorary degrees and was elected to
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1967.
Condorcet’s practical method
Condorcet also suggested a third procedure which is called Condorcet’s practical
method. It works as follows:
• Each voter votes for one alternative. If one alternative gets more than 50%
of the votes, it is chosen.
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Table 7.8 Condorcet’s practical method at work
32 voters 38 voters 10 voters 10 voters 10 voters
B C B C A
A A C B B
C B A A C
• Otherwise, each voter votes for two alternatives. The alternative with the
largest number of votes is chosen.
It is of particular interest to notice that Condorcet’s practical method may end
up with a Condorcet loser being elected. This is shown by Table 7.8. Here A,
the Condorcet loser, is elected by Condorcet’s practical method.
7.5 Problems of Condorcet’s intuition
Condorcet’s intuition about winning – captured in the Condorcet winner
criterion – is still very much appreciated. In particular, there is a fairly wide-
spread consensus concerning the desirability of an eventual Condorcet winner
alternative being chosen. Yet, there are contexts in which the Condorcet winner
does not seem to be the most plausible choice. Fishburn provides the following
example (Table 7.9) (Fishburn 1973: 147).
In Table 7.9, D is the Condorcet winner, that is, it defeats all other alternatives
in a pairwise vote by a majority. Yet, choosing the Borda winner E would seem
pretty natural since E has as many first ranks (2) as D, more second and third
ranks than D and no lower ranks than third. D, on the other hand, has one lowest
and one next to lowest rank. So, there are contexts in which the choice of the
Condorcet winner is not the most natural one.
Table 7.9 Fishburn’s example
1 voter 1 voter 1 voter 1 voter 1 voter
D E C D E
E A D E B
A C E B A
B B A C D
C D B A C
Saari’s (1995) work casts even more serious doubt on the plausibility of
Condorcet winners. Saari shows that the Condorcet winner in a profile is sensitive
to a transformation in the profile that intuitively should leave things unchanged.
To wit, if there is a group of voters whose preference profile constitutes a
completely symmetric Condorcet paradox, i.e. the groups in Table 7.5 are of
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Donald G. Saari (born 1940) is a Finnish–American astronomer, economist, deci-
sion theorist and – above all – mathematician. Applying and developing geometric
and topological methods to social choice problems he has profoundly influenced
our understanding of voting systems, markets and mechanism design. Saari’s
ground-breaking book Basic Geometry of Voting (1995) was followed by two other
booklength treatises on voting: Chaotic Elections! A Mathematician Looks at Voting
(2001a) and Decisions and Elections (2001b), along with a large number of articles
published in leading journals of the field. His most recent book, Collisions, Rings
and Other Newtonian N-Body Problems (2005), analyzes some of the classic prob-
lems of physics and astronomy. Saari is i.a. a Fellow of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science and a recipient of several doctoral degrees honoris causa.
equal size, then adding or subtracting such a sub-profile to or from any larger
profile should leave everything unchanged as far as the collective preferences
between alternatives are concerned. Yet, it can be shown that an alternative may
be the Condorcet winner in a given profile, but cease to be that after an addition of
a group of voters whose preferences are those of a symmetric Condorcet paradox.
To illustrate, consider Table 7.10. Here we have a strong Condorcet winner, that
is, an alternative ranked first by more than 50% of the voters. It is A.
Table 7.10 Borda count and strong Condorcet winner




Add now a group of 12 voters – four with preference ranking ACB, four with
ranking CBA and four with ranking BAC – whose preferences, thus, consti-
tute a Condorcet’s paradox to the original group. The ensuing profile is shown
in Table 7.11. We observe that the Condorcet winner in the new profile is B.
Thus, adding a symmetric Condorcet’s paradox profile undermines the Condorcet
winner and brings about a new one.
Table 7.11 Added profile
7 voters 4 voters 4 voters 4 voters 4 voters
A B A C B
B C C B A
C A B A C
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7.6 Voting procedures
Most real-word voting procedures have probably been adopted on intuitive
grounds, i.e. without systematic experimentation or comparison with other
possible procedures. Over the past decades scholarly work has, however,
established a number of results on properties of various voting procedures. These
results can, of course, be utilized in future debates concerning advantages and
disadvantages of procedures.
7.6.1 Procedures
Existing voting systems can be classified in many ways, but perhaps from the
practical point of view the following three-fold system is particularly useful
(Nurmi 1983b). It classifies systems into binary, positional and multi-stage, non-
binary ones.
In the first class we have systems which essentially resort to pairwise com-
parison of alternatives in determining the winners. The defining property of the
systems in the second class is that the likelihood of an alternative being the win-
ner depends on the position it occupies in the voters’ preference rankings. In the
third class the systems require several stages of computation before the winner
can be determined. The following list gives examples of each class of procedures.
• binary: amendment, Copeland, Dodgson, max–min;
• positional: plurality, Borda count, approval voting;
• multi-stage: plurality runoff, Nanson, Black, Hare, Coombs.
Of these we have already discussed the amendment, plurality and approval
voting as well as the Borda count and plurality runoff. Copeland’s procedure is
based on counting the number of victories of each alternative in pairwise com-
parisons with other alternatives. Typically, the victory is determined by simple
majority, but one could envision other criteria of pairwise winning. In this book,
however, the simple majority criterion will be used. The Copeland winner is an
alternative that defeats more alternatives than any other alternative. Dodgson’s
procedure is also binary. It defines the winning alternative as one that can be
rendered the Condorcet winner with the smallest number of preference changes
in the given profile. The max–min winner is the alternative that has the largest
minimum support in all pairwise comparisons.
Nanson’s procedure is a Borda elimination one in the sense that it elimi-
nates all alternatives with an average or smaller than average Borda score. After
the elimination, new Borda scores are computed and again those with at most
average score are eliminated. Eventually, no eliminations are possible and those
alternatives one is left with are the winners.
Black’s system is a hybrid one: it elects the Condorcet winner if one exists.
Otherwise, it elects the Borda winner. Hare’s system determines the winner as
an alternative that has been ranked first by more than 50% of the voters. If no
such alternative exists, one eliminates that alternative which has been ranked
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first by the smallest number of voters. After the elimination, one again checks if
some alternative has been ranked first by more than 50% of voters. If such an
alternative is found, it is elected. Otherwise, one proceeds with eliminating the
next alternative, etc.43 Coombs’ procedure is identical with Hare’s except that
the alternatives that are ranked last by the largest number of voters are eliminated
instead of those ranked first by the smallest number of voters.
All these systems have advantages and disadvantages. We now turn to some
of these.
7.6.2 Criteria
The following criteria list is but a small subset of all those discussed in the
literature (Fishburn 1977; Nurmi 1983b, 1987; Riker 1982; Straffin 1980).
None the less, it provides a fairly rich picture of the criteria that are deemed
relevant.
• Condorcet criteria: Condorcet winner, Condorcet loser. The former requires
that the Condorcet winner should be elected whenever it exists in a profile.
The latter, in turn, requires the exclusion of the Condorcet loser.
• Monotonicity and no-show criteria. The former amounts to requiring that an
additional support should never be harmful for an alternative. The latter, in
turn, rules out systems under which non-voting may result in an outcome
that is preferable to that ensuing from voting.
• Pareto. This criterion requires that if all voters prefer x to y, then y is not
chosen.
• Choice set invariance: consistency, property α. Consistency requires that if
x is chosen by all subgroups of voters, then x should also be chosen by the
group as a whole. Property α, in turn, is satisfied by systems that guarantee
that any alternative x that is chosen from a set of alternatives, is also chosen
from each such proper subset of alternatives that include x.
All the above requirements are plausible, but unfortunately no system satisfies
all of them. In fact, each procedure in the preceding list has at least one serious
shortcoming. We shall now briefly outline some of these.
7.6.3 Positional methods and Condorcet criteria
From the days of Borda it has been known that plurality voting fails on the
Condorcet loser criterion. Since plurality voting can be regarded as a limiting
case of the approval voting, it follows that the latter also fails on this criterion.
Both systems also fail on the Condorcet winner criterion, which means that they
may not always elect the Condorcet winner. Both of these failures are illustrated
by Borda’s paradox (Table 7.2). A, the Condorcet loser, is elected by the plurality
voting and by approval voting if all voters vote for their top-ranked alternative.
On the other hand, B, the Condorcet winner, is not elected.
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Table 7.12 Borda count fails on Condorcet winning criterion
2 voters 2 voters 3 voters 2 voters
A A B C
C B A B
B C C A
The Borda count satisfies the Condorcet loser criterion, but fails on the other
Condorcet criterion. This is illustrated by Table 7.12 as well.
The weaknesses of positional procedures are related to Condorcet criteria. The
binary procedures do naturally better on these. Yet, they have their drawbacks
as well.
7.6.4 Inconsistency of binary procedures
The main shortcoming of the binary procedures is captured by the theorem
of Young (1975): all consistent methods are incompatible with the Condorcet
winning criterion.
H. Peyton Young (born 1945) is an American economist and applied mathemati-
cian. He has made important contributions to the social choice theory, electoral
systems studies and the evolutionary theory of social institutions. Young’s books
are Fair Representation (with Michel Balinski) (1982), Equity in Theory and Prac-
tice (1994), Individual Strategy and Social Structure (1998) and Strategic Learning
and Its Limits (2004).
This is a very typical way of expressing results in social choice theory. One
shows that two or more desiderata are incompatible. In the case of Young’s
theorem it is shown that if one wishes to have a procedure that always elects a
Condorcet winner (as is done by typical binary procedures), one has to make do
with systems that occasionally make inconsistent choices. The emphasis is on
the word ‘occasionally’, since there are profiles in which a Condorcet winner in
each subgroup is also the Condorcet winner in the overall group. For example,
if a candidate is ranked first by more that 50% of the voters in each subgroup and
if the Copeland’s system is being resorted to, then this candidate is also elected
in the group at large. Yet, Copeland’s system is inconsistent, that is, there are
profiles where it fails on consistency.
7.6.5 Non-monotonicity of multi-stage procedures
Perhaps the most dramatic shortcomings are failures on monotonicity and vul-
nerability to the no-show paradox. These are particularly dramatic since they
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Table 7.13 The no-show paradox
35 voters 25 voters 15 voters 25 voters
A B B C
B C C A
C A A B
show that it is possible that a system runs counter to the most obvious principle
of democratic elections: increasing a candidate’s support should improve her
chances of being elected. A failure of monotonicity occurs when additional sup-
port for the winning candidate – other things being equal or ceteris paribus –
makes it non-winning. The no-show paradox, in turn, refers to a situation where
an individual or group of individuals is better off, ceteris paribus, by not voting
at all than by voting according to her or its preferences. Consider the plurality
runoff system and Table 7.13.
With all voters voting according to their preferences, there will be runoff
between A and B, whereupon A wins. This is the last ranked alternative of
the 40 voters whose rankings are listed in the two middle columns. Suppose
now that 25 of those voters with preference ranking BCA abstain from voting.
Under this scenario there will be a runoff A and C. This results in the victory
of C. Clearly this is a preferable outcome to those who abstain since they prefer
C to A.
Vulnerability to the non-show paradox is by no means the only weakness of
the plurality runoff and Hare’s system. The latter is equivalent to the plurality
runoff in cases involving three alternatives as in the above example. Both of
these systems are also non-monotonic as illustrated by Table 7.14.
This profile leads to A’s victory. However, if the two right-most voters had
improved A’s position so that their preference had been ABC, then C would have
won. Clearly, then, an increase in support may be detrimental for a candidate in
plurality or Hare elections.
If one wishes to avoid the no-show paradox one should, of course, choose
systems that are not vulnerable to it. For those who would still like to insist
on the Condorcet winning criterion, the following theorem of Moulin (1988b)
presents, however, a hard choice: all procedures that satisfy the Condorcet
winning criterion are vulnerable to the no-show paradox.
Table 7.14 Non-monotonicity of plurality runoff (and Hare)
6 voters 5 voters 4 voters 2 voters
A C B B
B A C A
C B A C
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Hervé Moulin (born 1950) is a French–American mathematical economist and
social choice theorist. His works have focused i.a. on strategic voting and mecha-
nism design. He has been the editor or associate editor of several leading scholarly
journals in his field. Moulin’s most important books are The Strategy of Social
Choice (1983), Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making (1988a) and Fair Division
and Collective Welfare (2003).
Note that this theorem says nothing about procedures that do not satisfy the
Condorcet winning criterion. In other words, those procedures may or may not
be vulnerable to the paradox. The plurality and Hare systems fail on both counts:
they do not necessarily elect a Condorcet winner and they are vulnerable to the
no-show paradox.
The results cited above are quite typical in the social choice literature. They
show that it is impossible to satisfy all reasonable-looking desiderata when choos-
ing a voting procedure. While this is what these results strictly say, one should
keep in mind that to show an incompatibility between a system and a desidera-
tum, say Condorcet winning criterion, all one has to do is to present an example,
i.e. a profile where the procedure does not elect the Condorcet winner. The result
itself says nothing about how common or likely these kinds of profiles are.
7.7 Choice procedures and performance criteria
The literature on voting systems and performance criteria is extensive. Table 7.15
gives a summary of 11 systems assessed in terms of 7 criteria (see Nurmi (1983b)
and (1987) for a fuller discussion).
The rows indicate the procedures and columns stand for the following criteria
of performance: a = Condorcet winner, b = Condorcet loser, c = majority
Table 7.15 A Comparison of voting procedures
Criteria
Voting system a b c d e f g
Amendment 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Copeland 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Dodgson 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Maximin 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
Plurality 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Borda 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
Approval 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Black 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Plurality runoff 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Nanson 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Hare 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
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winning, d = monotonicity, e = Pareto, f = consistency and g = property α.
Most of the criteria have been defined above. The majority winning criterion is
the requirement that whenever there is an alternative that is ranked first by more
than 50% of the voters, then that alternative should be elected.
Entry ‘1’ (‘0’, respectively) in the table indicates that the procedure repre-
sented by the row is compatible (incompatible) with the criterion indicated by
the column. To demonstrate incompatibility one needs to present one profile in
which the choice made by the procedure is not one allowed for by the criterion.
To demonstrate compatibility one needs to show that in all profiles the choices
made by the procedure are those allowed for by the criterion.
7.8 Two social choice theorems
Going through various procedures and lists of criteria is a straightforward way to
proceed in finding satisfactory ways of making collective choices. A more gen-
eral way is to work through criteria and their relationships. Thus, for example,
one may ask whether property x is always satisfied by systems that satisfy prop-
erty y. If the answer is no, then properties x and y are incompatible. The most
celebrated results in the social choice literature are of this type. They demonstrate
the incompatibility of properties or requirements imposed on choices. The more
plausible the properties, the more dramatic are the results showing their incom-
patibility. In the following we shall mention just two well-known examples of
this literature.
Theorem 1 (Arrow 1963). No social welfare function satisfies the following
conditions:
1. unrestricted domain
2. independence of irrelevant alternatives
3. Pareto
4. non-dictatorship
This is by far the best-known theorem in social choice theory. Its main signifi-
cance is to point out the incompatibility of a set of apparently plausible desiderata.
Closer scrutiny reveals that the main culprit is the independence of irrelevant
alternatives condition which – albeit at first blush plausible – is not satisfied
by any of the 11 systems touched upon in the preceding (for an illuminating
discussion on this condition, see Saari 1999).
The other example is the theorem of McKelvey (1976, 1979). It deals with spa-
tial models of voting. In these models the voter ideal points and policy alternatives
are represented as points in a multi-dimensional policy space (see section 6.5).
In other words, the alternatives are characterized by their properties or values
on various dimensions. Similarly, each voter is assumed to have an idea of the
best possible property combination which is represented by a point in the space.
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Kenneth J. Arrow (born 1921) is one of the best-known economists of our time.
His works cover an extremely wide range of modern economics, but among the
general public he is probably best-known for his work on social choice theory.
The sheer volume of Arrow’s contributions is enormous. Collected Papers of
Kenneth J. Arrow (1983–1985) constitute six volumes. Of his booklength works,
Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd edition 1963) is a classic. Also Essays in
the Theory of Risk Bearing (1971) and General Competitive Analysis (with Frank
Hahn) (1971) are well known within the economics profession. Arrow was awarded
the John von Neumann Theory Prize in 1986 (Vane and Mulhearn 2005: 51–52).
He became a Nobel Memorial Laureate in economics in 1972.
Moreover, each voter is assumed to have preferences that can be represented by
means of a distance measure or norm defined in the space under consideration:
the further a point is from a voter’s ideal point (in terms of the distance measure),
the less preferred is the corresponding alternative in the voter’s mind.
Richard D. McKelvey (1944–2002) was an American political scientist and one of
the pioneers in the laboratory experimentation of voting systems and other mech-
anisms. His contributions range from the mathematical theory of voting through
game-theoretic solution concepts to computational economics. His theorems on the
essential arbitrariness of the simple majority rule in spatial voting games are now
classic in the social choice theory.
Let us assume that each voter has a Euclidean utility function:
xRiy if and only if DE(x, I ) ≤ DE(y, I )
where DE(x, I ) denotes the Euclidean distance between policy proposal or alter-
native x and voter i’s ideal point I . An alternative belongs to the core of the
spatial voting game if and only if there is no other alternative that is preferred
by majority to it. Now, McKelvey’s theorem states the following.
Theorem 2 (McKelvey 1976, 1979). Let Rk denote the k-dimensional
Euclidean policy space. Suppose that the core is empty, i.e. for each alter-
native there is a majority preferred one. Then for any two points x and y in Rk ,
there is a sequence z1, . . . , zm of points (proposals) in Rk so that z1 = x and
zm = y and zi+1 beats zi by a simple majority for all i = 1, . . . , m − 1.
This theorem, thus, shows that if the voters always vote for the alternative
closer to their ideal point – which is to say, for the alternative they prefer – then
starting from an arbitrary point in the space one can end up with another arbitrary
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point ‘democratically’, i.e. using simple majority voting. Phrased somewhat dif-
ferently, if the voters are myopic – that is, consider only two alternatives at a
time – then the person who controls the agenda also controls the outcome of the
sequential majority voting or amendment procedure.
7.9 Voting as a game
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that the voters express their true preferences
in voting. In other words, voters choose their voting strategies so that these reveal
their preferences over the outcomes. In political science literature this type of
behavior is sometimes called expressive or sincere voting. It is, however, quite
conceivable that the voters resort to other kinds of behavior. In particular, in
certain circumstances it may be entirely plausible not to reveal one’s preferences
in choosing voting strategy if by so doing one achieves a more preferable outcome
than by sincere voting. To illustrate, consider Borda’s paradox again (Table 7.2).
If the two voters with preference ranking CBA know the preference profile and
assume that the other seven voters vote expressively, they also know that the
outcome is bound to be A if they also vote expressively. If, on the other hand,
they vote strategically – i.e. aiming at the best possible outcome, given other
voters’ strategy choices – they may bring about the victory of B by voting for
B instead of C. Since these two voters prefer B to A, it makes sense to do so.
Hence the two voters have an incentive not to vote ‘sincerely’, that is, according
to their preference ranking.
What this illustration shows in game theoretic terms is that in the case of
Borda’s paradox the sincere voting strategies do not lead to a Nash equilibrium.
Given the choice sincere strategies of the seven other players, the two players
with ranking CBA are better off by not voting sincerely. Of course, Borda’s
paradox is just an example involving a specific profile and a specific voting
rule, plurality voting. It suggests, however, an important general question: is the
possibility of benefiting from strategic, in contradistinction to sincere, behavior
common in voting situations? Furthermore, are there differences among voting
systems in this regard, i.e. are some systems more likely to create incentives
for strategic voting than others? Given that elections and referenda are primarily
held in order to find out the voters’ views of candidates or issues, these are, of
course, fundamental questions.
Answers to them have been sought for several decades. The first ground-
breaking work in this area is Farquharson’s Theory of Voting (1969). This book
suggested a distinction between sincere and sophisticated voting strategies. Given
a preference profile and the assumption that its details are common knowledge
among the voters, the sophisticated strategies for each voter are the ones that
are left once all dominated voting strategies are eliminated. Farquharson focused
on pairwise voting systems, that is, on systems where the decision alternatives
are confronted with each other in pairs. Elimination of dominated strategies is,
however, rather tedious when the number of alternatives is even moderately large
(larger than 4).
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Within 10 years from the publication of Farquharson’s book, two important
results where achieved. The first, methodological, one is due to McKelvey and
Niemi (1978). It gives a general method for finding sophisticated voting outcomes
in binary voting systems, that is, in systems where, at each stage of voting,
the voters are faced with a choice between two options. These may be either
alternatives or subsets of them. The other result is a theorem concerning the
vulnerability of voting systems to strategic behavior. It is known as the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975). We shall discuss both
of these in the following.
An example of binary systems is the amendment system, where the voters are
voting for either one of two alternatives at each stage of voting. The successive
procedure, on the other hand, is a typical representative of the other variant of
binary systems, namely of those where the voters are comparing single alterna-
tives with subsets of them. In successive voting the agenda consists of a specific
sequence of alternatives, say, a1, . . . , ak . In the first step the voters vote for
either a1 or for the subset consisting of all the other alternatives. If a1 receives
the majority of votes, it wins. Otherwise, a1 is eliminated and the next vote
taken between a2 and the subset consisting of a3, . . . , ak . If a2 gets the majority,
it wins. Otherwise one continues in similar way until the winner is found.
McKelvey and Niemi’s method is an application of Zermelo’s algorithm
(discussed previously in section 5.2) to binary voting trees. These trees are repre-
sentations of voting games emphasizing their strategic nature. Trees consist of
nodes and edges. Each node in a binary voting tree represents a voting situa-
tion, that is, a choice between two options (alternatives or sets of alternatives).
An edge emanating from a node represents a choice (again either alternative
or set of alternatives) made in the node. To illustrate, consider the following
three-voter profile (Table 7.16). This profile has a background in the real world.
When considering applications to the vacant chair of an academic department X,
the faculty council of the social sciences at university U invited three referees
to assess the scholarly merits of the applicants. There were ten applicants. The
referees were asked to provide a ranking of the candidates they regarded as most
competent for the chair. The symbols A–G stand for those candidates ranked
among the five top ones by the three referees. The table indicates these rankings
(with a minor modification) reported by the referees.
Table 7.16 Profile illustrating the McKelvey–Niemi method
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The ranking differs from the ones we have discussed above in one respect: not
all candidates appear in all rankings. For example, candidates C and D appear in
only one ranking.
According to the university statutes the faculty council makes its nomination
partly on the basis of the referee reports and partly using other criteria, such as
teaching skills. Suppose, however, that the referees are to make the nomination
proposal themselves. Suppose, moreover, that the referees resort to the successive
procedure with the following agenda:
1. B vs. the rest of candidates,
2. A vs. the remaining candidates,
3. C vs. the remaining candidates,
4. D vs. the remaining candidates,
5. E vs. the remaining candidates, and
6. F vs. G.
This agenda can be presented as the following tree (Figure 7.1).
The preference over a set of alternatives does not in general enable us to infer
preferences over pairs that consist of a single alternative and a set of alternatives.
Thus we cannot predict what will be the outcome of successive voting, given the
above agenda, unless we make some further assumptions about voter preferences.
Let us assume that the voter always votes for the subset (that consist of one or
several alternatives) that contains her most preferred alternative of those that have
not yet been eliminated. Under this assumption, we can predict that sincere voting
Figure 7.1 The successive agenda.
E 
F G 
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strategies lead to the victory of F. This shows that the successive procedure does
not necessarily end up with the Condorcet winner (here B) under sincere voting.
To find out sophisticated voting outcomes McKelvey and Niemi suggest back-
ward induction. First they define the multi-stage sophisticated equivalent (SE, for
short) of a node in the game tree. It represents the rational outcome expectation
under the assumption that this node will be reached. For terminal nodes, that
is, those lowest in the tree (F and G in our example), these are simply identical
with those very outcomes. For non-terminal nodes, i.e those higher than termi-
nal ones in the game tree, the sophisticated equivalent is the majority preferred
alternative among those emanating from the node. In our example, the SEs of
the terminal nodes are F and G. The SE of the last nonterminal node, in turn,
is F, since F is preferred to G by two referees out of three. The outcomes written
in bold-faced letters in Figure 7.2 are the SEs of our example. The upper-most
SE is the sophisticated voting outcome. Thus, in our example the sophisticated
voting outcome is B.
B, it will be recalled, is the Condorcet winner in this example. McKelvey
and Niemi show that this is the case in general, that is, the sophisticated voting
outcome in successive voting always coincides with the Condorcet winner when
the latter exists.
The same applies to the amendment procedure which differs from the suc-
cessive one in resulting in an eventual Condorcet winner also under sincere
voting. McKelvey and Niemi show that in monotonic binary voting systems,
sophisticated voting leads to the Condorcet winner when one exists. In other
words, the ‘nice’ behavior of sophisticated voting is not restricted to the best
Figure 7.2 The SEs of department X chair agenda.
B 
F G 
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known binary procedures, amendment and successive one, but extends to any
type of monotonic binary procedure.
Another major result of McKelvey and Niemi is related to the other theorem
of McKelvey (1976, 1979) discussed above. According to it, the outcomes of
sincere pairwise majority voting can be found anywhere in a multi-dimensional
policy space, unless there exists a Condorcet winner or core alternative. The
core alternative is one which beats or ties all other alternatives in sincere voting.
In short, the amendment procedure with sincere voting can lead to an arbitrary
outcome under fairly general conditions. The McKelvey and Niemi result states
that this is no longer the case with sophisticated voting. Rather, the outcomes are
restricted to a subset of the policy space, known as the top cycle set. Top cycle
is the smallest subset A′ of alternatives which satisfies the following condition:
every alternative in A′ defeats every alternative not in A′ (Miller 1995: 63).44
Thus, sophisticated voting can be regarded as an antidote against agenda
manipulation. The latter means constructing voting agenda so that the objectives
of the agenda setter are satisfied, i.e. she gets what she wants as the outcome of
the process. Sincere voting combined with the amendment procedure gives the
agenda setter maximal control over the outcomes (provided that no core alterna-
tive exists). Sophisticated voting restricts this control to a subset of alternatives.
Yet, this subset is in a sense too large to characterize outcomes ensuing from
sophisticated voting. Indeed, Miller (1977, 1980) has shown that all sophisticated
voting outcomes of the amendment procedure must be located in a subset of the
top cycle set, that is, the uncovered set. This consists of alternatives that are not
covered by any other alternative. An alternative x covers another alternative y if
it defeats both y and all those alternatives that y defeats.
The plausibility of the uncovered set as a solution concept is fairly obvious:
choosing a covered alternative means that one foregoes another alternative that
not only beats the chosen one but also all the others that the latter beats. So,
Miller’s result amounts to showing that the amendment procedure results in one
of these plausible alternatives if the voters are sophisticated.
The uncovered set is, however, in general ‘too large’. It may contain outcomes
that cannot result from sophisticated voting under any amendment agenda. Banks
(1985) gives a full characterization of the sophisticated voting outcomes under
amendment procedure. He shows that a subset of the uncovered set, now known
as the Banks set, contains all possible outcomes of sophisticated voting and no
other alternatives. To define the Banks set we need the concept of the Banks
chain. Given any alternative x, the chain is formed as follows. We look for an
alternative that defeats x. If such an alternative, say y, exists, we have a chain
x − y. We now look for an alternative, say z, that defeats both x and y. If such a
z is found, we now have the chain x−y−z and we continue by looking for another
alternative that defeats z and both its predecessors. Continuing in this manner,
we shall eventually reach a point where no alternative beats all those in the chain.
Let the last alternative in the chain be w. It defeats all the previous ones and no
other alternative defeats it along with all the others in the chain. The end point
w is then one element of the Banks set. There may be several chains beginning
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from x. The Banks set consists of endpoints of all Banks chains. In other words,
it consists of all end points of the chains starting from all alternatives.
Jeffrey S. Banks (1958–2000) was an American political scientist and social choice
theorist who during his brief career achieved several important results in the theory
of voting, game theory and mechanism design. Apart from his numerous schol-
arly articles he published Signaling Games in Political Science (1991), Positive
Political Theory I: Collective Preference (with David Austen-Smith) (1999) and
(posthumously) Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure (with David
Austen-Smith) (2005).
The department X chair example demonstrates that sincere and sophisticated
voting may result in different outcomes. The question now arises as to how gen-
eral is this discrepancy. Does it extend to all binary voting procedures? It does. In
fact the discrepancy covers a very wide class of voting systems, as shown by the
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. It states that all non-discriminating and resolute
voting systems are either manipulable or dictatorial. Non-discrimination means
in this context that the system does not treat alternatives or voters in a discrim-
inating manner. An example of a discriminating system is a committee voting
by plurality where ties are broken by the chairperson’s vote.45 Another example
is the parliamentary amendment system which places the status quo alternative
– which means keeping the existing legislation intact – always in the last pair-
wise comparison. In general, however, it is regarded plausible that a system not
discriminate for or against alternatives or voters. Among non-discriminating sys-
tems the theorem, thus, confronts us with a choice between dictatorial systems or
those vulnerable to preference manipulation. Both are negative properties. Dic-
tatorial voting systems are those where there is a voter whose preference decides
the choice regardless of the opinions of other voters. Manipulability, in turn,
means that revealing one’s true preferences does not always result in a Nash
equilibrium. In other words, there are profiles where a voter gets a better out-
come (from her own point of view) by not revealing her true preferences than by
voting sincerely. So, the discrepancy between sincere and sophisticated voting is
quite widespread.
The fact that a system is manipulable means that under some circumstances it
makes it possible for a voter to benefit from misrepresenting her preferences. It is,
however, easy to exaggerate the practical importance of the theorem. Firstly, it is
basically an existence result in the sense that it states that there are profiles which
make preference misrepresentation beneficial for some voters. It says nothing
about the likelihood of those profiles in voting bodies. Secondly, even if such a
profile were to materialize, it might not provide incentives for the voters to vote
sophisticatedly as they do not necessarily know the voting strategies of the others.
Knowing the preference profile is not the same as to know the voting strategies.
Thirdly, the voters might be expressive voters, that is, they might wish to express
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their preferences even at the risk of ending up with worse outcomes than they
would if they resorted to sophisticated voting.46 None the less, it is natural to
consider voting as a game where opinions are transformed into voting strategies
and these, in turn, according to the procedure specific rules, into outcomes.
7.10 Suggested reading
Black (1958) is the classic treatise on voting in committees. The historical back-
ground of voting is extensively covered by McLean and Urken (1995). Arrow
(1963) and Sen (1970) are also classic works, as is Pattanaik (1971). Peleg (1984)
discusses the committee voting from the strategic perspective. In the 1990s, Saari
introduced a new, geometric, approach to voting. Saari (1995) gives the basics
of the approach which is further developed in Saari (2001a) and (2001b) as well
as in numerous technical articles, e.g. Saari (2000a) and (2000b). Sophisticated
voting and agenda institutions are analyzed extensively in Miller (1995). Widgrén
(2002) presents a model of agenda-based voting in the European Union.
8 Designing for elections and public
goods provision
We now turn from committee voting systems to a discussion of systems applied
in large scale (nationwide, municipal) elections. The problems encountered in
electoral systems design do not differ essentially from those discussed above
in the context of committee voting, but often there is a new assignment to be
dealt with, namely that of building a multi-member representative body. In other
words, there is an additional consideration involved that pertains to how the
elected representatives and their views are related to those of their electors. In his
book Principles of Electoral Reform, Michael Dummett (1997) splits the question
of the choice of electoral system into two parts. Firstly, which parties and/or indi-
viduals should represent the people at large? Secondly, which electoral system
would best guarantee the desired distribution of elected candidates and parties?
He then goes on to argue that the answer to the first question is, in fact, much
more difficult than one would perhaps anticipate. Furthermore, once this question
is answered, the answer to the second one is often relatively simple, although it
may require devising new electoral systems.
Dummett’s focus is on electoral reform and, more specifically, on the types
of reforms that have been debated in the United Kingdom over the decades.
From the more general constitutional design perspective, his analysis brings forth,
however, an important preliminary insight: in order to come up with reasonably
well-behaving institutions, one should pay careful attention to specifying one’s
desiderata. In particular, one should aim at specific criteria for the evaluation
of proposed reforms. Once these have been set up and arranged in order of
importance, the choice of the institutions is a relatively straightforward matter.
In the following we shall discuss on a fairly general level the issues related
to setting up such criteria of performance of political institutions. Of particular
interest are, of course, criteria pertaining to democratic and efficient institutions.
Before going into the details of those criteria, a few remarks on the perspective
from which we approach the institutions are in order.
Our approach is in certain respects similar to that adopted by the social philoso-
phers of the social contract tradition. That is, we shall try to find out justifications
for institutional arrangements stemming from a ‘neutral’ setting that precedes
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them in time. From the practical point of view, this approach is, of course, unreal-
istic since all institutional reforms take place in specific socio-political contexts.
That is, the real-world situations involving institutional design or reform are
necessarily preceded by a status quo situation which provides a natural basis for
comparison. Thus, some actor groups (interest groups, parties, ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities) typically benefit from certain types of reforms, while some
others may lose thereby. This makes the practical institutional design situations
akin to games of strategy.
For example, in the United Kingdom the modification of the electoral system
from the present first-past-the-post system to some version of proportional repre-
sentation is likely to be accompanied with parliamentary seat losses to both the
Labour and the Conservative parties. This conjecture is based on the assumption
that the geographical distribution of support for all parties in Britain remains
largely as it is. The fact that the consequences of the proposed systems can be
compared to the status quo by the parties makes the reform more difficult than
it would be behind the veil of ignorance, to use John Rawls’s famous concept
(Rawls 1971). Behind the veil of ignorance all actors involved in the institu-
tional design are assumed to be ignorant about the issues to be decided upon
in the future, their own positions in the new institutional framework, even their
abilities, etc.
Yet, there are institutional issues that can be discussed in abstracto, that is,
without any particular constitutional starting position in mind. These deal with
the various desiderata of institutions, i.e. various properties one would wish the
institutions to possess. These are the foci in the following.
8.1 The majority rule
One of the oft-cited hallmarks of democracy is the majority rule. It says that
given two mutually exclusive propositions (e.g. joining or not joining an eco-
nomic alliance), the one supported by a majority should be adopted. It makes
perfect sense to argue that the majority rule is indeed the only reasonable way
of deciding in this kind of situation. To choose otherwise (i.e. against the
majority opinion) would seem discriminatory. Either one of the two alternatives is
discriminated for (or against) or some voters’ opinions are being discriminated for
(or against).
In fact, K.O. May (1952) showed half a century ago that the majority rule is the
only rule that satisfies non-discrimination and the following two requirements:
1. duality: if everyone changes their mind regarding the alternatives, the
outcome should also change accordingly, and
2. strict monotonicity: if equally many voters support each of the two alterna-
tives, then only one voter needs to change her mind to change the outcome
from a tie to the victory of one of the alternatives.
148 Designing for elections and public goods provision
That the simple majority rule has these properties is, upon a moment’s reflec-
tion, pretty obvious, but the converse, i.e. the fact that any rule that satisfies the
above requirements is equivalent to the majority rule, is perhaps less straightfor-
ward. None the less, this is what May proved. Clearly, these properties are quite
plausible.
From another point of view the majority rule can also be justified by referring
to the costs an individual incurs when acting in a group rather than on her own
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Behind the veil of ignorance, the individual has
no way of knowing which kinds of issues will appear on the agenda of the
collective decision-making body. What she can anticipate, however, is that some
of the collective decisions will be against her interests, while others are favorable
to them. Obviously, the individual would like to minimize the probability of the
former type of decisions and maximize the probability of the latter ones. The
costs caused by the adverse decisions to the individual are called external costs
by Buchanan and Tullock. These summarize, thus, the negative effects that the
collective decisions have on the individual when they are against her interest. On
the other hand, the individual is obviously keen on promoting collective decisions
that are in accordance with her interests. In doing so, she incurs costs. These are
called decision-making costs.
James M. Buchanan (born 1919) is one the founders of the public choice tradi-
tion. He is an economist by training. Many of his works touch upon foundational
issues of societies, such as the proper role of the state. He has written exten-
sively on constitutional economics, the rationale of rules, principles of taxation
and constitutional contracts. Among his most important books are The Calculus of
Consent (with Gordon Tullock) (1962), The Limits of Liberty (1975), Power to Tax
(with Geoffrey Brennan) (1980) and The Reason of Rules (with Geoffrey Brennan)
(1985). In 1986 Buchanan became the Nobel Memorial Laureate in economics.
The basic idea underlying the rational choice of the decision-making rule is
that the external costs as well as the decision-making ones can be expressed as
functions of the decision rule, i.e. the size of the majority required for proposals
to pass. In particular, the external costs are monotone non-increasing functions
of the size of the majority, while the decision-making costs are assumed to grow
with the size of the majority (see Figure 8.1).47 The precise form of the func-
tions vary between individuals, but the above qualitative features make intuitive
sense. That the external costs reach the minimum when a unanimous support is
needed for a motion to pass is obvious since the individual may veto all pro-
posals that are against her interests. Similarly these costs are maximal when
the smallest possible group may dictate the collective decision. The decision-
making costs, in turn, are minimal when the individual needs to persuade no
others to support her proposal for it to be adopted. The maximum of those
costs is reached when every member of the collectivity is required to support a
motion.
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Figure 8.1 External and decision-making cost functions.
Gordon Tullock (born 1922) is, with James Buchanan and Mancur Olson, one of
the founders of the public choice school of thought. A lawyer by training Tullock
introduced the concept of rent-seeking to the vocabulary of public choice theo-
rists. He has also been a pioneer of law and economics research tradition. Tullock
has written more than twenty books, i.a. The Calculus of Consent (with James
Buchanan) (1962), The Logic of the Law (1971), Autocracy (1987) and Rent Seeking
(1993). He is the founding editor of Journal of Non-Market Decision Making (later
renamed Public Choice).
If the cost functions are symmetric, one would expect the curve representing the
sum of the two cost types to reach its minimum in the middle of the line segment
from 1 to n. Thus, the majority rule could be seen as a cost-minimizing rule for
individuals choosing the decision rule behind the veil of ignorance. A somewhat
more technical argument for the majority rule can be built using Douglas Rae’s
calculus of the probability of being on the winning side in collective decisions
(Rae 1969). In dichotomous ‘yes–no’ decision situations assuming that the future
agendas are unknown, an individual’s probability of being on the winning side
is maximal when the decision rule is the simple majority. In other words, any
other decision rule results at most the same probability of being on the winning
side (i.e. voting for ‘yes’ when ‘yes’ wins and for ‘no’ when ‘no’ wins) as the
majority rule.
Given these basically plausible arguments for the majority rule, one may
wonder why this rule is not universally adopted. At least two reasons can
be cited:
1. many decision settings differ from the one that guarantees the nice perfor-
mance of the majority rule, and
X 
Decision rule 
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2. the wish to avoid majority tyranny whereby only slightly more numerous
majority permanently subsumes the preference of the only slightly smaller
minority (Guinier 1994; Miller 1983).
With regard to the first-mentioned reason, the most important difference is
that, while the majority rule is defined for only two alternative decision settings,
the real-world applications of collective decision making typically involve more,
sometimes many more, than two alternatives. Of course, one may still act as if the
decision setting were the same as the one defining the majority rule. So, for exam-
ple, the amendment procedure used in many contemporary parliaments is based
on pairwise comparisons of alternatives where the winner in each comparison is
determined as in the definition of the majority rule. Condorcet’s paradox shows,
however, that the outcome of this procedure may be essentially arbitrary (see
Table 7.5 in the preceding chapter). Furthermore, McKelvey’s theorem shows
that when the majority rule fails, it fails completely in the sense that one cannot
be assured that the outcomes are anywhere near the voter ideal points.
8.2 Majority and plurality
The amendment procedure is one way of generalizing the majority rule into many-
alternative settings. Perhaps a more widely known way, however, is the one-
person-one-vote principle which is often held as the cornerstone of democracy.
Given several alternatives, this principle calls for each voter to vote for one and
only one alternative. Once the votes have been given, the winner is the alternative
which has been voted for by more voters than any other alternative. This system
is the plurality procedure which we have discussed above. With more than two
alternatives, it may obviously happen that the plurality winner receives less than
50% of the votes.
This undoubtedly democratic procedure may, however, run into a head-on
collision with the majority principle of the preceding section. It can happen that
the plurality winner is by no means victorious in pairwise comparisons with
other alternatives. In fact, as was shown by way of an example by Borda (see
Table 7.2 in section 7.4), the plurality winner may fare extremely poorly in such
comparisons (DeGrazia 1953).
The plurality procedure is used for example in the elections of the British
parliament. Each constituency sends one member to the parliament. The fact
that the elected member may have the support of less than 50% of the electorate
provides motivation for the plurality runoff systems. These behave exactly as the
plurality system in cases where one candidate has more than 50% of the total votes
cast. In other cases, a runoff is arranged between the two largest vote-getters.
Of these, one is bound to have a majority of votes. The runoff thus secures that
the elected candidate has been supported by at least half of the active voters.
In the example of Table 7.2, B would be the likely runoff winner since it is
ranked higher than its contestant A by 5 voters out of 9. Despite its ‘majoritarian
spirit’, the runoff system may fail to elect a candidate that would defeat all others
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in pairwise contests. Modifying Table 7.2 so that the four voters on the left switch
their preference between B and C, we end up with a situation where C would
defeat both A and B with a simple majority. Yet, C would not make it to the
second round. Thus, it would not be elected. This is obviously an unpleasant
possibility for those who find the Condorcet winning criterion compelling.
Apart from the cyclic majority problems, the other main concern pertaining
to the exclusive use of the simple majority rule is the majority tyranny. This
concept refers to the possibility that a majority of voters forms a permanent
coalition to the detriment of the minority (Miller 1983; Baharad and Nitzan
2002). Should a permanent coalition of 51% of voters form and the majority rule
be applied, this coalition would in fact dictate each and every decision in the
society. Surely, when thinking of the majority rule as an indicator of the rule
by the people one would find this eventuality highly undesirable. Intuitively one
tends to think that 51% of the voters should dictate roughly 51% of the decisions,
not 100% of them. Under this intuition, then, democracy seems to contain an
idea of proportionality.
It is well-known that the majoritarian systems do not guarantee proportionality.
This fact was pointed out in the United States presidential election of the year
2000 where it turned out that the elected president, George W. Bush, had less
popular votes than his opponent, Al Gore. Under the US constitution this kind
of outcome is quite possible since the Electoral College which actually elects the
president, albeit representing the states in somewhat proportional manner, works
according to the ‘winner-take-all’ principle. Thus, all the electors of each state
vote for the candidate which was supported by the majority of voters of that state.
As it happened, Bush won by 271 electors against Gore’s 267. In terms of the
popular vote numbers, Gore, however, received some 300,000 votes more than
Bush. Thus, it could be (and was) argued that Bush had ‘too few’ votes to qualify
as the real winner of the contest. This argument misses the essential nature of
the majoritarian US system. Bush would have won even with a dramatically
smaller number of votes. In fact, all the votes he received in those states where
Gore won the majority of votes, were in a sense redundant for Bush since they
did not increase the number of his electors. Similarly, in those states where
Bush received the majority of votes, all those votes in excess of the majority
were redundant since he would have received all the electors in those states
without them.48
The peculiarities of the majoritarian systems become perhaps even more vivid
by the observation that in the US presidential election a candidate may receive
overall more votes than any other candidate without getting a single elector
(Nurmi 2002: 22). The plurality rule may thus lead to extreme deviations
from proportionality. Yet, single-member districts and plurality voting can be
defended on the grounds that they typically result in clear majorities in legisla-
tures. Combined with parliamentarianism these systems then have the advantage
of producing stable and fairly enduring governments. The latter, in turn, enable
the governments to pursue relatively long-term social goals. The disadvantages
of these systems are equally well-known: the legislation may largely benefit the
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supporters of the ruling majority and thus alienate the opposition. Of particular
interest in systems with more or less permanent cleavages is the representation
of the minorities, be they of religious, linguistic or ethnic nature. Let us now
take a look at a procedure which can be seen as an attempt to secure minority
representation without jeopardizing the majority’s right to call the shots.
8.3 Single transferable vote
In Ireland, Malta and many municipalities of New England, the system used
in electing collective bodies is called the single transferable vote (STV). In the
Irish parliamentary elections the members of parliament (MPs) are elected from
multi-member constituencies, but the system lends itself to an application in
single-member constituencies as well. In those circumstances it is usually called
the alternative vote or Hare’s system. This has already been discussed above.
In Britain, STV is often regarded as the main rival of the first-past-the-post
system, but it is obviously not the only alternative. One of the main advantages of
STV is the relative high degree of minority protection it provides. In other words,
it guarantees that even fairly small voter minorities, when acting in concert, can
guarantee representation in the elected bodies. Just how small minorities can do
this depends, however, on the number of MPs elected in the constituency: the
larger the constituency (i.e. the larger the number of MPs elected from it), the
better the chances of even small minorities to get representation.
STV operates as follows. Given a set of candidates, each voter is asked to
express a ranking of the candidates. The set of these rankings is the preference
profile used in computing the winners. Suppose that the constituency we focus on
sends k MPs to the parliament. In determining the election result, we first define
the Droop quota, D, which is the smallest integer strictly larger than n/(k + 1)
where n is the number of voters who voted in the constituency. Next, one finds
out whether some of the candidates have been ranked first by at least D voters.
If such candidates exist, they are declared elected. Because of the rounding up
involved in the computation of D, at most k candidates can be declared winners.
Often the number of winners found after the first count is strictly less than k .
Once the candidates who have been ranked first by at least D voters have
been found, the candidate who has been ranked first by the smallest number of
voters is eliminated. This means that the votes given to her are assigned to those
candidates mentioned in the second place of those ballot slips. Also, the votes
in excess of D are reassigned to other candidates in proportion of the number of
voters who indicate those candidates next in their ballots. Table 8.1 and Table 8.2
illustrate the computation of winners in a two-member constituency with 100
voters and four candidates (Nurmi 1996/7).
The Droop quota in Table 8.1 is 34. Table 8.2 shows the phases of computation.
The result is that A and D emerge as winners.
STV is often regarded as a method that guarantees some proportionality in the
voting outcomes. Indeed, with the increase of the district size, the minority pro-
tection of STV increases since clearly any minority of 1/(k + 1)th of the district
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Table 8.1 Computing the STV winners
15 voters 15 voters 10 voters 20 voters 25 voters 15 voters
A B B C D A
D C C A B D
C A A D A C
B D D B C B
Table 8.2 Phases of computation
Candidate First count Second count Third count
A 30 +20 = 50 −16 = 34
B 25 25 25
C 20 −20 = 0 0
D 25 25 +16 = 41
electorate may through concerted action guarantee representation (k denoting the
number of representatives elected from the district). This is certainly an impor-
tant feature in some contexts. Another advantageous feature in STV is that it is
difficult to benefit from misrepresentation of one’s true preferences. In order to
successfully benefit from it, one has to know a great deal about the preference
ranking distribution of the electorate. While it is possible to find circumstances
in which strategic voting might work under STV, there seems to be a fairly
widespread consensus among election system experts that misrepresentation
efforts are likely to backfire.
To balance these advantages, STV has several serious drawbacks. One of them,
non-monotonicity, has been pointed out by Doron and Kronick (1977). In other
words, additional support could under some circumstances decrease rather than
increase a candidate’s likelihood of being elected. More specifically, when STV
(or some other non-monotonic system) is used, a candidate may have incentives
to ask some of her voters not to vote for her lest her chances of being elected
be jeopardized. This is obviously not a desirable property of a voting system.
It has been argued, though, that the circumstances under which STV creates such
incentives are extremely rare (Allard 1995).
A more serious problem in STV pertains to incentives to vote. To wit, STV is
one of those systems which may result in a no-show paradox. It will be recalled
that this paradox occurs when a group of voters would be better off by not
voting at all than by voting according to its preferences. This feature is intuitively
related to monotonicity, but on closer inspection, turns out to be logically distinct
from it (Campbell and Kelly 2002). From the viewpoint of encouraging voter
participation, the possibility of a no-show paradox is, of course, unpleasant.
An instance of the paradox under STV can be seen in Table 8.1. Suppose that
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the 10-voter group with preference ranking BCAD abstained. Now, the Droop
quota would reduce to 31. The first alternative to be eliminated would be B
after which C as well as A would emerge as winners. Surely, this outcome is
preferable for the abstainers to the original victory of A and D.
Another feature that is often regarded as a weakness of STV is the possibility
that a Condorcet winner alternative is not elected. On a moment’s reflection this
is a relatively straightforward consequence of the fact that the alternative that
would defeat all others in pairwise contests with a majority of votes is not neces-
sarily ranked first by a single voter. Thus, it is very ‘often’ eliminated in the early
rounds of computing the STV winners. Of course, the strong Condorcet winner,
i.e. an alternative ranked first by more than 50% of voters will necessarily be
elected by STV. Hence, STV avoids the most blatant type of conflict with the
majority principle.
As Doron (1979) has pointed out, STV is an inconsistent procedure. This
means that rather counterintuitive surprises may surface when STV is applied in
several districts. In particular, it may happen that an alternative, say A, wins in
all districts by STV, but when all districts are considered simultaneously, some
other alternative wins (see also Fishburn and Brams 1982).
As all procedures, STV is thus characterized by a mixture of desirable and
undesirable properties. Baharad and Nitzan (2002) provide an illuminating gen-
eral discussion on how systems that are based on individual preference rankings,
like the Borda count, are effective in countering majority tyranny. Thus, even
though in the English-speaking world STV is often regarded as the most impor-
tant way of guaranteeing some degree of proportionality and of avoiding majority
tyranny, it is by no means the only way. In continental Europe, however, various
list-type proportional representation systems are far more common. We now turn
to some of these systems.
8.4 Quota and divisor methods
The explicit aim of proportional representation (PR) systems is that the elected
body of representatives is to a reasonable degree a miniature of the political
opinions of the electorate at large. In the following we shall call the elected body
the parliament, but it is, of course, possible and even common to resort to PR in
municipal and other types of elections. Hence, what will be said of PR systems
and parliamentary election applies to these other types of elections as well.
In most PR systems one can distinguish two phases:
1. the allocation of parliamentary seats to districts, and
2. the allocation of seats within a district to parties or candidates.
The former phase is often called apportionment. It precedes the election in
time. There are PR systems in which the entire country (or municipality) is
regarded as one district. Thus, the former phase is, in some cases, trivially solved.
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Of the methods used in the apportionment stage, the largest remainders or
Hamilton’s method is very often used. This method is in a way ‘natural’ since it






Here Vi denotes the number of voters in district i, V the total number of voters,
Si the number of seats allocated to district i and S the house size, i.e. the total
number of seats in the parliament. In the apportionment problem we are given
the values of S, Vi and V . Thus, we can solve for Si. This is the exact quota of
district i. A new problem, however, emerges thereby. To wit, the value obtained
is typically not an integer. How to deal with the fractional parts? One way is to
simply ignore them and allocate seats to districts in accordance with the integer
parts of Si. This, however, would leave us with a few unallocated seats since
the sum of the integer parts is typically smaller than S. The largest remainders
method solves the problem by first allocating each district the number of seats
corresponding to the integer part of its quota and then allocating the available
additional seats to districts in the order of magnitude of the fractional parts of
their quotas. Thus, the label ‘largest remainders’ gets its explanation (for an
extensive and systematic treatment of various PR methods, see Balinski and
Young 1982).
Although at first sight intuitively plausible, the largest remainders method may
yield bizarre outcomes, one of which led to its abandonment as the apportionment
method in the United States. This anomaly bears the name Alabama paradox,
since it relates to the period during which the state of Alabama was to enter
the union, i.e. in the early 1880s. During the process of new states entering,
the constitution provided that they be allocated a share of seats in the House
of Representatives that would correspond to the share of their population in the
total US population. Up to the 1880s this had been interpreted as calling for the
largest remainders allocation. In 1881, however, the chief clerk of the US Bureau
of Census, C.W. Seton, reported an astonishing observation: on the basis of his
calculations, Alabama would be entitled to 8 representatives if the House had
299 seats, but to only 7 if the House size were 300.
The requirement that the largest remainders method violated in the case of
the Alabama paradox is nowadays known as house monotonicity: given a fixed
distribution of seats over n districts in a house of size m, the amount of seats
allocated to each district should be no less if the house size is increased to
m + 1. It turns out that the method is vulnerable to other types of anomalies
as well. Specifically, it may respond in a strange way to relative changes in the
populations of states (see Balinski and Young 1982: 42–43). In 1901, the state of
Virginia would have lost one seat to the state of Maine according to the census
data and, yet, the ratio of the population of Virginia vis-à-vis that of Maine had
increased (for similar observations in Finland, see Nurmi and Lagerspetz (1984)
and Nurmi (1999: 114–115)).
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To balance its unexpectedly poor performance when judged according to the
criteria above, the largest remainders method has one clear advantage pointed
out by Birkhoff (1976), that is, binary fairness. This most plausible requirement
states that the allocation of seats should be optimal in the sense that any reallo-
cation of seats between two districts would result in a larger deviation from strict
proportionality with regard to these two districts.
Another virtue of the largest remainders method is that the resulting alloca-
tions always satisfy the quota, i.e. no district receives less than si − 1 or more
than si + 1 seats. Yet, due to its failure on monotonicity, this method has been
replaced by some divisor method in many countries. For example, in Finland
the apportionment is conducted using the largest remainders method, but the
allocation of seats to parties after the votes have been cast is done by d’Hondt’s
method, which is one of the divisor ones.
The divisor methods are characterized by a sequence of increasing divisor
numbers a( j) ( j = 1, . . . , k) that are used in dividing the support given to each
party list in elections. The seats available in a given district are then allocated to
parties in the order of magnitude of the numbers obtained by dividing the party
support in a district by consecutive numbers in the sequence. Thus, the first seats
to each party are given in the order of the numbers obtained by dividing the party
support by a(1).
The divisor methods differ from each other with regard to the values of a(i).
d’Hondt’s method is characterized by a(i) = i. The advantage of the divisor
methods is that they are in general monotonic. But the most important source
of disproportionality is the existence of multiple districts. Regardless of how
one determines the candidates elected in districts, the country-wide distribution
of parliamentary seats may grossly deviate from proportionality if there are no
surplus or compensation seats to be allocated to parties on the basis of the overall
support. Thus, the most straightforward way to achieve proportional distributions
is to do away with districts, i.e. to consider the whole country as a single district.
This method is used, for example, in the Netherlands and Israel. This has the
disadvantage of playing down the local or area considerations in the composition
of the parliament. Obviously, this is not entirely plausible in geographically large
and heterogeneous systems. A more plausible way is to resort to allocation of a
fixed share of parliamentary seats on the basis of country-wide support of parties,
as has been done, e.g. in Germany.
8.5 Proportionality of what?
The intuitive concept of proportionality connects the views of members of the
representative body with those of the electorate at large. According to this intu-
itive conception, the views of the electorate are reflected in the election results
(see e.g. Baker 1996). But in typical elections, each voter can reveal very little
of her opinions regarding candidates and/or parties. More often than not, she
can only pick one alternative (party list or candidate) as her favorite. Sure, there
are elections, notably of the STV variety, that allow for a richer expression
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Table 8.3 Ambiguous proportionality
30% of voters 35% of voters 25% of voters 10% of voters
A C D B
B B B C
C A A D
D D C A
of opinions. The point, however, is that if we assume that the voters have
opinions regarding all candidates or at least several of them, the notion of propor-
tionality underlying current electoral systems becomes ambiguous. Consider an
example (Table 8.3).
Here we have four candidates competing for three seats in a constituency.
Systems based on plurality as well as STV would elect A, C and D. Yet, B is
ranked first or second by all voters, while D is ranked last by 65% of them. The
exclusion of B would seem unreasonable.
By a slight modification of the above table one may create a situation where
plurality and STV systems end up with different outcomes. By assigning 35% of
the voters to the left-most group, 40% to the next one, 15% to the next one
and 10% to the right-most group, we get different results with plurality-based
systems and STV. The former ends up with A, C and D, while STV results in A,
B and C. It is not difficult to see that our notion of proportionality is crucially
dependent on the voting system. This – along with voter preferences – determines
what kind of seat distributions we consider proportional. Thus, it seems that the
very meaning of proportionality hinges on an implicit assumption of the social
choice procedure to be used. Consequently, it may well happen that, given a
preference profile, we may have several proportional outcomes (e.g. allocations
of parliamentary seats to parties) depending on the underlying choice procedures
(e.g. STV, Borda count, plurality).
Suppose now that nearly perfect proportionality has been achieved in the sense
that there is an agreement as to what voting procedure is used in defining propor-
tionality and that, moreover, the seat distribution of parties corresponds closely
to the distribution of support in the electorate. The voting body is then assumed
to be a miniature model of the electorate at large in relevant respects (opinions
on the main political issues). Surely our assumption is very strong, but nev-
ertheless it can be easily seen that crucial problems remain open even if the
proportionality of seat distribution were our sole desideratum. This is shown in
the following.
Consider a voting body – say, a parliament – with 100 seats. Suppose, more-
over, that on the basis of elections held, the perfectly proportional seat distribution
would give party A 55 seats, party B 25 seats and party C 20 seats. Now, the
main role of parliaments is to enact laws and other norms. In passing legis-
lation, the parliaments resort to collective decision-making procedures. Very
often the majority rule is being applied. In other words, one looks at decision
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alternatives in a binary fashion and, at any given stage of the procedure, chooses
that alternative which is supported by a majority in a contest with another
alternative (or set of alternatives). The amendment and successive procedures,
discussed above, are of this variety. It is clear that when the number of seats
of a party exceeds that of a majority, it determines the winners in every pair-
wise contest. Thus, the influence of such a party over the legislative outcomes
is decisive. In our example, party A clearly determines the outcome of every
pairwise vote. Hence its control over the legislation is complete. With 55% of
the seats – and, by assumption, of the popular support – it controls 100% of the
legislation.
On the basis of examples like this one could argue that what should be dis-
tributed proportionally is not seats but voting power, i.e. influence over legislative
outcomes. This, however, begs the question of measuring the latter. What the
above example suggests is that the seat distribution is at times a poor proxy of
voting power distribution. In particular, under circumstances where one party is
capable of dictating the voting outcomes, the distribution of seats to others is
largely irrelevant. But is the negative conclusion valid in general, that is, are we
in general entitled to the conclusion that the seat distribution gives a distorted
picture of the voting power distribution?
The answer to this question depends on one’s measure of voting power. Some
of these have been discussed in the preceding. These measures equate voting
power with the importance of a party when voting coalitions are assumed to
form in specific ways. For example, the Banzhaf index makes the simplifying –
and often empirically false – assumption that all winning coalitions are equally
likely to form. Under this assumption and taking into account the seat distribution
as well as the required number of votes to pass legislation, it counts the number
of winning coalitions in which a party is non-redundant. These coalitions are
the swings of the party. Dividing the number of swings of a party with the total
number of swings of all parties gives the normalized Banzhaf index value of
the party.
The Banzhaf index is but one of many measures of a priori voting power.
Its advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis other similar measures has been a
subject of debate for some time.49 Whatever its shortcomings, it is certainly
a more informative and useful measure of voting power than the practice of
distributing seats to parties in proportion to their popular support. What this
practice ignores is the fact that decisions in collective bodies are always made in
accordance with decision rules. Typically these state the vote thresholds that have
to be exceeded in order to pass new legislation. That a measure which takes these
thresholds into account is superior to the common practice seems pretty obvious.
What remains an open question is whether one should include more institutional
detail into power measures. One such detail, already discussed in the preceding,
is the existence of a spatial continuum along which the parties occupy more or
less fixed positions. The traditional left–right continuum is an obvious candidate
for such a spatial dimension. Whether it still today constrains the parties in
their coalition behavior is, however, somewhat questionable. In any event, the
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concept of proportionality is ambiguous and, thus, a rich source of issues for
political debate.
8.6 The general design problem
Designing voting systems for committees and electorates at large is a special
case of a more general problem, namely that of institutional design. What kind
of institutions would bring about the desired socio-political outcomes? This is the
general formulation of the institutional design problem. This formulation begs the
question of what is meant by desired outcomes. It also leaves open the meaning
of ‘bring about’.50 Depending on the context the concept of desired outcome may
have a wide range of different meanings. For example, in the design of voting
procedures, one might consider it desirable that the procedure always results in
an outcome that is Pareto optimal. Or we might view the choice of an eventual
Condorcet winner desirable.
Stated more precisely, a mechanism consists of two parts (Palfrey and
Srivastava 1989; Thomson 1996; Jackson 2001). Firstly, it includes the set of
strategies of each player, formally an n-tuple of sets, if there are n individuals.
Secondly, it includes a rule that associates an outcome to each collection of
strategies given by the individuals. These strategies – often called messages in the
literature – may be votes, bids or any other acts. A mechanism simply determines
the outcome once the individuals have chosen their strategies. A mechanism is,
thus, ‘almost’ a game: it is a game form, that is, a game without utilities or
preferences assigned to the outcomes. Consider now a social choice function that
assigns an outcome to each preference profile of individuals.51 It is said to be
implementable by a mechanism if the latter – when augmented with individual
preferences – always results in the same outcomes as the social choice function
so that these outcomes are game theoretic solutions or equilibria in some specific
sense, e.g. Nash or subgame perfect equilibria. The equilibrium concept is then
used in the characterization of the implementation. Thus, some choice functions
are Nash-implementable, subgame perfect implementable and so on. The the-
ory of mechanism design, that is, of conditions under which choice rules are
implementable by game forms, is nowadays fairly abstract. In the following we
shall, however, assume a less abstract approach and focus on mechanism that are
devised for the specific task of public goods provision.
There are several ways of showing why the standard supply and demand mech-
anism fails when public goods are considered. The classic tragedy of commons
is a story in which there is a relatively large area of land that is suitable for
cattle grazing (Hardin 1968). There are several cattle owners who make use
of this land. Since the land is relatively large and each additional animal con-
sumes only a minuscule quantity of the available vegetation, each cattle owner
has the incentive to increase the size of her herd. However, there is an upper
limit to the number of animals that the commons can sustain. Once this limit
is exceeded, the yield of the commons in terms of meat production begins to
deteriorate, thus decreasing the income of all cattle owners using the commons.
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Yet, each cattle-owner faces the dilemma: refraining from bringing more animals
to the commons contributes to the welfare of the cattle already grazing there, but
only under the condition that other cattle-owners do not take advantage of this
by bringing their new animals to the commons. Thus, the maintenance of the
commons seems to require coordination and enforcement of contracts.
In the preceding we have already discussed some elementary game theoret-
ical models of public goods provision. In those games – PD and Chicken –
the setting is one where a ‘lumpy’ public good is focused upon (lighthouse,
bridge). This is somewhat restrictive. We, therefore, now broaden the per-
spective by introducing public goods – like security – that can be provided
in varying amounts. The model discussed in the following section is based on
Feldman’s (1980) text.
8.7 Optimizing the public goods provision
The problem of optimal amount of public good will be approached in the simpli-
fied context where there are only two goods in the economy, one public and one
private. Let x denote the amount of the public good. To simplify the expressions
below we assume that each unit of the public good costs one unit of currency,
i.e. the price of an additional unit of the public good is 1. It follows then that
x denotes both the amount and the cost of the public good.
Let yi denote the amount of private good in the possession of individual i.
To simplify things further, let us assume that the welfare level of each individual –
her utility – is a sum of her utility of possessing a certain amount of private good
and her utility of the available amount of the public good, i.e. her utility function
with regard to the private and public good is separable. Thus, we can express
i’s utility as
ui = vi(x) + yi
where vi is a continuous function.
Let now vi/x be i’s marginal utility of the public good at point P, that is,
when the amount of public good already available is P. This is approximately
the amount that her utility increases when the amount of public good increases
by one unit while her consumption of the private good remains constant. v′i(x)
denotes i’s marginal utility when the amount of public good is x.
The amount of money to be allocated to the public and private goods comes
from the individual original possessions denoted by wi. In other words, in this
highly simplified economy the individuals allocate all their original possessions
to private and public goods. Furthermore, there is no borrowing.
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In other words, the entire original possessions – no more and no less – are
allocated to public and private goods. Now, what is the optimal amount of
public good?
To derive what is known as Samuelson’s optimality condition we consider the
following inequality:
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) > 1
In other words, the sum of the first derivatives of vi(x) with respect to x is set
strictly larger than 1. This means that we are looking at those supply levels of
x for which the sum of marginal utilities of individuals is larger than 1. Let us
assume that for all individuals the amount of private good exceeds the marginal
utility of the public good at x, that is, yi > v′i(x). We show that the level of public
goods provision at which the sum of marginal utilities exceeds unity is too small
to be optimal.
To see this let us decrease the private goods consumption of each i by v′i(x).
Hence, for each individual i the new private goods consumption is:
ȳi = yi − v′i(x).
Altogether we have decreased the private good consumption by:
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) = 1 + 
with  > 0, since the left hand side of the inequality is by assumption larger
than unity.
Take now a part of this aggregated decrease, namely 1 unit, from the private
good and allocate that to the provision of the public good. The new amount of
public good is:
x̄ = x + 1.
With this new amount of public good each i’s utility increases approximately
by the amount of her marginal utility at x, that is, by v′i(x). Therefore, when the
consumption is at the level (x̄, ȳ1, . . . , ȳn) each i is approximately equally well off
as at (x, y1, . . . , yn). But we still have  of the decreased private goods left over.
This can be distributed among the individuals so that at least some fare strictly
better than they did at (x, y1, . . . , yn). Consequently, if
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) > 1
then the situation is not optimal in the Pareto sense since one can reallocate
resources by diminishing the consumption of the private good and increasing
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that of the public good so that some individuals are strictly better off and no one
is worse off after the reallocation.
In a similar way we can show that if
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) < 1
the level of public goods provision is not Pareto optimal. In this case it is by
increasing the private goods consumption that one can improve at least some
individuals’ welfare without a loss to anyone.
Hence, we must conclude that a necessary condition for Pareto optimal
allocation is
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) = 1
This is known as Samuelson’s optimality condition for public goods. What it
says, then, is that in optimal allocation the sum of individual marginal utilities
of the public good sums to unity.
It turns out that this optimality condition coincides with the maximum of the
aggregated net utility of the public good. To see this, consider the net aggregated
utility of the public good, i.e. the utility sum minus the costs of buying the
public good:




To find the maximum of this expression we set its first derivative with respect




which is identical with the Pareto optimality condition for public goods. Hence,
the Samuelson condition is not only necessary but also sufficient for the optimal
level of provision of the public good.
Can we expect the optimal level of public goods provision to be reached in
practice? The answer is no. To see this, let us assume that each individual i
purchases the public good in a rational fashion, i.e. each individual i tries to
maximize
ui = vi(x) + yi
so that the following budget constraint is satisfied:
x + yi = wi.
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Substituting for yi this amounts to maximizing
ui = vi(x) − x + wi.
Now, wi is constant which means that the function to be maximized is vi(x) − x.
Graphically this is the vertical distance between vi(x) and the line y = x. Since
vi(x) is assumed to be concave upwards – i.e. the returns from additional units
of public good are diminishing – the distance is maximized at the point where
the slope of the tangent of vi(x) equals the slope of y = x. In other words, at the
maximum
v′i(x) = 1.
Let x̂i be the amount of public good that would maximize i’s utility and assume
that i undertakes to purchase this amount. After all, this would seem to be the
rational thing to do. It follows then that x can be consumed by others as well. Now,
we may well find an individual j for whom v′j(x̂i) < 1. For such a person giving
up a unit of the private good in order to purchase an additional unit of the public
one would decrease her overall utility. Hence this individual does not contribute
to the public goods provision. Instead she takes the free ride offered by i.
There may, of course, be individuals k for whom v′k (x̂i) > 1. These individuals
would benefit from giving up a unit of the private good in order to purchase an
additional unit of the public good. Indeed, one would expect those individuals to
keep on purchasing additional public good units until v′k (x) = 1. So, the process
of buying additional public good units will stop once we have reached the level x
which is characterized by:
• there is at least one individual i for whom vi(x) = 1, and
• for all members j: v′j(x) ≤ 1.
However, the fact that vi(x) = 1 for some individuals i and the fact that for all
individuals j: v′j(x) > 0 mean that
v′1(x) + v′2(x) + · · · + v′n(x) > 1
In other words, the sum of marginal utilities exceeds 1 which implies that the
amount purchased is not optimal.
The above reasoning provides an explanation to Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966)
finding that in public goods provision it is often the case that the ‘big’ members
pay a disproportionately large share of the costs of public goods. This might well
be a result of the fact that the optimal level of public goods is larger for those
members than for small ones. Hence, once the big members have purchased their
optimal level, purchasing additional units would actually decrease the welfare of
the smaller ones.
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Without coordination, then, the amount of public good provided is likely to be
non-optimal. Mere coordination is, however, not enough to secure optimality. For
example, arrangements whereby individuals would signal their utility functions
regarding the public good to a coordinator who would then determine the level
of public goods provision as well as allocate the costs among individuals are
likely to fail because of the incentive problem. When asked, the individual has
an incentive to play down her utility of the public good. If everyone acts on
this incentive, the outcome is likely to be a substantially sub-optimal level of
public goods. Is this unavoidable, i.e. is it impossible to connect individual true
preferences for public goods with the amount they are charged? It turns out that
this connection between payment shares and utility levels can be made in a fair
manner. The solution is known as the demand revealing mechanism which makes
use of the Clarke tax (Tideman and Tullock 1976; Clarke 1980; Hillman 2003:
110–125). It works as follows.
First, the mechanism calls for all the individuals to report their utility functions
regarding various levels of supply of the public good. The reports may be truthful
or distorted. Once the reports have been given, the benevolent tax authority




It will be recalled that this is Samuelson’s optimality condition for public goods
which is also the amount of the good that maximizes the sum of individual net
utilities of the public good x. Let us denote the value of x that satisfies this
optimality condition by x̄. So, if all messages used in determining x̄ are truthful,
then the aggregate net utility of the good is maximized at this point. Next the tax
authority computes the Clarke taxes Ti of each individual i as follows:




where mj denotes the value that individual j reports to the tax authority. The
Clarke tax of i is thus a function of the messages of all other individuals, but
does not depend on i’s own message.
Suppose that a public project, say a street lamp, is to be set up and paid for by
individuals 1, . . . , 4. The individuals know the mechanism and may suspect that
they might be better off by reporting values that differ from their true valuations.
Let the total cost of the project be 100 dollars. The individual messages regarding
the value of the lamp expressed in dollars are: u1 = 50, u2 = 10, u3 = 20, and
u4 = 0.
We thus get the following Clarke taxes: T1 = 70, T2 = 30, T3 = 40, T4 = 20.
Intuitively this makes sense since the individuals with higher reported valua-
tions of the public good get higher taxes. We observe, however, that the tax
authority makes a huge profit by collecting 160 dollars for a 100 dollar project.
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This problem of budget balance turns out to be endemic, but can to some extent be
ameliorated by subtracting a report-independent amount from each individual’s
Clarke tax. That is, each individual’s tax amount is diminished by an amount that
does not depend on her report or on the level of public good.52 More important,
however, is the question of whether this mechanism induces truthful reporting.
It turns out it does (Feldman 1980: 122–129; Hillman 2003: 110–114). Instead
of a proof, let us illustrate the fact by considering individual 1’s strategies.
Suppose that 50 dollars is, indeed, her true valuation of the street lamp, but
instead of 50 she reports only 40 dollars as her valuation. Provided that the others
give the same reports as above, 1’s Clarke tax remains 70. However, the amount
of public good provided, that is, the value of x̄, changes. It is no more the optimal
one in terms of i’s true valuation. Hence, i pays the same tax as for the optimal
amount of public good, but the level of the good is not optimal for her.
As we saw above, this mechanism does not in general balance the budget, that
is, the collected taxes may amount to more or less than the cost of the public good
provided. It turns out that there is no way in which the excess payments could
be returned to the tax payers in proportion to their taxes without destroying the
demand revealing nature of the mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to augment
the above description of the mechanism by requiring that the taxes not be used
for the purpose of funding the provision of the public good in question (Hillman
2003: 112). Rather the taxes must be collected in the government budget from
which all kinds of goods and services are funded. Another, somewhat more
desperate way of dealing with the excess funds is to destroy them or donate them
to another country (Feldman 1980: 128).
The incentive to free riding as well as the sub-optimal level of public
goods provision may be regarded as important explanations for the emergence
and prevalence of political decision-making mechanisms, e.g. in the form of
governments. However, the elimination or reduction of negative externali-
ties – i.e. negative external effects of activities – caused by individuals or
groups to other individuals or groups are often results of government activities.
For example, the government may step in to restrict production activities which
bring about major negative externalities to the population in the form of envi-
ronmental damage. Indeed, Pigou (1929) argued that because of the externalities
accompanied with production, consumption and leisure activities, the interaction
between individuals and groups often leads to suboptimal outcomes unless there
is a government interference. On the other hand, government activity itself is
often a major source of externalities (Tullock 2005).53 But are these the only
important reasons for the existence of governments? The next chapter will deal
with this question. We shall also discuss the plausibility of the assumption of a
benevolent government.
8.8 Suggested reading
A theoretical overview and analysis of the main proportional election systems is
presented in Balinski and Young (1982), and also Taagepera and Shugart (1989)
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as well as Shugart and Carey (1992) introduce research methods and discuss
findings on a variety of electoral systems. Another important source book on
electoral systems is Colomer (2004). The properties of majority rule are discussed
in Hillman (2003: section 3.1) and Mueller (2003: Chapters 5–6). The former as
well as Feldman (1980: Chapters 6 and 9) also discuss majority rule in public
goods provision. The mechanism design literature tends to be rather technical.
Hurwicz (1972) and (1979) as well as Maskin (1985) are important works in this
field. The theory of implementation is also developed in Jackson et al. (1994),
Moore and Repullo (1988) and Moulin (1984).
9 What kind of government?
One of the fundamental roles of the state is to provide a specific kind of public
good – security – for its citizens. This has likely been the most important consid-
eration in establishing ancient states and certainly the most important criterion
used in the assessment of their success. Reflecting this importance, the modern
theory of state suggests that the emergence of states can be explained as a nat-
ural response to the security needs of the individuals in a hypothetical stateless
‘original position’.
9.1 States as bandits
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick (1974) presents a theory of the emergence
of state in a fictitious situation where individuals possess a set of natural rights,
such as personal freedom, the right to the product of one’s own labor or to the
income that is voluntarily transferred from one individual to another.54 Given
this state of affairs, Nozick argues that the emergence of the state can be given
an invisible hand explanation. In other words, the state can be seen to emerge as
a by-product of the security demands of individuals. In the first stage groups of
individuals, realizing their common need to protect their possessions from theft
or robbery, arrange for common protection of the possessions of group members.
Eventually, protective agencies form to respond to demand for security services.
Thus, security service becomes marketable. Because of the relative nature of the
service provided – i.e. the quality of the service depends on the resources of other
agencies – a dominant protective agency emerges. In Nozick’s terminology this
is called the ultra-minimal state. It is the end result of a process whereby each
actor tries to maximize her own utility. However, the result itself is no one’s
goal. Hence, invoking the process is called an invisible hand explanation: the
process leads inevitably to an end state which no one has intended.55
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Robert Nozick (1938–2002) was one of the most influential American philosophers
of the 20th century. As his contemporary John Rawls, also Nozick represented
analytic tradition of social philosophy. His best known work is Anarchy, State
and Utopia (1974), where he proposed a theory of justice which in many ways
contradicts Rawls’s theory. Indeed, Nozick came to be seen as a champion of
libertarianism and neo-conservatism. In contrast to Rawls, however, he was not
keen on defending and further developing his work on social philosophy. Instead
his attention focused on other philosophical topics. Philosophical Explanations
appeared in 1981 and The Nature of Rationality in 1993. Also noteworthy
is his last book Invariances (2001), which deals with the foundations of
epistemology. Nozick received the National Book Award for Anarchy, State
and Utopia.
In Nozick’s view, the ultra-minimal state is, however, not a morally defensible
end state. The reason is that the agency having the monopoly of the means of
protection is providing its services to only those willing and capable of paying
for them. Therefore, Nozick argues, one more step in the process of state forma-
tion is needed to make the end result morally defensible. This is one where all
individuals get equal protection from the dominant protective agency regard-
less of their payments. Once this step is taken, we have reached the minimal
state: a night-watchman state enforcing property rights and securing the personal
freedoms of its citizens. Up to this point the process is morally defensible, but
anything beyond it is not, says Nozick. In particular, all activities related to
redistribution of values from individuals or groups to other individuals or groups
are not morally defensible in this theory.
Nozick’s theory is consistent with another, more economically motivated view,
namely Olson’s account of the process of ‘rational monopolization of theft’
(Olson 1991, 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996). Olson argues that in an anar-
chical original position it is to be expected that there are individuals who see it
advantageous for themselves to rob other people’s harvests and other products
instead of – or in addition to – engaging in productive activities themselves. The
social class of roving bandits is based on this utility calculus. However, given
the ever-present risk of losing one’s harvest or other output of production, the
productive population is unlikely to produce a whole lot to steal. Thus, even
banditry is unlikely to be a highly profitable source of income. Olson argues that
in time some bandits realize that they can maximize their profits by not stealing
their victims’ entire livelihood, but leaving them enough resources to continue
their productive activities so that the bandits, upon returning at some later point
in time, may find some new products to steal. Of course, the returning bandits
have to make sure that they are the only robbers visiting these victims. The best
way to guarantee this is to become a stationary bandit. The crucial characteris-
tic of these kinds of bandits is that they possess the monopoly over the means
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of violence in the area under their control. Thereby they become the dominant
protective organization, in Nozick’s terminology.
Olson emphasizes the economic motives behind the formation of the ultra-
minimal state. The people who produce benefit from stationary as opposed to
roving banditry, since the former leaves them enough resources to continue pro-
duction – and, indeed, if rational, so much resources that the production capacity
is maximized – while the latter would leave them empty-handed. But the bandits
also benefit from becoming stationary since they now have a reasonably steady
stream of income instead of an unpredictable one. The parallelism of interests
between those with coercive power and their subjects does not end with station-
ary banditry. McGuire and Olson construct a model of an economy where the
interests of those in power are largely consistent with the interests of the society
and those subject to the power. The consistency is the larger the more encom-
passing are the interests of the power-holder. When these interests are sufficiently
encompassing, McGuire and Olson (1996: 74) argue that the power-holder treats
‘those subject to its power as well as it treats itself.’ This is a result of utility
maximization of the power-holder.
The key concept is that of encompassing interest. Whenever an individual
or group has an encompassing interest in a society, it is ipso facto inter-
ested both in its share of the gross national product (GDP) of the society
but also in the size of the GDP. Groups with limited interests, on the other
hand, are typically maximizing their utility by maximizing their share of
the GDP.56
This argument makes no distinction between autocracies and democracies, i.e.
between systems governed essentially at the will of one person or a clique and
those where all citizens have a role in determining the composition of the bodies
enacting laws and enforcing the most important policy decisions. This means
that in both types of systems the economic interests of the rulers are to a large
extent consonant with those of the ruled. The end result is proportional taxation
of incomes, that is, no income redistribution among citizens. This result is also
largely the same – although mathematically more elaborated – than the upshot
of Nozick’s theory.
Nozick’s and Olson’s theories do not invoke any other normative elements
except the economic one: utility maximization. There is no benevolence involved,
but no sheer malevolence either. States that provide decent living conditions for
everyone regardless of their productive capabilities seem to be at odds with the
views of Nozick and Olson. Similarly at odds are kleptocracies or robber states
which bear close resemblance to roving banditry. The latter exemplify rulers who
do not have encompassing interests in the society. This may be due to general
instability of the system, external threats or – God forbid – irrationality of the
power-holders.
But there are distinctly normative theories of state as well. Indeed, many
people would instinctively think that the states and/or governments exist in order
to establish and maintain certain norms.
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9.2 A just state
Undoubtedly best-known modern normative theory of the state precedes Nozick’s
theory in time. In fact, the latter was intended as a criticism and refutation of
Rawls’s (1971) normative theory. This theory belongs to the tradition of contract
theories. The defining characteristic of contract theories is that they envision
states emerging as a result of voluntary contract between the individuals in an
original position which in the case of Rawls is ‘Hobbesian’, i.e. a war of all
against all. Rather than looking for processes that might lead to the emergence
of state in this situation, Rawls sets out to find the rules that rational individuals
would voluntarily agree upon as guidelines for their cooperation.
Principles voluntarily agreed upon are, however, not necessarily just. To the
extent that the original position immediately preceding the agreement is biased –
e.g. in resource allocation – one cannot expect voluntary agreement to correct this
bias. If, for example, two persons are about to make a contract about principles of
compensation for labor and if in the original position one of them has a control
over both actor’s food supply, one can expect that the contract will likely be
biased in the controlling actor’s favor. Hence, Rawls introduces the concept of
‘justice as fairness’ by which he means that contracts voluntarily agreed upon by
rational actors in unbiased original position must be viewed as just in virtue of
being entered into under fair conditions. This leads to the question of what is a
fair original position.
The crucial feature of the original position is the veil of ignorance which
means that the actors do not know their future position in the society to be
established. They do not know even their own characteristics as these might
condition their preference regarding principles of justice. Indeed, the list of facts
of themselves that the individual are not supposed to know is fairly extensive:
tastes, wealth, generation to which they belong and so on (Mueller 2003: 599).
Rawls argues that any principles of division of rights and duties voluntarily agreed
upon under the veil of ignorance is fair because of the unbiasedness of the original
position. By the same token, these agreements are just. This gives the theory the
characterization: justice as fairness. It is not thereby claimed that the prevailing
norms of justice were results of such a bargaining, but the construct of a fair
original position has an important role to play in evaluating existing norms. Any
observed norm that could conceivably have been a result of a contract agreed
upon by rational actors behind the veil of ignorance, can be deemed justified.
Thus, the theory provides us a benchmark for comparing existing norms.
The principles of justice that, according to Rawls (1971: 60–62), emerge in
the fair original position under veil of ignorance are the following:
1. each individual is to have right to the most extensive basic liberty that is
compatible with other individuals having similar liberty,
2. social and economic inequalities are to be such that:
• one can reasonably expect them to benefit all, and
• they are attached to positions that are open to all.
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So, liberty and equality are the basic norms which according to Rawls will
be chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Of these, the latter has received the
most attention. In particular, the rendering that Rawls gives to the requirement
that inequalities, if justified, should be to the benefit of all. This interpretation
is known as the difference or maximin principle. It says that in order to be
justified the inequalities should benefit the worst-off individuals of the society.
This criterion allows for ordering of social states or political systems. Suppose
that there are two systems, A and B, so that the welfare level of the worst-off
individual in A is strictly higher than the welfare of the worst-off individual in B.
The difference principle will then strictly prefer A to B regardless of the welfare
levels of other individuals. Applying this principle consecutively leads to maxi-
mizing the welfare of the individual with the minimum income or possessions.
Hence, the term ‘maximin principle’.
The difference principle contains a lexicographic ordering (Mueller 2003:
600). One first looks at the welfare levels of the worst-off individuals. Should
these be the same in A and B, one then focuses on the next to worst-off
individuals. If their welfare is higher in B than in A, then B is to be preferred.
If even these levels are identical in A and B, one then moves on to individuals
whose welfare level is third-lowest and so on.
Rawls’s principles of justice are listed in the order of their priority in the theory.
In fact, the order of principles themselves is lexicographic. In other words, when
comparing systems or states, one first considers principle 1 (maximal liberty to
all) and only in those cases where the systems or states do not differ in terms of
this criterion is the second principle invoked. This gives the theory a distinctively
‘liberal’ outlook (Barry 1973). Whenever a distinction can be made with regard to
the amount of liberty between systems or states, the preference in terms of justice
is thereby determined and in a sense the second principle is entirely redundant.
Thus, no matter how high the level of welfare of the worst-off individual in
system B, system A is more just in the sense of Rawls if the liberty it allows its
citizens to enjoy is even infinitesimally larger than that of system B.
Brian Barry (born 1936) is a British political and moral philosopher. He has writ-
ten extensively of justice, rights and politics. His best-known works are Political
Argument (1965), Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (1970), Justice as
Impartiality (1995) and Culture and Equality (2001). In 2001 he was awarded
the Johan Skytte Prize in political science.
The difference principle may lead to somewhat bizarre conclusions. Consider,
for example, the possibility that in system A all individuals have the same level
of welfare, say w̄ and that in system B one individual has the welfare level that is
almost the same as w̄, but just barely recognizably lower. All others in B enjoy
levels of welfare much higher than w̄. Now the difference principle would deem
A preferable to B.
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Examples like this make the utilitarian principle look more plausible. This
principle determines the preference between A and B in terms of the sum or
average of welfare levels of the individuals in these two systems. Whichever
system has the larger sum or average is preferred to the other. In the preceding
example this would make B more ‘just’ than A. The utilitarian principle can
also lead to intuitively questionable results. Consider two systems, C and D,
with populations of equal size. Suppose that in the former the population is
partitioned into two homogeneous classes C1 and C2. C1 consists of people who
live in luxury, while those in C2 have to endure extreme poverty. In system D,
on the other hand, all people live under comfortable, if not luxurious, conditions.
As long as the sum of utilities of the individuals in C exceeds the corresponding
sum in D, the utilitarian principle ranks C higher than D. The difference principle,
in contrast, prefers D to C.
9.3 Redistribution and rent seeking
The literature on social justice is extensive, but our focus on Nozick and Rawls
can be defended on the grounds that these two represent in some ways two
principal views on the nature of justice and government. In Nozick’s view it
makes no sense to discuss and evaluate social states in terms of justice. Justice,
in his view, is not something that characterizes states. Looking merely at a
distribution of possessions, rights and duties at a given point in time is simply
not sufficient for an evaluation of their justice. One needs a historical record and,
more specifically, an account of how these possessions, rights and duties have
come about. In Nozick’s theory a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to those
possessions, rights and duties that she has in that distribution. Justice is about
entitlements or principles of acquisition (production, exchange) and transfer.
Rawls’s principles, on the other hand, are applicable to the evaluation of
social states, that is, distributions as such. Provided we are able to spot the
worst-off individual,57 we are immediately able to compare the systems. The
central difference between Rawls and Nozick is, however, the fact that the former
presents a normative theory, while the latter sets out to outline the moral limits
of government activity. Protection against theft and enforcement of contracts are
within those limits, while redistribution is not. Rawls’ theory, on the other hand,
is all about redistribution.
Reducing externalities is one of the tasks of governments. The citizens may,
however, disagree as to how one should go about it. Tullock (2005: 29–30)
points out that it is an oversimplification to argue that governments carry out
actions agreed upon by citizens. Very often there is no consensus regarding the
action that should be taken in reducing externalities. Indeed, it may happen that
there is no consensus even about the existence of an externality. For example,
a person drinking alcohol while sitting on a bench in a public park next to the
playground for children is likely to create a negative externality for the parents of
those children, but the person herself may see no such externality. Governments
are needed to carry out actions not agreed upon by everyone. Moreover, the
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externality reduction may result in redistribution of welfare. The person evicted
by the police from the bench probably experiences her welfare being reduced,
while the parents’ level of welfare is improved by the government action.
By definition governments engage in coordinating economic and political
activities through legislation and other norm setting actions. A vast network
of norms guides economic activities in most countries of today. Typically these
norms can be justified on public interest grounds. For example, the existence of
legislation against fraud is likely to encourage people to conduct business trans-
actions thereby invigorating economic activities which, in turn, create wealth and
prosperity. Hence, the legislation is in public interest. However, there are also
norms, even legislative ones, that are socially wasteful. Some of these relate
to rents. These are defined as ‘benefits that a person receives beyond what
is necessary to provide incentives to perform particular tasks’ (Hillman 2003:
447). A typical example of the benefits are monopolist’s profits. These are very
often in excess of those ensuing from competitive pricing. The behavior aiming
at securing rents (such as achieving the status of monopolist or monopsonist)
is called rent-seeking.58 Basically all activities aiming at restriction of com-
petition can be viewed as rent-seeking. For example, labor legislation, tariffs,
standardization – all typical public sector activities – are of interest to those
organizations that seek rents for their members. Governments in the wide sense
of the word are important arenas for rent-seeking activities, as can be observed
in the extensive networks of contacts established by lobbying organizations with
cabinet ministers, MPs and government officials.
So, governments’ role in reducing externalities may sometimes be accompa-
nied with creating new ones. By solving problems of coordination, e.g. through
legislation and thus reducing or removing externalities the state may give rise to
new externalities in the form of rent-seeking. Governments also engage in public
policy making. We shall now turn to evaluating these policies.
9.4 Suggested reading
Both Nozick’s (1974) and Rawls’s (1971) theories have provided inspiration
to a wide range of scholarly publications. Before dwelling on this secondary
literature, it is advisable to study the original texts in some detail. Barry (1973)
and (1989) together with Daniels (1975) offer a variety of criticisms of Rawls’s
theory. Rawls has later on returned to his theory. Indeed, Rawls (2005) modifies
and continues the themes of Rawls (1971) by taking into account and responding
to the criticisms leveled against the latter. The libertarian view of the state is
spelled out and elaborated in Buchanan (1975, 1991a and 1991b). Kolm (1996)
gives a comparative overview of theories of justice. Morris et al. (2004, parts I–II)
contains several relevant articles on the emergence and design of institutions.
10 Aspects of policy evaluation
Over the past decades public sector institutions have, to an unprecedented extent,
been subjected to evaluations.59 This has also been the case in institutions of
higher learning, where evaluations have traditionally been restricted mainly to
academic posts and scholarly publications. Although the methods discussed in
this chapter apply to evaluation in any field of public policy, we shall illustrate
them using universities as examples. Today it is common that not only individual
scholars and publications but universities and schools as a whole are objects of
evaluation. The typical method is still based on peer reviews. The evaluation
process has several phases consisting of setting the goals of evaluation, gathering
the review board, self-evaluation of the unit to be focused upon, etc.
Also in research funding organizations peer reviews are widely used both
in project and candidate evaluations. When evaluations are repeated at regular
intervals, it is customary to resort to explicit criteria to assure that the evaluation
is made according to a reasonably stable set of characteristics of the applicants
or projects. Peer reviews thus take on the form of multiple-criteria decision
making augmented with group decision making, since the evaluators typically
work in groups. In normal cases, the group strives at forming a common stand
on the projects to be funded or applicants to be appointed to research posts. The
process within review groups consists of two stages: one in which each group
member forms an opinion on the alternatives (projects, candidates, etc.) and one
in which the group, through voting or bargaining, forms a collective opinion of
the alternatives.
This pattern is common in other evaluation contexts as well. In this chapter
the focus is on the first stage of the process, i.e. the stage in which the alterna-
tives are evaluated according to the criteria that are deemed relevant. We shall
discuss some counterintuitive phenomena that can be encountered at this stage
of policy evaluation. The main goal is to show that, despite their widespread use,
certain methods of deriving policy recommendations on the basis of empirical
data should be used – if at all – with caution.
10.1 Deciding the number of criteria
In the evaluation of institutions of higher learning there are certain ‘obvious’
criteria, such as the level of research and teaching, that have to be included in
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any meaningful evaluation. Similar obvious criteria can be found in nearly all
institutional evaluations. The lists of criteria seem, however, to have a tendency
to grow, sometimes for quite plausible reasons. Often new criteria are introduced
in order to enhance the accuracy and descriptive power of the evaluations. For
example, the research performance criteria of universities nowadays often include
measures of networking of scholars in addition to the more traditional indices of
academic research output. The introduction of new criteria is often justified by
referring to the opportunities for giving a more nuanced picture of the units under
consideration. Similarly, the evaluation boards are often augmented with new
members in order to include more relevant aspects of units in the evaluations.60
This process is, however, accompanied with the problem of how to form an
overall assessment of the units to be evaluated on the basis of a multiplicity of
criteria. We are confronted here with the problem of information aggregation or,
more specifically, with the problem of choice of the right aggregation method.
When our task is to choose the best alternative, it is possible to utilize methods
based on the majority rule or principle. With two alternatives this principle does,
indeed, work without complications (May 1952; Plott 1976; Lagerspetz 2002).
It is, after all, natural to choose the alternative ranked first by more criteria
of performance than the competing alternative. The plausibility of this choice
depends, however, on the assumption that each criterion is given the same weight
in the evaluation.
10.2 Majorities, positions, weights
With more than two alternatives the majority principle loses its precise meaning.
As an extension of this principle, one could think of the plurality rule, which
considers best the alternative that is ranked first on more criteria than any other
alternative. There is another way of extending the majority principle: one could
require that the alternative that in pairwise contests with all other alternatives is
ranked higher than its competitor on a majority of criteria should be considered
best. These two extensions are not equivalent: the best alternative in the plurality
sense may not be the best in the pairwise sense. A classic example is Borda’s
voting paradox (see Table 7.2 in chapter 7). We are thus led to ask whether the
unit ranked first on more criteria than any other unit should be given priority,
or whether priority should be given to a unit that in a pairwise contest with any
other unit would be ranked higher by more than half of the criteria.
At first sight one could look for the answer in the weighting of criteria, but, alas,
the problem remains. To take a hypothetical example from university evaluation,
consider a case where three criteria have been invoked: the level of research,
the quality of teaching and the external impact of the university. Let us assume
that our evaluator has decided to give these criteria the weights 7, 5 and 4,
respectively. Three units are under scrutiny: A, B and C. These are ranked on
the three criteria as in Table 10.1.
In terms of the weights given to criteria, A is the best unit, followed by B,
and C is the last. In pairwise contests A, however, is defeated by B with weight
scores 7 to 9 and by C with identical scores. C, on the other hand, defeats B with
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Table 10.1 University evaluation with weighted
criteria




weights 11 to 5. Thus, C defeats both A and B if the above weights are given
to the criteria. C is the Condorcet winner. We conclude that giving weights to
criteria does not solve the conflict between the plurality and pairwise principles.
The plurality principle pays attention to how the alternatives are positioned in
the rankings defined by each criterion. The principle, however, utilizes only a
very limited amount of this positional information, that is, only the first ranks
count. Still, the plurality principle is a positional one in the sense that the position
of each unit in the ranking that results from overall evaluation is determined solely
by the position of that unit in each criterion’s ranking.
There are many other positional rules. Let there be k alternatives and let w =
(w1, . . . , wk ) be a vector so that wi is the score assigned to the alternative ranked
ith and wi ≥ wj whenever i < j. In other words, higher ranked alternatives are
given larger scores than lower ranked ones. Any such vector w defines a positional
rule in which the ranking of alternatives is determined by the total scores. The
latter are the sums of scores that each alternative obtains from its rank in each
criterion. Thus, the Borda count is the positional rule: wB = (k−1, k−2, . . . , 1, 0).
In the hypothetical example above, the overall ranking on the basis of the
Borda count would be C(AB), i.e. C is ranked first followed by A and B, which
obtain the same score. The antiplurality rule gives all positions except the last one
the same number of points, i.e. 1. More formally, the antiplurality rule is defined
as wAP = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0). In this example this rule results in the ranking CBA.
Thus, plurality, antiplurality and Borda rules result in different overall rankings.
The outcome of the evaluation may thus crucially depend on the choice rule
rather than on the merits of the units under investigation.
10.3 Changes in alternative sets
In academic evaluations as well as in public policy, the set of alternatives
may undergo changes during the evaluation process. Funding applications may
be cancelled, the evaluation may involve stages where some alternatives are
eliminated, etc. It would, of course, be desirable that the aggregation rule behave
in a reasonably consistent way during these stages.
Unfortunately this may be too much to ask, at least insofar as the positional
rules are concerned. Saari (1989) shows that nearly anything can follow from
the elimination of one or several alternatives in the course of applying posi-
tional aggregation rules. More precisely, the positional rules do not satisfy binary
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consistency. This requirement pertains to preferences in subsets of alternatives.
It states that for any subset of alternatives the aggregated preference ranking has
to coincide with the ranking obtained by considering the aggregated ranking for
the set of all alternatives and ignoring all but those alternatives in the subset
under study. Thus, for example, the aggregated preference ranking between A
and B has to be the same when the subset {A, B} is considered as the ranking of
A relative to B in the set {A, B, C}.
The example introduced in the preceding section illustrates binary consistency.
Considering the entire set of three alternatives and assigning each criterion the
weight specified above, the aggregated ranking using the plurality rule is ABC.
Assuming that C is not a legitimate alternative (e.g. the proposal C is withdrawn
from the contest), the plurality ranking between A and B becomes BA. If B is
withdrawn, the aggregated preference between A and C is reversed into CA. If A
is withdrawn, the ranking between B and C becomes CB. Thus, all binary prefer-
ence rankings contradict the one obtained when considering the ‘global’ ranking
ABC. This shows that the plurality rule does not satisfy binary consistency.
Saari’s result is a generalization of Fishburn’s (1981). Fishburn considers a
situation involving four alternatives and several criteria. Upon eliminating an
alternative and holding the relative positions of the other alternatives fixed, he
observes that, when the Borda count is used, the preference ranking between the
remaining three alternatives may be completely reversed. Saari’s result extends
this possibility to all positional procedures.
Positional rules, thus, seem sensitive to changes in alternative sets. Arrow’s
(1963) independence of irrelevant alternatives as well as Chernoff’s (1954) con-
dition can be viewed as attempts to avoid this kind of sensitivity (see Aizerman
and Aleskerov 1995; Plott 1976). Chernoff’s condition requires that if something
wins in a set of alternatives, it should also win in each subset it belongs to.
Positional procedures have, however, properties that come pretty far in compen-
sating for the lack of binary consistency. It is also worth pointing out that both
independence of irrelevant alternatives and Chernoff’s condition are extremely
rare among aggregation procedures. In particular, the binary procedures that are
used in practice fail on these conditions.
10.4 Close and yet so far
Most straightforward to conduct are evaluations where the units end up in iden-
tical preference rankings on each criterion. In these cases the overall ranking
naturally coincides with the one appearing on each criterion. Also in those situa-
tions where a given unit is placed first on each criterion, it would seem plausible to
rank this unit first in the overall evaluation. This plausible requirement is known
as the respect for unanimity (Baigent 1987). It requires that a unit or project
ranked first on every criterion should also be first in the overall evaluation. It is
difficult to envision an aggregation rule that does not satisfy this requirement.
Equally natural are requirements that amount to excluding discrimination for or
against certain alternatives or criteria. Let us impose yet another requirement
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on aggregation rules, namely that small changes in criterion-wise evaluations are
accompanied by no more than small changes in overall evaluations. This require-
ment is known as preference proximity (Baigent 1987). It amounts to insisting
that if small mistakes are made in measurements on one criterion, this does not
result in dramatic changes in the overall assessment.
The preference proximity requirement is quite a desirable property since
it guarantees a degree of stability in the choice process. Baigent (1987)
shows, however, that no aggregation rule that respects unanimity and is non-
discriminating can satisfy preference proximity. In other words, in all unanimity
respecting and non-discriminating procedures, it may happen that small measure-
ment errors in criterion rankings lead to large changes in overall assessments.
The following example illustrates this (Nurmi 2002: 76–78).
Two universities, A and B, are being evaluated. Two criteria are invoked: the
level of research and the level of teaching. Assume that the true rankings are
those presented in Table 10.2.
Suppose that in measuring the performances of units on the first criterion, we
make a minor error in reporting so that Table 10.3 ensues.
Had we made a mistake in measuring both criteria, we would have had
Table 10.4.
Clearly, Table 10.4 results from a large mistake since basically all true values
are reported in an erroneous manner. We show now that the distance of the true
Table 10.2 University evaluation: true
rankings
Level of research Level of teaching
A B
B A
Table 10.3 University evaluation: small
mistake
Level of research Level of teaching
B B
A A
Table 10.4 University evaluation: large
mistake
Level of research Level of teaching
B A
A B
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evaluation result from overall evaluation outcome involving a small mistake is in
fact larger than the distance from the former to the overall evaluation involving
a large mistake. In other words, a small mistake brings about large consequences
in overall assessments.
We denote the distance between two rankings i and j by d(i, j). With the aid of
this, we define the distance between two measurement profiles (tables) I and J,
denoted by D(I , J ), so that it equals the sum of criterion-wise distances. Thus, the
distance between Tables 10.2 and 10.3 above is the sum of the distance between
Tables 10.2 and 10.3 on level of research criterion and of the distance between
these profiles on the level of teaching criterion. We notice that
D(10.2, 10.3) = d(AB, BA) + d(BA, BA).
Since d(BA, BA) = 0, we have D(10.2, 10.3) = d(AB, BA).
Similarly,
D(10.2, 10.4) = d(AB, BA) + d(BA, AB).
We now focus on the distances between evaluation outcomes in these displays.
Let g(i) be the overall evaluation outcome in profile i, that is, a ranking of
units resulting from the evaluation. Assuming that the aggregation rule is non-
discriminating, we see that g(10.2) = g(10.4) since these two profiles differ only
in terms of the labels of criteria, i.e. interchanging columns in Table 10.2 leads
to Table 10.4 and vice versa. From the assumption of respect of unanimity, it
follows that g(10.3) = BA.
Consider now d(g(10.2), g(10.3)) vis-à-vis d(g(10.2), g(10.4)). The former
denotes the distance between the evaluation resulting from true values and the
evaluation in which a small measurement error has been made, while the latter is
the distance between the true evaluation and the one resulting from a large error.
Now the latter distance is obviously 0, while the former must be larger than
that, since one of the criterion rankings has been inverted. In other words, the
distance between the overall evaluations in Tables 10.2 and 10.3 is larger than
the corresponding distance between Tables 10.2 and 10.4. This shows that aggre-
gation rules satisfying non-discrimination and respect for unanimity may lead to
assessments where small errors lead to larger errors in overall evaluations than
large errors.
In the preceding we have considered a very large class of aggregation rules,
namely those that are non-discriminating and respect unanimity. To take a closer
look at the significance of measurement errors, we shall now focus on a subset of
this class, non-monotonic rules. This subset consists of many multi-stage voting
procedures, e.g. plurality runoff. From the viewpoint of policy evaluation, the
interest of non-monotonic rules is in their unexpected reaction to certain types of
measurement errors. An error that is favorable to an alternative in the sense of
giving it a higher rank, ceteris paribus, on certain criteria than it would rightly
deserve, may exclude it from the set of winners where it would belong without
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Table 10.5 Plurality runoff rule in evaluation: true
rankings




the error. Let us illustrate this possibility with an example involving 17 criteria
and 3 units: A, B and C (Table 10.5).61
When the plurality runoff system is applied, one first finds out whether one
of the alternatives has been ranked first by more than 50% of the criteria, i.e. on
at least 9 criteria. Obviously this is not the case in our example. One then
proceeds by eliminating the alternative that is ranked first by the smallest number
of criteria. This is C. On those criteria where C is ranked first, the second ranked
alternative is lifted to the top rank. One then checks whether some alterna-
tive has now more than half of the first ranks. Clearly B has. It is, thus, the
winner.
Assume now that in evaluating the units A, B and C one has made a small
mistake in B’s favor: on two first criteria B has been accidentally ranked ahead
of A and C. Thus, the above ‘real’ situation has been falsely reported as in
Table 10.6.
In this perturbed setting A is first eliminated, whereupon C wins. Thus, the
measurement error that was in B’s favor turned out to be fatal for it: had the
error not occurred, B would have won, with the error it does not.
Non-monotonicity is a quite common flaw in multi-stage aggregation rules.
Positional rules are, however, basically immune to it.
10.5 One more criterion cannot do any harm, can it?
The criterion sets tend to grow with time. The reasons for this vary, but usu-
ally one justifies new criteria by the need to give a more nuanced picture of the
units at hand. Obviously strategic considerations also play a role: representa-
tives of units tend to introduce criteria that they believe will favor their units.
Table 10.6 Plurality runoff rule in evaluation: false rankings
Criteria 1–2 Criteria 3–6 Criteria 7–12 Criteria 13–17
B A B C
A C C B
C B A A
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When rules of forming overall assessments are based on pairwise unit compar-
isons, the introduction of new criteria may lead to counterintuitive consequences
in assessments. Thus, it is possible that the introduction of a criterion on which
unit A would be first ranked might lead to an outcome that ranks A lower than
if the criterion had not been invoked. It may even happen that A would become
first ranked in the overall assessment if this criterion were not used, but lower
ranked if it were present. An example illustrates this (Table 10.7).
Table 10.7 Introducing new favorable criteria may backfire
Criteria 1–2 Criteria 3–5 Criteria 6–7 Criteria 8–9
A B C C
B C A B
C A B A
Let us assume that we form an overall assessment on the basis of pairwise unit
comparisons so that the winner in each comparison is determined by the number
of criteria favoring each of the alternatives: the alternative with more criteria in
its favor wins. We assume that the agenda of comparisons is such that first A is
confronted with B and then the winner of that comparison faces C. The winner
of the latter comparison is the overall winner.
With this method B first defeats A and then C, becoming thus the overall
winner. Let us assume that criteria 8 and 9 turn out to be defective so that they
are abandoned. Applying now only criteria 1–7 we observe that A defeats B in
the first comparison, but is defeated by C on the second one. Thus, C becomes
the winner. The counterintuitive fact is that C is ranked first by those very criteria
whose absence guarantees C’s victory.
It is thus possible that adding criteria that are in a most obvious way favor-
able to an alternative may, in fact, decrease the likelihood of that alternative
being chosen. The connection between criterion success and choice probability
becomes perverted. Unfortunately, this phenomenon is not a nuisance of just
a few aggregation rules, but it has been shown by Pérez (2001) that we may
encounter it when using almost any Condorcet extension, i.e. any rule that ends
up with the Condorcet winner when it exists. Positional rules, in contrast, are
immune to it.
There is another problem that relates to pairwise rules. This problem is analo-
gous to the one that may be encountered in positional rules with varying number
of alternatives. In pairwise rules, the problem emerges when the number of
criteria is varied. To illustrate, consider the following setting (Table 10.8).
If we look at the subset of criteria 4–6, 7–9 and 12–14, we observe that the
rankings on those criteria form a Condorcet cycle: A defeats C, C defeats B and
B defeats A, each with six criteria against three. In this subset of criteria, the
situation is entirely symmetric: no grounds exist of preferring one alternative to
the rest. There seems to be a perfect tie in this subset.
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Table 10.8 Introducing new criteria that exhibit a tie
Criteria 1–3 Criteria 4–6 Criteria 7–9 Criteria 10–11 Criteria 12–14
A A C B B
B C B C A
C B A A C
Table 10.9 Introducing new tied
criteria: the reduced profile




As a perfect tie does obviously not help us in making a choice, we can omit
these nine criteria in the overall assessment. The remaining part of the setting is
given by Table 10.9.
In this subset the choice is easy: A, since it is first ranked on more than
50% of the criteria. It is not only the Condorcet but also the plurality winner.
In the original 14-criterion setting, there was also a Condorcet winner, but it
was B. Thus, the removal of the intuitively unhelpful Condorcet cycle leads to a
change in the Condorcet winner. In contradistinction, both the Borda and plurality
winners remain the same in each setting. The pairwise rules seem to react in an
implausible way to a removal of intuitively meaningless criteria from the criterion
set. The analogy with the removal of alternatives in positional rules is obvious.
10.6 Forest and the trees
In the preceding we have focused on settings where a decision maker ranks the
units under scrutiny on various criteria. The way in which the ranking is arrived
at may vary a great deal. It may be based on a purely subjective and qualitative
assessment, but its background might as well be a property that is quantitative
and objectively measurable. In either case one may encounter problems that are
variants of Simpson’s paradox.62 The following example, based on Saari and
Sieberg (2001), illustrates the problem in a policy evaluation context.
Two universities, say A and B, experiment with a new incentive system to
encourage the faculty members to publish in top-tier scholarly outlets. In both
universities there is an experimental population consisting of those departments
where the new system is being applied and a control population of those depart-
ments where the system has not been introduced. It turns out that 1/3 of
experimental faculty members in A and 2/3 of experimental faculty members
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in B managed to have their research published in the intended outlets within a
given observation period. In the control populations the ratio was 1/4 in A and
1/2 in B. So, the relative publication frequency was higher in the experimental
than in the control populations in both universities. However, when looking at the
faculty population as a whole (i.e. adding up the faculty members of A and B),
it turns out that the relative publication frequency is higher in the control than in
the experimental population. Thus, considering the two universities together, the
incentive system seems to fail to produce the intended results. Yet, in both univer-
sities the incentive system seems to work, i.e. to increase publication frequency.
How is this possible?
Let K(A) and K(B) denote the experimental populations in A and B, respec-
tively. Similarly, L(A) and L(B) denote the control populations in A and B. The
ratios mentioned above imply that
2
3K(B) + 13K(A)




L(A) + L(B) (10.7)
What we have here is an instance of Simpson’s paradox. It is not the only
possible one, but there is a very large set of values of the variables K(A), K(B),
L(A) and L(B) that satisfy the above inequality (i.e. that expression (10.2) is larger
than (10.1)). One example can be constructed by choosing a number between 1/3
and 2/3, i.e. between the publication ratios in the experimental populations in A
and B. Let us take 2/5. We now set (10.1) equal to the selected value 2/5 and
solve for K(B) in terms of K(A) to obtain K(B) = 14K(A). Thus, for example,
values K(A) = 40 and K(B) = 10 will satisfy the inequality.
We next choose a number between 1/2 and 1/4, i.e. between the publication
ratios in the control populations of A and B, so that the number is larger than
2/5, the value we chose above. Let us choose 5/11. We now set (10.2) equal to
5/11 and solve L(B) in terms of L(A). We obtain L(B) = 4.5L(A). Thus we can
choose values L(A) = 10 and L(B) = 45. Thus, even if the incentive system were
efficient, we might well obtain the impression that it is not, if our experimental
and control populations are composed as in Table 10.10.
The composition reveals that the control group consists predominantly of
university B faculty, while the experimental one has mostly A’s members. This,
together with the observation that the university B faculty seems to be much more
productive on the whole than its colleagues in A, explains why the aggregated
control population–experimental population comparison leads one to infer that the
incentive system does not work. The faculty population is not homogeneous as far
as its publication propensity is concerned and this is reflected in the contingency
tables.
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A paradox of more recent origin is related to converting cardinal scale
measurements into ordinal scale ones and using the latter in evaluating the
overall performance of units. Let us assume that three units A, B and C are
evaluated in terms of a cardinal measurable criterion.63 For concreteness, let the
cardinal measurable property be the average number of publications in scholarly
journals per faculty member in a calendar year. Units B and C resort to tradi-
tional uniform standard faculty compensation, while A adopts a production-based
compensation. Average productivity measurements are made at two time points
x and x + 3. Separate productivity measurements are made for international and
domestic journals.
Let the average productivity measures for international journals be:
Unit A Unit B Unit C
Year x 2.69 2.63 2.62
Year x + 3 2.74 2.71 3.00
For domestic journals we assume the following scores:
Unit A Unit B Unit C
Year x 2.89 2.81 2.80
Year x + 3 2.98 2.90 5.99
Expressed in ordinal numbers both of these tables take the form:
Unit A Unit B Unit C
Year x 4 5 6
Year x + 3 2 3 1
Sum 6 8 7
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In words, both in the light of international and domestic journal publications,
the ranking of the units is the same: C’s performance in year x+3 is best followed
by A’s record in the same year, etc.
Let us sum up the performance scores to obtain an overall measure of publica-
tion success. In terms of these sums of ordinal numbers the units can be ranked
in terms of productivity as ACB. This applies to both international and domestic
publications. Thus the new production-based compensation seems to have some
effect over both time periods.
However, had we tabulated the measurements simultaneously for all – i.e.
domestic and international – journals, we would have the following table of
ordinal numbers:





Now the ordinal number sums translate into the productivity ranking:
CAB. Thus, the production-based compensation scheme appears not to affect
productivity. Obviously our procedure of aggregating ordinal ranks is not consis-
tent. The policy recommendation seems to depend on the way the measurements
are aggregated: A does better than C both in domestic and international jour-
nals and, yet, it does worse than C when both classes of outlets are considered
simultaneously.
More precisely the procedure is not consistent under replication as defined by
Haunsperger (2003): a procedure is consistent under replication if the aggregate
of any k sets of data, all of which correspond to the given matrix of ranks, gives
rise to the same ordering of the candidates as does the matrix of ranks for any
positive integer k . Clearly in terms of productivity both in international and in
domestic outlets, we obtain the same matrices of ordinal numbers, but when
the data are looked at simultaneously for all journals, we have different overall
ranking.
The straightforward summing up of the rank numbers seems, thus, to ignore
information that would be essential to preserve consistency. But there are clearly
circumstances where the procedure does not lead to inconsistent outcomes. The
most obvious case is one where all data matrices are identical in cardinal numbers.
In such cases our procedure works without problems. But this is, of course, a
very special case. It is therefore worth asking if there are other circumstances that
guarantee consistency under replication. There are, but again the environments
are very restrictive. Haunsperger (2003) proves the following: a data matrix is
consistent under replication if and only if it is row-ordered. A word of explanation
is in order. A data matrix is simply a tabular organization of data in a given
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number of rows and columns. In the example above, we have seen 2×3 matrices,
since we had three units each characterized by two measurements of average
productivity. Now, a matrix of this type is row-ordered if the observations of
each unit or alternative can be arranged in an order so that every row of the
matrix gives rise to the same ranking of the units or alternatives.
The next matrix is an example of a row-ordered matrix. It is thus consistent
under replication.





We see that the order of magnitude of numbers in each row is the same:
unit 1 smallest, then unit 2 and finally unit 3. The next one, in contrast, is not
row-ordered.





Here the order is the same in each row except for the second one where unit 1
is followed by unit 3, while it is followed by unit 2 in other rows.
The conditions for consistency are, thus, highly restrictive: at each time point
the measurements have to yield an identical order of the cardinal values. This
means that the performance of the units in terms of the cardinally measurable
property has to define an identical order of priority at each time point.64
10.7 Voters are much the same as criteria
The problems discussed above are mainly extensions of voting paradoxes to
multi-criteria choice contexts. They show the basic similarity of social choice
and multi-criteria decision making. Since this chapter has primarily dealt with a
setting where a single decision maker is in charge of evaluating a set of units or
policy alternatives, this means that the problems in fact reappear in the ‘natural’
setting of voting theory, i.e. at the stage where several decision makers have
to come up with an evaluation. What we have seen is that the social choice
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paradoxes do not go away if collective decisions are replaced by those of a
benevolent dictator.
Although many facts reported above are of the notorious incompatibility
nature – i.e. one cannot have procedures with all nice properties – the main
message is constructive. Although serious problems exist, some of them can be
avoided or at least rendered less serious. Even in cases where little can be done,
the awareness of the problems may cast a shadow of healthy doubt on outcomes
that may, in fact, be arbitrary. To start from the number of criteria used in the
evaluations, it is often argued that the more criteria used, the richer the picture
one has of the entities being evaluated. At first blush, this makes sense, but
overlooks the new difficulty arising out of multiplicity of criteria, namely how
to weigh them? Obviously no general answer can be given, but it makes sense
to experiment with slightly different weights to see how much difference they
make in the ensuing overall evaluation outcomes.
The issue of positional versus pairwise procedures touches the very foundation
of preference aggregation theory and has been debated for more than two hundred
years. One upshot of the debate is the observation that while the positional proce-
dures are sensitive to changes in the policy alternative set, the pairwise systems
are similarly sensitive to changes in the criterion set. Obviously, in group decision
settings, both of these facts can be strategically utilized, but in individual policy
evaluations their significance is in calling attention to the essential importance
of focusing on all realistic alternatives and all important criteria (with proper
weights) and only them. Again experimentation with slightly enlarged or trimmed
alternative or criterion sets may help in estimating the robustness of one’s overall
evaluations.
Simpson’s paradox is explained by the inhomogeneity of various sub-
populations. As such, it casts doubt on any association observed in a large
population with possibly inhomogeneous parts. This paradox can also take the
form of suggesting – on the basis of an association found in all sub-populations –
that a connection between policy variables exists, when in fact this is not the case.
Simpson’s (1951) example is particularly instructive in this regard. The paradox
is particularly puzzling in areas where randomization and experimentation are
ruled out. The so-called ‘small-N’ methodology is obviously particularly vulner-
able to Simpson’s paradox.65 Again experimentation with varying subpopulations
may, whenever feasible, give hints about the reliability of the conclusions.
10.8 Suggested reading
The paradoxes that appear in inferring properties of a system from those of its
parts are illustrated by Ostrogorski’s and Anscombe’s paradoxes. These along
with some other similar paradoxes are discussed in Bezembinder and Van Acker
(1985), Daudt and Rae (1978), Lagerspetz (1995) as well as Nurmi (1997, 1999).
Saari and Sieberg (2001, 2004) provide a thorough analysis of the underlying
reasons. The connection between aggregation paradoxes and multiple-criteria
decision making is discussed in Nurmi and Meskanen (2000).
11 Homo œconomicus: should we let
him go?
The journey through the basic models of political economy reveals that the bulk
of these models is built on the assumptions that individuals have connected and
transitive preferences over alternatives and that all the action in political econ-
omy is about making choices. Taken together, these assumptions imply that
essential to political economy is maximizing behavior. As we saw in chapter 4,
homo œconomicus has been under attack for quite some time, but survived in
remarkably good shape. Much of the success of this model is due to the lack of
credible alternatives. If one abandons the assumption of rationality in the thin
sense, then the floodgates are open for nearly arbitrary explanatory accounts of
human behavior. If the systematic violations of rationality axioms are taken as
the point of departure – as e.g. in prospect theory – the simple elegance of the
axiomatic choice theory is lost and we are left with a bewildering variety of
theoretical systems which account for some particular types of violations of the
standard theory.
Homo œconomicus as a concept fits nicely in the tradition of thinking that Smith
(2005) – using Hayek’s (1973) term – calls constructivist rationality. The basic
tenet of this tradition is that social institutions are to be seen as results of con-
scious human reasoning. Whenever an institution appears, there is also an agent
who has consciously designed it. This tradition has its roots in the rationalist
philosophy. Smith contrasts this tradition with what he calls ecological ratio-
nality which allows for – and is particularly interested in – those institutions
which have rational characteristics and, yet, have not been designed by anyone.
The ecological rationality tradition investigates the preconditions and processes
of evolution or emergence of social systems out of interaction of individuals
and groups following their behavioral norms and strategies. These individuals
and groups may not have any idea of the order or system emerging out of this
interaction.
As characterized by Hayek and Smith the constructivist rationality seems
implausibly narrow. Admittedly there are institutions that have been designed
with certain desiderata in mind and which turn out to achieve those very desider-
ata. However, there are also institutional designs which bring about unintended
changes in other institutions. For example, the abandonment of trade barriers in
Europe over the past decades is changing the organization of the labor markets.
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Similarly, the establishment of the European Parliament and the growth of its
importance in the Union legislation will undoubtedly be reflected in the national
parliaments. So, the constructivist rationality represents an unduely narrow view
of institutions: very few of them – probably none – have been designed to their
last detail anticipating all effects on other institutions.
Accepting the ecological view of rationality presents new challenges to homo
œconomicus as a descriptive model. These are illustrated with the PD tournament
strategies discussed in section 5.4. The dominant strategy in a one-shot PD leads
to very low aggregated payoff in sequential PD tournaments. A population of
TFT players reaches a higher level of aggregated payoff than a population of
players resorting to the dominant strategy in each game. Obviously, TFT as a
general norm has a better survival capability than the dominant strategy.
The ecological rationality plays a central role in what is known as evolutionary
economics. As the term suggests this approach traces the over-time variation of
economic behavior, structures and – most importantly – institutions. It differs
from neoclassical economics not only in terms of rationality concept, but also
in the importance attached to equilibria (Young 1998: 3–6). Its focus is in pro-
cesses whereby standards, customs, norms and behavior patterns emerge over
time out of interactions between individuals going about their business not nec-
essarily realizing that what they are involved in is an institution building process.
Nevertheless, this approach does not do away with rationality as the primary pre-
dictor of individual activity. Instead of looking at one-shot or repeated games
with invariant rules, it focuses on adjustments of individuals and rules to external
shocks. So, the difference between neoclassical and evolutionary economics is
not in the former’s concentration on equilibria and short-term behavior, but in
the latter’s focus on out-of-equilibrium adjustments and learning processes that
eventually may lead to an equilibrium. Thus, even in evolutionary economics
homo œconomicus has a role to play.
Even the most ardent advocate of rationality in the axiomatic sense is likely
to admit that predictions based on player rationality are sometimes counter-
intuitive and burdened with a large body of contrary experimental evidence (see
Colman 2003). The best-known examples are one-shot and sequential PD games,
but also in Rosenthal’s (1981) centipede game and in several other settings the
game-theoretic solution methods, like backward induction, lead to implausible
outcomes.66 This has motivated the development of behavioral game theory
(Camerer 1997, 2003). It has some similarities with the ecological rationality
concept, but is not exclusively concerned with institutions. Instead, it looks for
principles of reasoning that would make the observed deviations from the game
theoretic predictions intelligible. The behavioral game theory is very much akin
to prospect theory and other similar attempts to account for the observed devia-
tions from the EU theory. Colman argues that the weakness of game theory is that
its concept of rationality as expected utility maximization defined in individual
decision settings does not readily apply to interactive decisions, i.e. those dealt
with by game theory proper. Yet, he is ready to admit that ‘game theory has vastly
increased our understanding of interactive decision making, and no alternative
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theory even comes close to challenging its power’ (Colman 2003: 152). Indeed,
the main value of game theory and its underlying concept of rationality is in its
relative simplicity and simultaneously in its explanatory and predictive power.
The latter is by no means universal, but provides a good benchmark for exper-
imental and, more generally empirical work. So, homo œconomicus continues
to be an important construct in the research on political economy. It is, after
all, primarily a model, and as such a useful approximation or idealization of
politico-economic agents of the real world. Experimental and other empirical
observations have occasionally cast a shadow on its usefulness in certain areas,
but due to its conceptual simplicity and intuitive plausibility it remains a useful
research tool in many other domains. Eventually, it is likely to be replaced by at
least as general and predictively more successful model, but at present no such
model is in sight.
Notes
1 Many a scholar pursues her research primarily in order to earn a living. This is also
a quite personal objective, but falls rather in the realm of labor economics than of
political economy.
2 There is a vast literature on the adequacy of Hempel’s views. See e.g. Achinstein
(1971), Collins (1966), and Scriven (1962). Treatises discussing the role of explanation
in philosophy of science include Achinstein (1983), Braithwaite (1953), Nagel (1961),
and Scheffler (1963).
3 Much has been written about the applicability of Hempel’s account to human sciences,
especially to historiography. See for example Dray (1957, 1968), Winch (1958), and
von Wright (1971).
4 Lest there be any confusion about the term, it should be mentioned that ‘F’ comes
from ‘Friedman’.
5 For example, the invasion of the allied forces in Normandy in June of 1944 was
preceded by deception landings along the western coast of continental Europe to
mislead the German forces as for the location of the imminent invasion.
6 To keep the example simple, we assume, perhaps unrealistically, that the inspectors
have no mercy, i.e. all passengers caught without a ticket will be charged 100 euros.
7 To keep the example reasonably transparent we overlook a number of considerations
that undoubtedly play a role in real life, such as, the embarrassment of the passenger
if caught without a valid ticket, the possibility of an increased fine in cases of repeated
rides without ticket, etc. Introducing these considerations to the passenger decision-
making calculus presents no major conceptual problems, but is unnecessary in an
illustrative example.
8 This condition is needed only in cases where the number of alternatives is infinite.
9 The proof of this as well as of the other representation theorem can be found in
Harsanyi (1977: 22–47).
10 We shall dwell on this point at some length in the next chapter.
11 For a more extensive discussion of the axioms as well as for the proof of the represen-
tation theorem, see Harsanyi (1977: 32–43). These axioms were originally presented
by Herstein and Milnor (1953).
12 More precisely, the second axiom imposes the following constraint on any three certain
outcomes A, B and C. Let I (B; A, C) denote the inferior probability set of B which
means that it consists of all those probability values p for which B  (A, p; C, 1 − p).
Similarly, S(B; A, C) is the set of those values of q for which (A, q; C, 1 − q)  B.
Assume that a sequence of values p1, p2, . . . converges to the value p0 and assume
also that B  (A, pi; C, 1 − pi) for all the values pi in the sequence. The requirement
that I (B; A, C) is closed amounts to that B  (A, p0; C, 1 − p0). The requirement that
S(B; A, C) be closed is formulated in an analogous manner.
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13 This axiom should not be confused with the independence of irrelevant alternatives
axiom which appears in social choice theory (Arrow 1963). Nor is it equivalent with
the independence axiom of Nash’s (1950) bargaining solution. We shall discuss both
of these concepts later on.
14 The paradox is, according to Daniel Bernoulli, last of the five problems his cousin
Nicolas Bernoulli submitted to mathematician Pierre Rémond de Montmort for solu-
tion (see Bernoulli 1968: 23). The term ‘St. Petersburg paradox’ is undoubtedly due
to Bernoulli’s affiliation with the Academy of Sciences of Imperial Russia in those
times located in St. Petersburg.
15 The paradox obviously does not depends on the currency. Ducat is the currency of the
original example.
16 One could argue that r1 is not a risky prospect since it can result in only one outcome.
It is definitely a very particular, indeed trivial, type of risky prospect. At the same
time it shows that all certain prospects can be represented as trivial risky ones.
17 It can be verified that an identical contradiction ensues if one chooses r2 rather than r1,
and r4 rather than r3.
18 We can assume that the ball picked in the first draw is returned to the jar so that the
number of balls remains the same in the two choice situations.
19 Similar examples can easily be invented. For example, assume that you would like to
buy mushrooms for cooking, but you do not know much about mushroom types.
Three persons X, Y and Z volunteer to supply you with the required amount of
mushrooms. The vertical dimension in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 represents the persons’
collecting efficiency (reflected in price) and the horizontal one their expertise in rec-
ognizing edible and poisonous types. Given that certain mushroom types are known
to be lethal, it would seem that the efficiency dimension is pretty irrelevant. Thus,
hiring ‘the compromise person’ or the one that dominates one of the others does not
seem rational at all.
20 An additional practical requirement is that the number of choices and stages of the
game are both small.
21 The last conclusion is, however, redundant since the fact that even one player
is better off by deviating from an outcome excludes it from the set of Nash
equilibria.
22 These types of games are discussed by many authors. For example, Hamburger (1979:
72) and Tsebelis (1989) use the same model in discussing the interaction between
speeding motorists and traffic controllers. Dutta’s (1999: 114–115) random drug test-
ing game for sports is also of the same strategic type. So is the classic matching
pennies game (Hamburger 1979: 12) as well as the best-known two-person zero-sum
game, i.e. the one that aims at modeling the crucial strategies of Admirals Imamura
and Kenney in a major Second World War naval battle that took place in the Pacific
war theater (see e.g. Nurmi 1998: 62–64).
23 In his article Selten calls this equilibrium perfect, but the term subgame perfect is
more informative and, therefore, more often used in the literature. See Binmore
(1987: 191).
24 We see that (cooperative, stay out) gives the chain store exactly the same payoff as
the latter outcome, but that does not disqualify (aggressive, stay out) from the set of
equilibria.
25 There are many similar examples in the literature. A relatively recent one is given by
Filippov et al. (2001: 215). Earlier variations of the same theme can be found in Riker
and Ordeshook (1973: 250–251), Hardin (1971, 1982) as well as Taylor and Ward
(1982).
26 In the analytic theory of the state this explanation is very common. See e.g. Birnbaum
et al. (1978). We shall return to this in later chapters.
27 In two-person games ‘the other players’, of course, reduces to one player.
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28 In addition to effectiveness and credibility, also rationality of the threat is an important,
albeit often trivial, requirement. It states that a successful threat improves the threat-
ener’s payoff from what it had been without compliance (Brams 1983: 131). Issues
related to threats in game theory are discussed extensively by Brams and his co-
workers; see e.g. Brams (1983); Brams and Hessel (1984); Brams (1990); Brams
(1994).
29 See e.g. Salonen and Wiberg (1987) for game classifications using various factors
affecting the rational behavior.
30 For a comprehensive discussion on games of incomplete information, see Aumann
and Heifetz (2002).
31 The Bismark Sea Battle game is a 2 × 2 zero-sum game with no Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. Its real world setting is a WWII naval battle involving Japanese naval
convoy and the US air force squadrons. The Japanese had to pass a large island using
either the northern or southern route. Using effective hours of bombing as the unit
of payoffs, it is natural to think of this battle as a zero-sum one. For more detailed
accounts, see Luce and Raiffa (1957: 64–65), and Brams (1975).
32 The axioms have been widely discussed. See for example Luce and Raiffa (1957),
Roth (1979), and Salonen (1985).
33 The line AC can be expressed as equality x + y = c where c is a constant. Thus all
quadrangles delineated by the horizontal and vertical axes as well as a point (x, y) in
the AC line have the area x × (c − x). Maximizing this gives the Nash solution. The
maximum value for the area is reached at x = c/2, that is, at the midpoint of AC.
34 Other interpretations have been given to the characteristic function. Sometimes it is
viewed as the value that S receives if its complement coalition N \S forms. See Riker
and Ordeshook (1973: 121–123).
35 A more stringent condition than cohesiveness is often imposed on characteristic func-
tions, namely that they be super-additive. This amounts to requiring that whenever
two disjoint coalitions join to form one coalition, the value of the new coalition is
never smaller than the sum of its constituent coalitions. Cohesiveness imposes this
requirement on just the grand coalition with respect to its sub-coalitions (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994: 258).
36 The magnum opus on Banzhaf and Shapley values and their applications is Felsenthal
and Machover (1998).
37 The voting weight distribution is the one that took force on 1 November 2004.
38 The index values have been computed using a program written by Tommi Meskanen.
The program can be accessed at http://powerslave.utu.fi/ and is maintained by Antti
Pajala. The vote distribution is from the Treaty of Nice.
39 Several other attempts to include player preference in the definition of voting power
have been made, see e.g. Napel and Widgrén (2002, 2004). For a critique of these
models, see Braham and Holler (2005).
40 This chapter is based on Nurmi (2003).
41 An important source book on the history of theory of voting is McLean and Urken
(1995), where the central texts of the Enlightenment era can be found in English
translation.
42 These solutions have been discussed by Nanson (1882). Nanson’s article is reprinted
in McLean and Urken (1995).
43 Hare’s system is a special case of the single transferable vote system (STV) used, for
example, in the Irish parliamentary elections. Hare’s system is in fact nothing but the
application of STV to single-member constituencies.
44 This definition assumes that the majority preference relation is complete and asym-
metric, that is, there is a unique winner in every pairwise comparison of alternatives.
In other words, there are no ties in voting outcomes. Allowing ties leads to somewhat
more complicated solution concepts (see Schwartz 1986).
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45 Despite the apparent edge this system gives to the chair, there are circumstances under
which she is disadvantaged with respect to the ordinary committee members. These
circumstances are known as the chairman’s paradoxes. See Farquharson (1969), Brams
et al. (1986) and Niemi et al. (1983).
46 The theorem has, furthermore, a technical restriction: it deals with singleton-valued
choice functions. Since most voting systems used in practice may result in a tie, it can
be argued that they do not fall into the domain of the theorem. It turns out, however,
that all commonly used voting systems are in fact manipulable (Nurmi 1984).
47 A function is monotone non-increasing if increasing the value of the argument is never
accompanied with an increase in the value of the function, i.e. the latter may either
decrease or remain the same.
48 It may happen that no candidate gets the majority of Electoral College votes. Rehnquist
(2004: 4) reports that this has occurred twice in the history of the US: in 1800 and
1824. The constitution provides that in these situations, the election be thrown to
the House of Representatives. And so it happened that in the former case Thomas
Jefferson and in the latter John Quincy Adams were elected.
49 See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Turnovec (2004) for arguments in support
of the Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices, respectively.
50 The notion of socio-political outcomes could also be questioned, but we shall bypass
it simply by assuming that they are what the individual and collective opinions,
preferences and decisions are aimed at.
51 In the modern literature it is common to use the term social choice correspondence
instead of social choice function. Hereby one emphasizes that the mapping from pref-
erence profiles to the alternative set may be one to many, that is, several alternatives
may be chosen for a given profile. Since we have defined social choice functions as
mappings from profiles into the set of subsets of alternatives, the concept of choice
function and choice correspondence amount to the same thing.
52 It is also possible that the Clarke taxes do not sum up the required amount. In these
cases, the way to proceed is to add to each individual tax an amount that is independent
on the reported values.
53 An extreme case is, of course, a war which typically is a government-organized activity
and inevitably leads to serious negative externalities in the form of loss of life and
property.
54 This original position differs from the ‘war of all against all’ situation, also known
as the Hobbesian jungle. The latter refers to the situation described in Hobbes’s
([1651]1982) Leviathan.
55 The terminology is obviously borrowed from Adam Smith who used analogous
reasoning in explaining the formation of the market equilibrium.
56 Olson (1982) applies this argument to Western economies after the Second World War
concluding i.a. that economies where the interest groups have encompassing interests
tend to have higher growth rates than those economies where more traditional and
narrowly defined interests are being pursued.
57 Not necessarily an easy task in practice (Harsanyi 1975).
58 According to Mueller (2003: 333) rents were first systematically discussed by Tullock
(1967), but the concept of rent-seeking was coined by Krueger (1974) somewhat later.
See also Buchanan (1980).
59 This chapter is based on Nurmi (2005).
60 It is becoming increasingly common to include people with business, especially mar-
keting, skills in the evaluation bodies in order to bring the entire life span of a scientific
finding, from the initial idea to the finished and marketable product, to the focus of
evaluation. Of course, the idea of a marketable product as a goal of scholarly work is
quite irrelevant in many fields of research work.
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61 The number of criteria may seem unrealistically large, but it is not larger than for
example the one used by the Commission of the European Union in assessment of
national research and innovation systems.
62 The paradox has been named after Simpson’s (1951) example, but earlier instances
have been found in the literature, see e.g. Cohen and Nagel (1934: 449). In Cohen
and Nagel’s example the paradox consists of the finding that in 1910 the death rate
from tuberculosis in two cities, New York City and Richmond, Virginia, was higher
in the latter than in the former, yet at the same time the corresponding death rates in
white and non-white sub-populations exhibited higher rates in New York. Simpson’s
example, in turn, shows that there are partitions of cards in a fair deck so that in both
subsets of cards there is an association between redness and plainness of cards. Yet
we know that in a fair deck no association exists in the deck as a whole.
63 This example is derived with minor modifications from Haunsperger and Saari (1991).
It can also be found in Haunsperger (2003).
64 The concept of consistency discussed here has a well-known analogue in the theory
of voting, see section 7.6 above and Young (1974). Many procedures are consistent,
e.g. plurality voting and the Borda count, but quite a few are not, e.g. plurality runoff
and the single transferable vote system.
65 Small-N refers to research settings where the number of units under investigation is
too small to allow for statistical techniques to be resorted to. See Lijphart (1971).
66 In the centipede game two players take turns in stopping or continuing the game.
The rules of the game specify a payoff for each player if the game is stopped at any
stage. In the beginning player 1 may stop the game whereupon both players get a zero
payoff. If she decides to continue, player 2 is in turn and can stop the game or continue
it. If she does the former, player 1 loses one unit, while player 2 gets 10 units. Provided
that player 2 continues, player 1 is now in turn and can either stop or continue the
game in the third stage. If she stops, both get 9 units. If the game continues player 2
can stop in the fourth stage whereupon she gets 19 and player 1 18 units. The game
continues so that at each stage one player may stop the game and if she does this,
she gets 10 units more than she would have received had the other player stopped the
game at the preceding stage. The player not stopping the game receives at each stage
1 unit less than her payoff would have been if she have stopped the game one stage
earlier. Obviously, the payoffs increase rather rapidly. So, if the player anticipates that
the other player does not stop the game, she is advised to continue the game herself.
However, if the other is expected to stop the game, then she is better off stopping.
Backward induction leads to the bizarre outcome that the first player stops the game
right at the outset.
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